Bruce Labovitz
About Bruce Labovitz
Bruce Labovitz, 57, has served as Chief Financial Officer of Bowman Consulting Group Ltd. since January 2013; he holds dual Bachelor of Science degrees from NYU’s Stern School of Business and oversees finance, audit, capital strategy, treasury, tax, credit facilities, and investor relations, including the financial design of growth and M&A initiatives . Under his financial leadership, FY2024 gross contract revenue grew 23.2% to $426.6M, net service billing grew 24.9% to $379.7M, and Adjusted EBITDA rose 26.6% to $59.5M with Adjusted EBITDA margin, net of 15.7%; backlog increased 30.5% to $399M, evidencing execution and demand health .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADR Software, LLC | Chief Financial Officer | Sep 2009 – Jan 2013 | Led finance for a construction software firm, broadening operating finance experience |
| Comstock Homebuilding Companies Inc. (Nasdaq: CHCI) | Chief Financial Officer | Feb 2002 – May 2009 | Managed the company’s IPO in 2004 and public-company finance functions |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external directorships disclosed in the company’s proxy for Mr. Labovitz |
Performance & Track Record
- FY2024 performance (year-over-year): Gross contract revenue $426.6M (+23.2%), net service billing $379.7M (+24.9%), Adjusted EBITDA $59.5M (+26.6%), Adjusted EBITDA margin, net 15.7% (+20 bps), backlog $399M (+30.5%) .
- Bruce emphasized lowering equity dilution: stock-based compensation was $14.2M for the first nine months of 2025 (4.4% of net service billing vs. 7.3% a year earlier) and is expected at ~$19.0M for 2025 and ~$20.5M for 2026, aligning with a pledge to reduce SBC as a percentage of revenue while supporting recruiting and retention .
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Gross contract revenue ($000s) | 346,256 | 426,564 |
| Net service billing ($000s) | 303,994 | 379,669 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($000s) | 47,031 | 59,520 |
| Adjusted EBITDA margin, net (%) | 15.5% | 15.7% |
| Backlog ($000s) | 306,000 | 399,000 |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 ($) | 2024 ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | 475,134 | 495,645 |
| One-time cash bonus | — | 245,644 (May 2024 for capital markets work) |
| Annual bonus (cash) | — | 99,129 |
| All other compensation (perqs, etc.) | 76,714 | 61,929 |
| Total | 1,833,518 | 8,469,706 (includes equity; see below) |
- Salary increased to $500,000 effective July 1, 2024 (annualized base in new contract) .
- Perquisites 2024: $24,726 aircraft reimbursement (fixed hourly), $18,000 auto allowance, $9,300 HSA contributions .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan (2024)
Plan design for executives, including CFO: Threshold 25% of earnings; Target 50%; Maximum 100%. 2024 metrics: Adjusted EBITDA Margin, net (50% weight), Growth in Organic Revenue (25%), Growth in Overall Revenue (25%) .
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout to Labovitz | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin, net | 50% | 14.5% | 16.5% | 18.5% | 15.70% (above Threshold, below Target) | $99,129 | Cash |
| Growth in Organic Revenue | 25% | $361M | $370M | $377M | Below Threshold | $0 | — |
| Growth in Overall Revenue | 25% | $386M | $429M | $472M | Below Threshold | $0 | — |
Notes:
- Committee determined Bruce’s entire 2024 annual bonus be paid in cash; CEO and another executive received RS for their STIP awards; vesting for STIP RS is no later than first trading day of following calendar year (Jan 2, 2025 for 2024 awards) .
Long-Term Incentives (Equity)
- Relative TSR-based PSUs; vest at 0–100% based on TSR percentile vs peer group (25% at 35th pct, 50% at 55th, 100% at 75th+) .
- Time-based RS (typical executive LTI) vest over three years beginning one year from grant; Bruce’s July 2024 RS is a special cliff vest (see below) .
| Grant | Type | Grant date | Shares/Units | Performance/vesting schedule | Grant-date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 LTI | PSUs (max opportunity) | Feb 8, 2024 | 21,451 | 3-year TSR period 1/1/2024–12/31/2026; vest based on relative TSR | 549,789 |
| 2024 LTI | Time-based RS | Feb 8, 2024 | 3,064 | Vests over three years beginning one year from grant | 111,070 |
| Special Award | Time-based RS | Jul 1, 2024 | 150,000 | Cliff vests on Jun 30, 2028 (4-year) | 4,612,500 |
| Special Award | PSUs (max opportunity) | Jul 1, 2024 | 100,000 | TSR period 7/1/2024–6/30/2028 | 2,294,000 |
Additional outstanding prior-cycle awards as of 12/31/2024 (max PSU opportunity and RS): 2023 PSUs 38,355; 2023 RS 3,670; 2022 PSUs 29,126; 2022 RS 1,414 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares beneficially owned | % of outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| Bruce Labovitz | 405,560 | 2.34% |
| Basis | Direct holdings; computed on 17,337,090 shares outstanding (3/31/2025) | — |
| Source |
- No stock options disclosed; equity is in RS and PSUs .
