Daniel Cunha
AVIS BUDGET GROUPAbout Daniel Cunha
Daniel Cunha, age 42, was appointed Chief Financial Officer of Avis Budget Group effective July 1, 2025, succeeding Izzy Martins, who served through June 30, 2025 . He previously served as CFO of Orion Services Group (past year), Ocean Spray (2019–2023), and Heinz North America; earlier roles include consultant at McKinsey & Company and private equity at GP Investments; he holds a Mechanical Aeronautical Engineering degree from Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica and an MBA from Harvard Business School . In 2024, Avis generated ~$11.8B of revenue, reported a net loss of ~$1.8B primarily driven by ~$2.5B of fleet-related impairment/charges, and delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $628M; 5-year TSR remained positive at 181% despite negative TSR in 2024 . Compensation practices emphasize pay-for-performance; 2024 annual cash incentives paid 0% for NEOs given below-threshold EBITDA, underscoring discipline likely to apply to future CFO incentives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Orion Services Group | Chief Financial Officer | Past year (per filing) | PE-owned field services; finance leadership for operations and performance |
| Ocean Spray | Chief Financial Officer | 2019–2023 | Led finance for global CPG cooperative |
| Heinz North America | Chief Financial Officer | Not disclosed | Regional CFO responsibilities at scale |
| McKinsey & Company | Consultant | Not disclosed | Strategy/operations advisory foundation |
| GP Investments | Private Equity | Not disclosed | Investing and portfolio value creation experience |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $650,000 per year | Paid bi-weekly |
| Annual Incentive (STIP) Target | 125% of eligible salary | Payout based on Company and individual performance; pro-rated for 2025; must be employed on payout day |
| Annual LTIP Eligibility | Eligible beginning 2026; target value $1,000,000 (subject to Committee approval) | Mix and value determined annually by Compensation Committee |
| Health, Welfare, 401(k) | Standard executive programs; 401(k) match $1-for-$1 up to 6% after one year | Terms subject to change |
| Perquisites | EVP-level perquisite programs | As amended by Committee over time |
| Relocation | Eligible under company policy for move to northern NJ | Standard policy |
Performance Compensation
Sign-on Equity (In lieu of 2025 annual LTIP)
| Award Type | Grant Value | Anticipated Grant Date | Vesting | Performance Metric(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (time-based) | 50% of $1,000,000 | July 23, 2025 (anticipated) | 1/3 per year on each anniversary of grant, service-based | N/A (time-based) |
| PSUs (performance-based) | 50% of $1,000,000 | July 23, 2025 (anticipated) | Cliff vest after three years, subject to continued employment and achievement of performance goals | Performance goals to be set by Committee (not specified in 8-K) |
STIP/Scorecard Design Reference (Company framework)
| Program | Metric/Design | Weighting | Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive Plan (reference: 2024 design) | Adjusted EBITDA (global) | 50% | 0–150% of target based on achievement; below-threshold yields 0% |
| Annual Incentive Plan (reference: 2024 design) | Individual scorecard of quantitative operating/financial metrics | 50% | Achievement (0–100%) multiplied by EBITDA multiplier; no payout unless EBITDA threshold met |
Note: The 2025 design for Mr. Cunha was not disclosed in the 8-K; his 2025 STIP will be pro-rated and contingent on plan goals and his individual performance per the offer letter .
LTIP Design Reference (Company framework)
| Award | Mix | Vesting | PSU Metric/Curve |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 LTIP (company-wide) | 50% RSUs, 50% PSUs | RSUs vest 1/3 annually; PSUs vest at 3 years | 3-year cumulative Adjusted EBITDA: Threshold $4.0B (50%), Target $5.0B (100%), Maximum $6.0B (150%) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Form 3 mechanics: Daniel executed a Power of Attorney on June 17, 2025 authorizing Section 16 filings (Forms 3/4/5), indicating insider reporting commencement; specific share holdings were not disclosed in that exhibit .
- Stock ownership guidelines: CFOs must hold stock equal to 3x base salary; executives must retain at least 50% of net shares from vesting until threshold is met; no set deadline due to mandatory hold .
