Daniel Swayze
About Daniel Swayze
Daniel Swayze, 54, is Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Bowman Consulting Group Ltd. (BWMN), a role he has held since July 1, 2024 after joining Bowman in 2022 and leading energy services and subsequently the transportation/MEP/renewables division; he holds a B.S. in civil engineering from Penn State and an MBA from Rutgers . In 2024, Bowman’s annual bonus plan was tied to Adjusted EBITDA margin (50% weight), organic revenue growth (25%), and overall revenue growth (25%); the company achieved 15.70% Adjusted EBITDA margin (above threshold, below target) but missed both revenue growth thresholds, illustrating the performance orientation of executive incentives Swayze will participate in from 2025 . His employment agreement sets a pay-for-performance mix with a target annual bonus of 50% of base salary from 2025 and performance equity tied to plan objectives and relative TSR, with anti-pledging and clawback protections .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bowman Consulting Group Ltd. | Chief Operating Officer | 2024–present | Oversees all professional services operations |
| Bowman Consulting Group Ltd. | EVP & Divisional Manager (Transportation, MEP, Renewables) | Jan 2024–Jun 2024 | Led multiple practices prior to COO elevation |
| Bowman Consulting Group Ltd. | EVP, Energy Services | 2022–2023 | Built and led energy services practice after joining company |
| Onyx Renewable Partners L.P. | Chief Operating Officer | Nov 2016–Aug 2022 | Led EPC and asset management; managed engineering from development to construction at a Blackstone‑backed renewables developer |
External Roles
No public-company board roles or external directorships disclosed for Swayze in company filings reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms / Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (initial 2024) | $457,184 | As disclosed upon COO appointment |
| Base Salary (employment agreement) | Not less than $475,000; annual increase ≥3% beginning Jan 1, 2026 | Agreement effective Nov 21, 2024; base not to be reduced without consent |
| Target Annual Bonus (from FY2025) | 50% of base salary (25% threshold; 100% max) | Under 2021 Exec Short‑Term Incentive Plan (Annual Bonus Plan) |
| FY2024 Bonus (transition year) | ≥$200,000, at least 40% payable in cash unless Swayze agrees otherwise | Outside the 2024 Annual Bonus Plan for NEOs |
| Equity (from FY2025) | Long‑term awards under Omnibus Plan/LTIP; value opportunity 35% (threshold)/75% (target)/150% (max) of base | Mix and performance terms set annually by Comp Committee |
| Perquisites | Vehicle allowance $1,500/month; company HSA contribution (max permitted) if eligible | Employment agreement benefits |
| Legal fee reimbursement | Up to $10,000 for agreement review/negotiation | One-time reimbursement |
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (Company metrics; Swayze participates from FY2025)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual 2024 | Payout Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin, net | 50% | 14.5% | 16.5% | 18.5% | 15.70% | Above threshold, below target (partial payout on this metric for eligible execs) |
| Growth in Organic Revenue | 25% | $361,000,000 | $370,000,000 | $377,000,000 | Below threshold | No payout on this metric |
| Growth in Overall Revenue | 25% | $386,000,000 | $429,000,000 | $472,000,000 | Below threshold | No payout on this metric |
Notes:
- Under the Annual Bonus Plan, exec payouts interpolate between levels; 2024 executive bonuses (for plan participants) were mixed cash/stock at committee discretion; Swayze’s 2024 bonus was governed by his agreement (minimum $200,000), not the plan .
Long‑Term Incentive (from FY2025 for Swayze)
| Element | Structure | Performance / Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| Time‑based Restricted Stock | Granted under Omnibus Plan/LTIP | Vesting schedules are set by award; under the LTIP for other executives, time‑based RS typically vests quarterly over three years beginning one year from grant (committee‑set) |
| Performance‑based RSUs | Relative TSR vs. peer group | Vest based on 3‑yr relative TSR: 75th percentile or higher = 100%; 55th = 50%; 35th = 25%; below 35th = 0% |
| Award sizing (value) | 35%/75%/150% of base salary at threshold/target/max | Number of shares determined by dividing dollar value by fair market value per Plan |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Alignment Factor | Status / Terms |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | Individual Swayze holdings not itemized; security ownership table as of Mar 31, 2025 notes the “all execs and directors as a group (9 persons)” total includes shares held by Mr. Swayze |
| Hedging/Short Sales | Prohibited under insider trading policy (anti‑hedging; no short sales) |
| Pledging | Swayze may not pledge, hypothecate, or encumber shares awarded under the equity plan; no margin accounts for such shares |
| Clawback | Incentive‑based compensation subject to Executive Officer Claw‑Back Policy |
| Ownership Guidelines | Director stock ownership guideline disclosed; no executive ownership guideline disclosed in filings reviewed |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Role/Start | COO effective July 1, 2024 |
| Agreement Term | Initial term through Dec 31, 2027; auto‑renews for 1‑year periods unless 90‑day notice of non‑renewal |
| Severance – Without Cause / Good Reason | Lump sum: 1x base salary + 1x target annual bonus; company pays COBRA premiums up to 18 months; certain benefits continuation; equity acceleration consistent with plan/agreements; subject to release |
| Change in Control (Double Trigger) | If terminated without cause or with good reason during the CIC window: lump sum equal to the greater of remaining base salary through term or 1x base + 1x target bonus; COBRA up to 18 months; certain benefits continuation; equity acceleration per plan/awards; subject to release |
| Non‑Compete / Non‑Solicit | Non‑compete for 12 months after termination under 7(d)/7(e); 6 months after termination under 7(f) (CIC); scope limited to states/DC where Bowman has ≥20 employees; separate 12‑month non‑compete consideration applies in certain terminations; non‑solicit and non‑disparagement also apply |
| Definitions | Cause/Good Reason/Change in Control defined; CIC aligns to Omnibus Plan definitions |
| 280G Treatment | “Best net” cutback—payments reduced only if it improves after‑tax outcome; no tax gross‑up |
| Dispute/Jurisdiction | Delaware law; courts of Delaware or E.D. Va. (Alexandria) |
| 409A | Payments structured to comply; specified employee delay provisions as applicable |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: From 2025, Swayze’s STI targets 50% of base and LTI value opportunity scales 35%/75%/150% of base, with PSUs tied to 3‑year relative TSR—mechanically aligning a significant portion of compensation to shareholder outcomes . 2024 company metrics show EBITDA margin achieved but revenue growth below threshold, indicating a plan that can constrain payouts when top-line growth lags .
- Retention and turnover risk: A multi‑year contract through 2027 with auto‑renewal, reasonable severance, and post‑employment non‑compete (12 months in most cases) moderates near‑term retention risk; double‑trigger CIC economics avoid windfalls absent termination .
- Governance and trading signal quality: Prohibitions on hedging and pledging, explicit clawback coverage, and no 280G gross‑ups are shareholder‑friendly; these reduce misalignment and mitigate forced selling risk from margin calls .
- Near‑term selling pressure: Equity award specifics for Swayze (grant sizes/dates) were not disclosed in the proxy; given plan design, future vesting could create periodic liquidity, but anti‑pledging and policy controls dampen risk of leveraged selling .