- Anti-hedging policy prohibits hedging and short sales; no pledging by Labovitz is disclosed in the proxy (pledge provisions are discussed only for the CEO’s agreement) .
Unvested/Outstanding Awards at FY2024 Year-End (selected)
| Grant | Unvested time-based RS (#) | Unearned PSUs at max (#) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 1, 2024 | 150,000 | 100,000 | RS cliff vests 6/30/2028; PSUs over 7/1/2024–6/30/2028 |
| Feb 8, 2024 | 6,819 (STIP RS) | 21,451 | 2024 STIP RS vests 1/2/2025; PSUs 2024–2026 |
| Feb 9, 2023 | 3,670 | 38,355 | 2023–2025 PSU period |
| Feb 9, 2022 | 1,414 | 29,126 | 2022–2024 PSU period |
| Dec 31, 2020 | 11,062 | — | Vests in equal installments on Jan 1, 2022, 2023, and 2025 |
Employment Terms
| Term | Key economics/terms |
|---|---|
| Current agreement | Effective Jul 1, 2024; initial term through Jun 30, 2028; automatic 1-year renewals thereafter |
| Base salary | $500,000 annualized (effective Jul 1, 2024) |
| Annual bonus opportunity | Threshold 25% / Target 50% / Max 100% of eligible earnings; metrics set annually by Compensation Committee |
| LTI during initial term | In lieu of standard LTI grants during initial term, received 150,000 time-based RS (cliff vest 6/30/2028) and 100,000 PSUs for TSR performance over initial term |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Applies during employment and for 2 years post-termination; confidentiality obligations survive indefinitely |
| Severance/change-in-control (CIC) | If he terminates without Good Reason during 7/1/2026–6/30/2028 with 180 days’ notice: base salary and benefits plus accelerated vesting of 50,000 of the July 2024 RS grant; if termination “as a result of a CIC” but without Good Reason with 180 days’ notice: 2x base salary, benefits, and accelerated vesting of all equity awards . Under the omnibus plan, if awards are not assumed on a CIC, they accelerate; certain terminations (without Cause/for Good Reason, including CIC-related) also trigger acceleration with a release . |
| Clawback | All awards subject to the company’s clawback policy |
| Deferred comp | No nonqualified deferred compensation/SERP maintained |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift and one-time equity: 2024 total compensation rose sharply due to a special mid-year package (150,000 RS; 100,000 PSUs) embedded in his new employment agreement, increasing equity’s share of pay and creating a long-dated retention anchor through 2028 .
- Pay-for-performance design: Annual bonus tied 50% to Adjusted EBITDA margin (achieved above threshold) and 50% to revenue growth (below threshold), yielding a modest cash bonus ($99,129) consistent with mixed company results on growth metrics; PSUs vest solely on relative TSR, maintaining external performance alignment .
- Perquisites are moderate and disclosed (aircraft reimbursement, auto allowance, HSA), with no tax gross-up provisions disclosed .
Say-on-Pay, Peer Group, and Committee Practices
- The Compensation Committee used PwC as an independent consultant in 2024 (fees: $24,000 for comp work; additional $621,265 for tax/internal audit provided to management), and determined no conflicts of interest existed .
- Peer group composition and say‑on‑pay results were not disclosed in the 2025 proxy; PSUs reference a relative TSR peer group approved by the committee .
Risk Indicators & Governance
- Anti-hedging/short sale prohibitions are in place; pledging is addressed in the CEO’s agreement; no pledging by Labovitz is disclosed .
- Equity plan provides for acceleration mechanics on non-assumption in CIC and for qualifying terminations; awards are subject to a clawback policy .
Investment Implications
- Retention and alignment: The 150,000-share cliff-vesting RS through June 30, 2028 and large multi-year PSU grants tie substantial wealth to long-term TSR and continued service, lowering near-term departure risk while creating a sizeable vesting event in mid-2028 that could add selling pressure as shares vest .
- Pay-for-performance: Annual bonus outcomes reflected EBITDA discipline but missed growth thresholds, and the PSU program directly links realized equity to relative TSR, supporting alignment with shareholder returns .
- Dilution management: Management’s plan to reduce stock-based compensation as a percent of revenue (with 2025–2026 SBC of ~$19.0M and ~$20.5M) suggests improving capital efficiency and may mitigate dilution concerns over time, a positive signal for shareholders sensitive to SBC trends .
- CIC economics: Labovitz’s agreement allows benefits and equity acceleration even without Good Reason if he resigns in connection with a CIC (with notice), a relatively executive-favorable construct that could modestly elevate turnover risk in a sale scenario but ensures continuity incentives before close; standard double‑trigger protection and non-assumption acceleration also apply via plan documents .