- Hedging/pledging: Insider trading policy prohibits hedging, pledging, margin accounts, and short sales for officers; additional pre-clearance and window restrictions apply .
- Ownership status: As a new appointee, compliance status versus guidelines is not yet disclosed; existing NEOs (as of 12/31/2024) largely met thresholds, illustrating policy adherence across the team .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Start Date | CFO effective July 1, 2025 |
| Employment Status | At-will; either party may terminate at any time |
| Notice | Executive agrees to provide at least 45 days’ notice for voluntary resignation |
| Restrictive Covenants | LTIP awards may require restrictive covenants, including non-compete, non-solicit, and confidentiality |
| Severance Plan Eligibility | Executive Severance Plan for officers (other than CEO/CHRO): 2 years base pay; pro-rata STIP for year of termination (individual component at target); accelerated vesting for RSUs scheduled within 1 year and PSUs within 1 year subject to performance; healthcare contribution lump-sum for 1 year; select perquisites up to 12 months (subject to release) |
| Change-in-Control (Equity) | Double-trigger: Equity accelerates only if terminated without Cause or for Constructive Discharge within 2 years following a Change in Control |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank compliant clawback applies to incentive-based compensation for executive officers |
| Tax Gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups; relocation-related tax reimbursements may be provided per standard policies |
Performance Compensation Outcomes Context (Company)
| Metric | 2024 Outcome |
|---|---|
| Annual Incentive (NEOs) | 0% of target; AIP EBITDA fell below threshold |
| 2022 PSU Cycle (2012–2024) | Earned/vested at 112.5% of target based on goals achieved (max EBITDA goal achieved; variable cost below threshold) |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: Company shifted long-term mix to 50% PSUs/50% RSUs, maintaining performance orientation while adding retention via time-based equity; no stock options granted in 2024, reducing leverage/volatility risk for executives .
- Pay-for-performance discipline: 2024 AIP paid 0%, and PSU outcomes reflected measured performance attainment (112.5% for 2022 award), reinforcing alignment and guardrails against discretion overriding results .
- Peer benchmarking and governance: Compensation set relative to a transportation/travel/auto retail peer set; say-on-pay support at 98.5% in 2024 signals favorable shareholder reception to program design .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags (Policy/Plan Guardrails)
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy in force for officers .
- Double-trigger equity acceleration upon change-of-control; single-trigger acceleration is not provided .
- Clawback policy compliant with SEC/Nasdaq standards .
- No excise tax gross-ups for “golden parachutes” .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: The $1.0M sign-on package split into 50% PSUs (3-year cliff) and 50% RSUs (3-year ratable) creates multi-year retention hooks and performance linkage precisely during the CEO transition period, which should align the new CFO’s incentives with shareholder value creation through the next strategic phase .
- Selling pressure windows: Time-based RSUs vest annually on grant anniversaries and PSUs cliff-vest at 3 years; these schedules can create predictable liquidity windows beginning one year post-grant, subject to trading windows and ownership retention requirements (50% net share hold until 3x salary met), tempering near-term selling pressure .
- Pay-for-performance signaling: The 0% AIP payout to NEOs in 2024 and performance-tied PSU outcomes (112.5% for the 2022 cycle) indicate discipline that should carry into the CFO’s STIP/LTIP beginning 2025–2026, improving confidence in compensation-investor alignment amid cyclical fleet cost and EBITDA variability .
- Downside protection and change-in-control: Double-trigger equity vesting and absence of excise tax gross-ups reflect shareholder-friendly structures; severance protection (2x base, pro-rata STIP, limited equity acceleration) mitigates retention risk for a newly onboarded CFO .
- Governance backdrop: Strong say-on-pay approval (98.5% in 2024) and explicit prohibitions on hedging/pledging support sound governance and reduce alignment risks from derivatives or collateralized share positions .
Monitoring items: Look for Daniel Cunha’s Form 3 and initial Form 4 to confirm starting share ownership and any sign-on grant details (share counts); the 2026 proxy should disclose his first full year of CFO compensation, ownership guideline progress, and PSU metrics for his awards .