Matthew Clark
About Matthew E. Clark
Matthew E. Clark is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Named Executive Officer) of The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated. His 2024 total compensation was $2,461,193, reflecting a pay mix with substantial performance-based components tied to adjusted EBITDAR, strategic goals, and multi-year equity metrics . Company performance in 2024 included record revenue of $3.58 billion (+4.1% YoY), EBITDA of $283 million and adjusted EBITDA of $329 million, underscoring operational execution and scale benefits . Executives’ long-term incentives emphasize three-year performance conditions on revenue growth, adjusted EPS, and adjusted controllable profit, aligning with shareholder value creation .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $576,942 | $601,154 | $624,731 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $11,583 | $17,034 | $19,169 |
Details of 2024 “All Other Compensation” for Clark: Automobile program $16,249, life insurance $2,920; total $19,169 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (Performance Incentive Plan)
| Item | Design/Target | 2024 Actual |
|---|---|---|
| Target Bonus as % of Salary | 80.0% of base salary | n/a |
| Plan Metrics | 75% adjusted EBITDAR; 25% strategic goals (two half-year periods for EBITDAR) | n/a |
| Adjusted EBITDAR Achievement (Company) | Threshold 75% pays 25%; Max 115% pays 150% | H1: 102.2% → 103.0% payout; H2: 105.5% → 112.0% payout; Overall EBITDAR payout: 107.5% |
| Strategic Goals Achievement (Company) | 0–100% of target based on goal attainment | 98.0% payout |
| Clark’s Bonus ($) | Target $492,000 | Actual $517,215 (105.1% of target) |
Long-Term Equity Incentives (2024 Grants)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Shares/Options | Exercise Price | Vesting | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-qualified Stock Options | 02/15/2024 | 52,230 | $34.91 | 20% per year over 5 years | $650,054 |
| Performance-Based Restricted Stock | 02/15/2024 | 18,620 (target) | n/a | Earned based on three-year goals; then 60% at year 3, 20% at years 4 and 5 | $650,024 |
Performance metrics and weighting for 2024 PBRS: Total annual revenue growth (1/3), adjusted annual EPS (1/3), adjusted annual controllable profit (1/3), measured over fiscal years 2024–2026 with earnout range 60–150% .
Multi-Year Compensation (Summary)
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,200,148 | $625,702 | $650,024 |
| Option Awards ($) | — | $625,013 | $650,054 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Comp ($) | $326,289 | $416,128 | $517,215 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $2,114,962 | $2,285,031 | $2,461,193 |
Option exercises and stock vesting in 2024: Clark had zero option exercises and 17,324 shares vesting (value realized $615,296) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 213,348 shares (includes 30,538 unvested restricted shares; 39,856 held directly; 142,954 options exercisable within 60 days) |
| Ownership as % of Shares Outstanding | <1% (asterisk in proxy) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executive Vice President multiple = 2x salary; compliance calculated annually |
| Compliance Status | All Named Executive Officers, including Clark, are in compliance as of 2024 year-end |
| Hedging/Pledging | Company prohibits hedging, short sales, puts/calls, margin accounts, and pledging of Company stock |
Outstanding awards context: As of March 24, 2025, Clark’s cumulative grants under plans totaled 208,570 options and 77,988 restricted shares across years .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Agreement Term | Initial term ≈1 year; auto-renews annually unless notice given ≥90 days prior to expiration |
| Severance (No CIC) | Cash severance = 1× current annual base salary; pro-rata annual bonus; 12 months health benefits; vesting acceleration for awards scheduled within 24 months (performance awards remain subject to achievement); vested equity generally exercisable 24 months; 36 months if retirement with 20 continuous years |
| Change-in-Control | Double-trigger: if terminated without cause or for good reason within 18 months post-CIC, same severance as above; automatic full vesting only if awards are not continued/assumed/replaced |
| Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicit; whistleblower protections explicitly authorized |
| Clawback | Comprehensive clawback policy compliant with SEC/Nasdaq; recoupment for restatements, with discretion to recoup all bonus/equity for fraud or intentional misconduct (prior three years) |
Potential Payments (As of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Pro-Rata Bonus ($) | Equity Acceleration Intrinsic Value ($) | Health & Welfare ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIC – Awards Assumed/Continued; No Termination | — | — | — | — | — |
| CIC – Awards Not Assumed/Continued | — | — | 6,216,640 | — | 6,216,640 |
| Termination w/o Cause or Constructive Termination within 18 months of CIC | 615,000 | 517,215 | 6,216,640 | 16,498 | 7,365,353 |
| Permanent Disability | 615,000 | 517,215 | 6,216,640 | 16,498 | 7,365,353 |
| Death | 615,000 | 517,215 | 6,216,640 | 16,498 | 7,365,353 |
| Termination w/o Cause (No CIC) or Constructive Termination | 615,000 | 517,215 | 3,367,728 | 16,498 | 4,516,441 |
| Termination with Cause or Voluntary (Including Retirement) | — | — | — | — | — |
Notes: Equity acceleration values computed per SEC methodology at $47.44 share price on 12/31/2024, with performance shares assumed at target .
Deferred Compensation
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Executive Contributions (2024) | $0 |
| Company Contributions (2024) | $0 |
| Aggregate Earnings (2024) | $73 |
| Aggregate Balance at 12/31/2024 | $2,865 |
Compensation Structure & Governance Signals
- 2024 program adjustments increased target bonus opportunities by 5% for NEOs (except CEO +15%) and reverted LTI metrics to include adjusted EPS, reflecting linkage to stockholder returns .
- Emphasis on performance pay: Clark’s annual bonus driven 75% by adjusted EBITDAR and 25% by strategic goals; LTI split 50% performance-based restricted stock and 50% options per his election .
- Strong governance: No hedging/pledging, no option repricing without shareholder approval, no excise tax gross-ups, minimum one-year vesting, dividends not paid on unvested awards; independent advisor FW Cook supports pay design .
- 2024 say-on-pay approval was ~98%, indicating broad shareholder support for the compensation program .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Clark’s pay is closely tied to adjusted EBITDAR outcomes and three-year performance on revenue growth, adjusted EPS, and controllable profit, incentivizing durable margin improvement and cash generation .
- Retention vs. selling pressure: Extensive unvested and performance-tied equity (plus option vesting over five years) suggests retention incentives; Clark had zero option exercises in 2024 while realizing value from vesting restricted shares . Prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment risk .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger framework with meaningful equity acceleration could create event-driven compensation leverage; however, absence of tax gross-ups and stringent clawback mitigate shareholder-unfriendly outcomes .
- Performance linkage: With 2024 company revenue and EBITDA growth and multi-year metrics including adjusted EPS, Clark’s incentives align with drivers of stock performance and valuation multiples in casual dining .