Travis Marquette
Burlington StoresAbout Travis Marquette
Travis Marquette, 53, has served as Burlington Stores’ President and Chief Operating Officer since October 2021. He previously held senior finance and operations roles at Ross Stores (CFO, Deputy CFO, SVP Store Operations) and earlier roles at Bain & Company, Carter’s, and PwC . Under the current leadership team, fiscal 2024 performance included $10.64B in revenues, Adjusted EBIT of $761M, and net income of $504M as the company opened 101 net new stores and relocated 31 large locations . For Pay vs Performance, Burlington’s TSR value stood at 130.56 (on a $100 base starting FY2020) alongside FY2024 net income of $503.6M and Adjusted EBIT of $761.1M .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ross Stores | EVP & CFO (2021), Group SVP & CFO (2019–2021), Group SVP & Deputy CFO (2018–2019), SVP Finance (2017–2018), SVP Store Operations (2015–2017), GVP Store Operations (2013–2015), VP Store Operations Finance (2009–2013), Director Strategic Planning (joined 2008) | 2008–2021 | Led finance and operations initiatives supporting growth at a leading off-price retailer |
| Bain & Company | Consulting roles | Part of 12-year period prior to 2008 | Strategy and performance improvement advisory experience |
| Carter’s, Inc. | Management roles | Part of 12-year period prior to 2008 | Retail/consumer operating experience |
| PricewaterhouseCoopers | Management roles | Part of 12-year period prior to 2008 | Finance/audit foundation |
Fixed Compensation
| Element | 2024 Detail |
|---|---|
| Base salary | $973,906 (effective after a 3.0% increase) |
| Target annual bonus | 100% of base salary; threshold 50%; max 200% |
| Actual annual bonus paid (FY2024) | $1,480,337, reflecting 152% payout on Adjusted EBIT over target |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weight | Target/Goal | Actual/Result | Payout | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive Plan: Adjusted EBIT | 100% | $706M target; threshold $600M; max $812M | $761M Adjusted EBIT (excludes ~$16M bankruptcy-acquired lease costs) | 152% of target for all NEOs | Cash bonus; Committee retained negative discretion but did not apply it |
2024 Long-Term Incentive Grants (LTIP)
| Instrument | Target value | Quantity | Vesting | Performance metric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Included in $3,782,160 target LTIP | 10,623 target units | Cliff vest after 3-year period (FY2024–FY2026) | Cumulative Adjusted EPS growth; 50%–200% payout range |
| RSUs (2024 grant) | Included above | 5,312 units | 25% per year over 4 years | Time-based |
| Stock Options (2024 grant) | Included above | 13,545 options (ex. price = FMV on 5/1/24) | 25% per year over 4 years | Stock price appreciation (value only if above strike) |
Program shift: Beginning with grants on/around May 1, 2025, Burlington eliminated options from the LTIP mix and increased PSUs to 65% (RSUs 35%), reflecting greater performance-based weighting .
Realized Performance: 2022 PSUs (3-year program with annual measurement adjustment)
| Grant year | Target shares | Earned shares | Payout explanation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSUs (Travis Marquette) | 6,378 | 8,483 | Goals measured annually given volatility; EPS growth achieved: -49% (2022=0%), 44% (2023=200%), 35% (2024=200%); average payout ≈133% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 61,594 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Near-term vested/vestable | 49,371 options exercisable within 60 days; 3,048 RSUs scheduled to vest within 60 days (as of 3/26/2025) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 3x base salary for executive officers (other than CEO) |
| Guideline compliance | Each NEO owned shares in excess of guideline or met retention requirement as of FY2024 year-end |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and corporate personnel |
| 10b5‑1 trading plan | Adopted 6/11/2025 to sell up to 50% of net shares from vesting of up to 19,651 RSUs/PSUs in 2025–2026; plan expires 5/8/2026 |
Employment Terms
- Employment start in current role: President & COO since October 2021
- Severance (without cause/for good reason): 2x base salary (Severance Payment); pro‑rated target annual bonus based on actual results (Annual Incentive Payment); up to 2 years of medical/dental/vision benefits continuation
- Change in control: Double-trigger acceleration (no single-trigger). Upon CIC plus qualifying termination, options/RSUs fully accelerate and PSUs vest at target; benefits aligned with plan terms
- Restrictive covenants: Non-compete and non-solicit provisions (generally two years for NEOs; one year under the Severance Plan)
- Clawbacks: Robust recoupment policy and Dodd-Frank Section 954-compliant policy for incentive-based compensation
Company Performance Context (FY2024 vs FY2023)
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($MM) | $9,727 | $10,635 |
| Adjusted EBIT ($MM) | $581.0 | $745.4–$761.1 (Adj EBIT discussed; AIP actual used $761M) |
| Net Income ($MM) | $339.6 | $503.6 |
| TSR value of $100 investment | 90.68 (2023) | 130.56 (2024) |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased “at-risk” mix: 65% of annual LTIP grants for NEOs will be PSUs starting 2025 (from 50% pre‑2025), and options eliminated—shift emphasizes performance alignment and reduces time-based/option-driven windfalls .
- Simpler, profitability-focused AIP: For 2024, a single metric (Adjusted EBIT) with a fixed target and a wider 50% threshold was used as post-pandemic volatility subsided, producing clear pay-performance linkage (152% payout on $761M actual vs $706M target) .
- Shareholder safeguards: No excise tax gross-ups; no hedging/pledging; no single-trigger CIC vesting; stock ownership guidelines and robust clawbacks; 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support ~83% .
Risk Indicators & Trading Signals
- Scheduled selling pressure: A Rule 10b5‑1 plan adopted on 6/11/2025 anticipates sales of up to 50% of net vested RSU/PSU shares through 5/8/2026—suggests programmatic disposition around vest dates (primarily tax/liquidity management rather than discretionary selling) .
- Governance risk mitigants: No hedging/pledging; double‑trigger CIC; clawbacks; no SERP; no option repricing without shareholder approval .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Deep off-price retail finance/operations experience (multi-year CFO and store operations leadership at Ross Stores) and strategy background (Bain) .
- Current remit as COO positions him at the center of execution on store growth, margin initiatives, and operating discipline referenced in Burlington’s strategy and results .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strengthening: the 2025 LTIP redesign (65% PSUs, no options) tightens linkage to multi-year Adjusted EPS growth and should curb windfall risk while enhancing retention via time-based RSUs .
- Near-term insider selling is likely to be rule-based: the 10b5‑1 plan and known vesting schedules imply predictable, scheduled sales rather than discretionary selling—lower “informational” signal quality but potential modest technical pressure around vest dates .
- Retention risk appears managed: competitive cash severance (2x base), double-trigger equity protection, and ownership guidelines, alongside recent performance momentum (FY2024 revenue and Adjusted EBIT growth), support continuity and alignment .
Overall: Compensation design and policies (no hedging/pledging, double‑trigger CIC, clawbacks, higher PSU weight) are consistent with alignment and governance best practices, while the 10b5‑1 plan signals planned, non-discretionary selling around vesting rather than opportunistic disposals.