Ian Grieves
DMC GlobalAbout Ian Grieves
Ian Grieves is President and Managing Director of DynaEnergetics, a business unit of DMC Global (BOOM). He joined DynaEnergetics in January 2013 as SVP/GM and previously held senior operating roles at Lydall and AAF International; he studied economics at the University of Sunderland, U.K. . He is 56 years old . Under his leadership, DynaEnergetics revenue declined from $315.0M in 2023 to $287.7M in 2024 and adjusted EBITDA fell from $56.3M to $24.8M as industry pricing softened; consequently, his 2024 annual bonus paid out at 0% of target . Company-level pay-versus-performance disclosures show multi-year TSR underperformance into 2024 (PVP TSR value of $16.36 for a $100 base), contextualizing the shift in 2025 incentive design toward cash-flow and EBITDA .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| DynaEnergetics (DMC Global) | Senior Vice President & General Manager; later President & Managing Director | 2013–present | Led energy products business (DS perforating systems); segment revenue fell 9% in 2024 in a tough pricing backdrop . |
| Lydall Inc. | SVP, Performance Materials Division; VP & GM Europe, Filtration Division | 2006–2013 | Ran global performance materials and filtration businesses . |
| AAF International | Various financial/general management roles; VP & GM AAF Europe (2003–2005) | 1995–2005 | Led European operations for industrial filtration leader . |
External Roles
- None disclosed for Ian Grieves in BOOM’s 2024–2025 proxies (executive officer biography only).
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (currency shown) | $386,313 | €375,000 | €388,125 |
| Target Bonus (% of base) | n/a | 60% | 60% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid | $292,400 | €143,575 | €0 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan – 2024 (DynaEnergetics)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual 2024 | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 10% | $300M | $320M | $345M | $287.7M | 0% |
| SG&A % of Revenue | 20% | 10.0% | 9.3% | 8.3% | 11.1% | 0% |
| Adjusted EBITDA % | 20% | 16.7% | 17.5% | 18.8% | 8.6% | 0% |
| Cash Conversion Days | 30% | 120 | 112 | 100 | 143 | 0% |
| Individual Component | 20% | — | — | — | 0% (Committee determination) | 0% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | 0% (No annual bonus) |
Notes:
- Grieves’ target bonus remains 60% of base salary; for 2024 the company component is 80% of total target and individual is 20% for segment heads .
Long-Term Equity Incentives
| Grant Year | Grant Date | Instrument | Shares/Units | Key Terms | Grant-Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Feb 28, 2024 | RSUs | 13,392 | Vests 1/3 annually on each of first three anniversaries | $234,494 |
| 2024 | Feb 28, 2024 | PSUs | 13,392 | 3-year cliff; payout 0–200% based on relative TSR vs S&P SmallCap 600 Industrials; schedule provided | $325,693 |
| 2023 | Mar 14, 2023 | RSUs | 10,623 | Vests 1/3 annually over three years | $224,995 |
| 2023 | Mar 14, 2023 | PSUs | 10,623 | 3-year cliff; 75% relative TSR vs peer group and 25% Adjusted EBITDA | $314,783 |
| Prior | Feb 23, 2021 PSUs | PSUs | — | Achieved 200% on 3-yr Adjusted EBITDA but below-threshold TSR; net 50% of target PSUs vested for Grieves | — |
2025 design changes (context): PSUs shift to cumulative Adjusted EBITDA and cumulative Adjusted Free Cash Flow (50%/50% for DMC/DynaEnergetics/NobelClad) instead of 100% relative TSR; annual bonus company component shifts to cumulative Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted FCF for DynaEnergetics .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category (as of Mar 20, 2025) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Common Stock | 72,525 shares |
| Restricted Stock Units (unvested counted separately in ownership table) | 37,926 RSUs |
| Performance Share Units (excluded from “Common Stock” count) | 49,472 PSUs excluded |
| Total Beneficially Owned (Company table definition) | 110,451 shares (Common + RSUs + Deferred as applicable) |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | <1% |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | NEOs must hold stock equal to shares awarded over preceding 3 years (net of tax shares); all NEOs in compliance or within phase-in |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited for directors/officers/employees |
Outstanding unvested awards detail as of 12/31/2024 (illustrative):
- RSUs: 2,153 (3/2/2022, third-year vest), 7,082 (3/14/2023), 13,392 (2/28/2024) .
