Acela Roselle
About Acela Roselle
Acela Roselle, age 64, is Executive Vice President and Human Resources Director at Blue Foundry Bancorp/Blue Foundry Bank, a role she has held since 1999; she attended The Wood Business School (NY) and obtained a SHRM PHR certification through Fairleigh Dickinson University in 2000 . Company performance tied to executive incentives in 2024 included loan growth of $22.8 million (to $1.58B), deposit growth of $98.4 million (to $1.34B), and a net interest margin of 1.90% . As of year‑end 2024, non‑performing assets were 0.25% of total assets, tangible equity to tangible assets was 16.1%, and tangible book value per share was $14.74 . Since the IPO at $10 on Jul 15, 2021, BLFY’s share price was $9.02 on Apr 9, 2024 (‑9.8% over that period) . Ms. Roselle is recognized as a member of an underrepresented minority group on the executive team and received the NJ Bankers Excellence in Diversity award in Q1 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blue Foundry Bank | EVP & Human Resources Director | 1999–present | Long‑tenured HR leadership during the public company transition; the company emphasizes human capital, diversity and retention initiatives (executive team includes underrepresented minorities) |
| Meadowlands Hospital Medical Center | Employment Manager | Not disclosed | HR/Employment management experience prior to joining Blue Foundry |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed in company proxy materials | — | — | Executive biography sections list no public company directorships or external board roles for Ms. Roselle |
Fixed Compensation
- Individual cash compensation for Ms. Roselle is not disclosed; Blue Foundry’s detailed compensation tables cover only Named Executive Officers (NEOs) (CEO, CFO, CTO in 2024–2025) .
- For program context (NEOs): 2024 base salaries were $700,000 (CEO), $420,000 (CFO), and $355,000 (CTO) .
Performance Compensation
Executive incentive design (applies to executive officers broadly; specific targets disclosed for NEOs):
- Annual Incentive Plan metrics and weights: Net Loan Growth (25%), Net Deposit Growth (20%), Core Deposit Growth (10%), Net Interest Margin (25%), and Individual Performance (20%) .
- Long‑term equity under the 2022 Equity Plan: time‑based restricted stock (2024 grants vest over 6 years) and performance‑based restricted stock measured over a three‑year period (2024–2026) on Net Loan Growth, Net Deposit Growth, and NIM; earned shares convert to time‑based awards vesting over 4 years (beginning 2027) .
- 2023 performance‑based awards were not earned and were forfeited on Jan 1, 2024, reflecting strict pay‑for‑performance standards .
Annual incentive metrics and 2024 results (plan design reference)
| Metric | Weight | Target/Goal | 2024 Actual | Payout (by metric) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Loan Growth ($mm) | 25% | $100 at target | $22.8 | 0% |
| Net Deposit Growth ($mm) | 20% | $135 at target | $97.5 | 58% |
| Core Deposit Growth ($mm) | 10% | $70 at target | $(13.2) | 0% |
| Net Interest Margin (%) | 25% | 1.87% at target | 1.90% | 104% |
| Individual Performance | 20% | Discretionary | 150% | 150% |
Long‑term performance metrics for 2024–2026 PSUs (plan design reference)
| Metric | Weight | Performance Target |
|---|---|---|
| Net Loan Growth | 30% | $350 million |
| Net Deposit Growth | 40% | $400 million |
| Net Interest Margin | 30% | 2.84% |
Equity vehicles and vesting (plan design reference)
| Vehicle | Grant cadence | Vesting schedule |
|---|---|---|
| Time‑based RSUs | Annual (NEO example: Feb 1, 2024) | Ratable over 6 years (2024 grants) |
| Performance‑based RSUs | Annual (3‑year measurement) | 3‑year performance (2024–2026); if earned, convert to time‑based RSUs vesting ratably over 4 years beginning 2027 |
| Stock Options (2022 issuance) | One‑time post‑plan approval | Ratable over 7 years; 10‑year term; strike ≥ FMV; no repricing without shareholder approval |
Notes:
- Ms. Roselle’s individual award levels/targets are not disclosed; the tables reflect company plan design and NEO disclosures .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | Executive officers (other than CEO): 1x base salary; 5‑year compliance window; must hold at least 50% of net shares from vesting until meeting guideline |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers (no margin accounts or pledges) |
| Clawback | Clawback and supplemental Dodd‑Frank‑compliant clawback adopted; applies to incentive compensation upon restatement |
| Beneficial ownership (Roselle) | Not specifically disclosed in principal holders/management tables; NEO and director holdings are provided, but Ms. Roselle is not individually listed |
Employment Terms
| Element | Ms. Roselle |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Not disclosed for Ms. Roselle; CEO has an employment agreement; CFO has a change‑in‑control agreement; no comparable agreement is identified for Ms. Roselle in proxy filings |
| Severance/CIC | Not disclosed for Ms. Roselle (CEO: 1x salary+target bonus (without CIC) or 3x salary+bonus (with CIC); CFO: 3x salary+highest bonus (with CIC)) |
| Non‑compete / non‑solicit | Not disclosed for Ms. Roselle (CEO agreement includes 1‑year non‑compete and non‑solicit) |
| Garden leave / consulting | Not disclosed for Ms. Roselle – |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Strong long‑term retention tilt: equity vesting periods (6–7 years for time‑based awards; options vest over 7 years) and double‑trigger CIC provisions indicate retention and alignment emphasis rather than near‑term monetization .
- Tight pay‑for‑performance calibration: 2023 performance‑based awards forfeited; 2024 adopts 3‑year metrics with meaningful growth/NIM targets before any conversion to time‑based vesting, tightening realization to results .
- Risk controls: anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging, clawbacks, and blackout policies reduce misalignment/insider‑selling risk and strengthen governance .
Additional Context: Company Operating Indicators (Incentive Drivers)
| Metric (FY2024) | Result |
|---|---|
| Loan growth | +$22.8 million to $1.58B |
| Deposit growth | +$98.4 million to $1.34B |
| Net interest margin | 1.90% |
| Non‑performing assets/Total assets | 0.25% (at year‑end 2024) |
| Tangible equity/Tangible assets | 16.1% (at year‑end 2024) |
| Tangible book value/share | $14.74 (year‑end 2024) |
| TSR since IPO to 4/9/2024 | −9.8% ($10.00 IPO to $9.02) |
Investment Implications
- Retention risk: Low. Two‑plus decades of tenure (since 1999) and long‑duration equity structures across executives (6–7‑year vests; 3‑year PSU measurement + 4‑year service vest) favor continuity; no hedging/pledging allowed .
- Alignment: Positive. Stock ownership guidelines for executive officers (1x salary), clawback policies, and strict PSU gates (2023 forfeiture) underscore pay‑for‑performance discipline and downside alignment .
- Selling pressure: Limited by policy. Anti‑pledging and blackout policies reduce forced or opportunistic sales; individual Form 4 activity for Ms. Roselle was not detailed in proxy disclosures .
- Governance and shareholder sentiment: A shareholder proposal seeking a sale/merger highlights investor pressure on performance; while not executive‑specific, it elevates scrutiny of incentive design and execution across leadership, including HR‑related talent outcomes .
Net takeaway: While Ms. Roselle’s specific cash/equity levels are not disclosed, program design and policies point to strong retention and alignment features. For trading signals, watch vesting calendars under the 2022 Equity Plan, PSU achievement versus 2024–2026 targets, and any ensuing Section 16 filings; from a governance lens, anti‑pledge/hedge and clawbacks are positives, with execution risk tied to delivering loan/deposit growth and NIM expansion that drive incentive realizations .
