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Langley Steinert

Executive Chair at CarGurusCarGurus
Executive
Board

About Langley Steinert

Founder of CarGurus and Executive Chair since January 2021; Chair of the Board since September 2017; director since March 2006. Age 61; MBA from Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth and BA from Georgetown University . CarGurus is a controlled company due to Steinert’s Class B holdings (ten votes per share), concentrating voting control and influencing governance structure . Recent performance context: 2024 TSR value of a $100 initial investment was $103.87 vs $68.68 in 2023; 2024 gross profit $738,945k and net income $20,972k .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
CarGurusFounder; CEO2006–2021Built online automotive marketplace; scaled multi-country platforms
CarGurusPresident2015–2019Led operational expansion and product evolution
TripAdvisorCo-founder; Chairman2000–2006Created leading travel content marketplace; exit platform experience

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
ApartmentAdvisor, Inc.Co-founder; Chairman2020–PresentApartment rental marketplace oversight
Tuck School of Business (Dartmouth)Board memberN/AAcademic board service

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Notes
202110,000Exec Chair salary intentionally set lower than market
202210,000Maintained at $10,000
202310,000Maintained at $10,000
202410,000Maintained at $10,000, at his request

Director pay: As Executive Chair, he received no additional compensation for director service .

Performance Compensation

ComponentYearMetric(s)TargetActual/PayoutVesting
Annual cash incentive2023Not eligibleN/AN/AN/A
RSU grant2021PSU (amended to time-based)N/AGrant-date fair value $1,876,728Amended Feb 2022 from performance to time-based
NQSO grant2021OptionsN/AGrant-date fair value $625,000Standard executive option agreement
RSU grant2022Time-based RSUsN/AGrant-date fair value $2,575,722Reflects 2022 PSU amendment modification expense
RSU grant2023Time-based RSUsN/A149,521 RSUs; grant-date fair value $2,499,9916.25% quarterly from 1/1/2023 over 4 years

2024 corporate bonus plan metrics (for NEOs generally): Gross Profit and Adjusted EBITDA with sliding-scale payouts; gross profit target payout 100% at plan, max 150% at 105% of plan; adjusted EBITDA target payout 100%, max 150% at 110% of plan . 2024 actuals drove payouts between ~98% and 146% for those metrics; Steinert had no disclosed bonus payout .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

As of April 10, 2025Class A SharesClass B SharesVoting Power %Notes
Beneficial ownership (direct + indirect)817,73214,215,08263.0%Includes trust holdings; Class B has 10 votes/share
Trust holdings51,369 Class A; 1,693,019 Class BHeld by The Langley Steinert Irrevocable Family Trust; Steinert disclaims beneficial ownership but may be deemed owner
Options exercisable (as of 4/10/2025)36,507Vested and exercisable
  • Hedging and pledging are prohibited by company policy, reducing pledging risk .
  • Equity forms include double-trigger change-of-control vesting acceleration; no single-trigger acceleration .

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerms
EmploymentAt-will; initial base salary in 2006 offer letter; eligibility for benefits
Restrictive covenantsNon-disclosure and IP assignment; 1-year post-termination non-compete, non-solicit of customers and employees (subject to extensions for breach)
ClawbackCompany maintains clawback policy complying with Exchange Act Rule 10D-1 and Nasdaq
Change-of-control vestingDouble-trigger acceleration of unvested RSUs/NQSOs upon termination without cause or for good reason within 12 months post-Change of Control

Potential payments (estimated, as of 12/31/2023, stock price $24.16):

ScenarioBase Salary ($)Bonus ($)Equity Acceleration ($)Health/Benefits ($)Other ($)Total ($)
Termination without cause
Resignation for good reason
Change of control (no termination)
Termination in connection with change of control4,407,171 4,407,171