- PSUs: 6,460 (3/2/2022), 10,623 (3/14/2023), 13,392 (2/28/2024) .
Employment Terms
- Contract: DynaEnergetics Europe GmbH employment agreement (Jan 1, 2020; superseded 2013 deal); annual base, target bonus 60%; non-compete and non-solicit during employment and for two years post-termination; non-compete compensation equals 50% of fixed annual salary during the restricted period .
- Retention agreement (Feb 17, 2024): Up to €425,000 payable upon staged milestones tied to a DynaEnergetics sale process; €100,000 earned for 2024; €325,000 forfeited as deal milestones not met .
- Termination economics (illustrative at 12/31/2024):
- Involuntary termination without cause: six months’ notice pay and pro-rated bonus (based on guaranteed base pay at least $427,000 and target bonus $256,200); immediate vest of RSAs/RSUs; PSUs remain subject to performance for the original period (PSUs included at target for the table) .
- Death: three months’ salary and bonus; acceleration of RSAs/RSUs and PSUs at target .
- Example values shown in proxy (USD): Base $213,500; Bonus $128,100; Accelerated RSAs/RSUs $390,300; Total $731,900 (involuntary w/o cause). Death: Base $106,750; Bonus $64,050; Accelerated RSAs/RSUs $390,300; Total $561,100 .
- Equity plan change-in-control (plan-level): Generally double-trigger for assumed awards; if not assumed, immediate vest; performance awards vest pro rata based on actual (or target if not determinable) at CoC .
- Clawback: Company policy mandates recoupment after accounting restatement; covers short- and long-term incentives and equity awards .
- Tax gross-ups: Not disclosed.
Performance & Track Record
| DynaEnergetics Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $315.0 | $287.7 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | $56.3 | $24.8 |
- 2024 performance shortfall vs. AIP targets (revenue, EBITDA%, SG&A%, cash conversion) drove a 0% annual bonus outcome and a 0% individual modifier for Grieves, consistent with underperformance .
- Company-level Say-on-Pay support was >95% in 2024, indicating broad shareholder acceptance of pay framework despite operating volatility .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: For “other NEOs” like Grieves, target pay remains majority variable (~70% variable) via annual and long-term incentives, reinforcing at-risk design .
- Shift in performance risk: 2025 PSU redesign (to cumulative EBITDA/FCF) increases line-of-sight and balance sheet discipline versus prior 100% relative TSR structure (2024 grants) .
- Discretionary outcomes: 2024 individual component for Grieves was set at 0% given DynaEnergetics’ underperformance, demonstrating negative discretion alignment .
- Equity award integrity: No repricing permitted; minimum vesting standards; no pledging/hedging; robust clawback; no evergreen; plan features viewed as governance-friendly .
Compensation Peer Group & Say‑on‑Pay
- Peer set spans building products, industrial infrastructure, and energy upstream names; S&P SmallCap 600 Industrials used for relative TSR benchmarking in 2024 PSUs; the committee does not target a specific percentile for pay positioning .
- Say-on-Pay approval exceeded 95% in 2024 after extensive investor engagement, indicating broad support for program design and changes .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and downside sensitivity: 2024 zero bonus outcome for Grieves reflects rigorous, formulaic metrics and negative discretion; the 2025 pivot to EBITDA/FCF metrics should better align incentives with deleveraging and cash generation goals—potentially supportive for equity value if execution improves .
- Retention and transition risk: A bespoke 2024 retention agreement tied to a DynaEnergetics sale paid only the initial tranche (€100k), suggesting deal uncertainty; combined with segment underperformance and a two‑year non‑compete structure, retention risk is mixed (financially cushioned but outcome‑dependent) .
- Ownership and governance: While Grieves’ economic stake is <1% of shares outstanding, the combination of stock ownership guidelines, anti-pledging/hedging, and a strong clawback reduce misalignment and governance risk .
- Execution watch items: Rebuild of DynaEnergetics margin/price realization, achievement versus new EBITDA/FCF targets, and any future Form 4 activity around vesting windows (not disclosed here) will be important near-term signals for trading and compensation alignment .