Board Governance

  • Service history: Director since March 2006; Chair since September 2017; Executive Chair since January 2021 .
  • Independence: Board determined all directors except Steinert (Executive Chair) and Trevisan (CEO) are independent .
  • Committees: Audit Committee (Hickok, Chair; Gupta; Schwartz) and Compensation Committee (Kaufer, Chair; Conine) comprised of independent directors; Steinert does not serve on committees .
  • Leadership structure: Separate CEO and Chair; no Lead Independent Director; Executive Chair sets agendas and presides over meetings .
  • Controlled company: Avails Nasdaq controlled company exemptions, including no standalone nominating committee; director nominees selected by full Board .
  • Attendance: Directors averaged 98% attendance at Board/committee meetings in 2024; independent directors meet in executive sessions at least semi-annually .
  • Director pay: Non-employee directors receive cash retainers and annual RSUs; Steinert receives no additional director compensation .

Say‑on‑Pay 2025 results:

ItemForAgainstAbstainBroker Non‑Votes
NEO compensation (2024)181,447,79831,726,8361,027,9136,436,455

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and risk: Steinert’s cash compensation is de‑minimis ($10k) with compensation primarily in equity; aligns with shareholder interests but reduces pay-for-performance via annual cash incentives (he was ineligible in 2023) .
  • Equity design: Time-based RSUs dominate; 2021 PSUs for executives were amended to time-based RSUs in Feb 2022, reducing performance linkage; this award modification is a governance caution .
  • Change-of-control terms: Double-trigger only; no tax gross-ups for change-of-control benefits per governance practices .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Controlled company risks: Majority voting control by Steinert potentially limits minority shareholder influence and enables continued exemption usage (e.g., no nominating committee) .
  • Dual-role governance: Executive Chair + Chair with no Lead Independent Director concentrates agenda-setting and board leadership; compensating factor is independent committee membership .
  • Award modification: 2022 conversion of performance-based RSUs to time-based RSUs weakens pay-for-performance alignment .

Equity Ownership & Alignment Details

ItemDetail
Total beneficial ownership817,732 Class A; 14,215,082 Class B; 63.0% voting power
Vested/exercisable options36,507 Class A underlying options vested/exercisable as of 4/10/2025
Indirect holdingsTrust holds 51,369 Class A and 1,693,019 Class B; Steinert disclaims beneficial ownership but may be deemed beneficial owner
Hedging/pledgingProhibited by policy

Employment & Contracts

TermDetails
Offer letter (2006)At-will; benefits; non-disclosure; IP assignment; non-compete and non-solicit restrictions post-termination for 1 year

Performance & Track Record

YearTotal Shareholder Return (Value of $100)Net Income ($000s)Gross Profit ($000s)
202368.68 22,053 651,454
2024103.87 20,972 738,945

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Composition: Stephen Kaufer (Chair), Steven Conine; both independent .
  • Consultant: Compensia engaged as independent advisor; independence assessed; no conflicts noted .
  • Peer group: Committee maintains/updates tech peer group; removed New Relic and Qualys in 2024 for comparability reasons .
  • Policies: Clawback policy; compensation risk oversight; equity-centric compensation; double-trigger change-of-control; no change-of-control tax gross-ups .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Steinert’s compensation relies on multi-year, time‑based RSUs and minimal salary, combined with substantial personal ownership and voting control; alignment is high via ownership, but award design shifts (PSU→RSU) dilute performance sensitivity .
  • Governance risk premium: Controlled company status, no Lead Independent Director, and combined Executive Chair/Chair role can warrant a governance discount; however, independent committees and clawback policy mitigate some concerns .
  • Trading signals: Quarterly RSU vesting from his 2023 grant can create predictable supply; double-trigger acceleration creates optionality in M&A scenarios; no evidence of pledging reduces forced‑sale risk .
  • Retention risk: No cash severance and a modest salary for Steinert indicate retention driven by ownership/control rather than cash economics; change-of-control equity acceleration is the primary economic protection .