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Stephen Bramlage

Chief Financial Officer at CASEYS GENERAL STORESCASEYS GENERAL STORES
Executive

About Stephen Bramlage

Stephen P. Bramlage, Jr. is Casey’s General Stores’ Chief Financial Officer, appointed in 2020 and aged 54 as of the latest proxy. Prior roles include EVP & CFO at Aramark (2015–2020) and SVP & CFO at Owens‑Illinois (2012–2015), giving him deep finance, M&A, procurement, IT, and risk management credentials that align with Casey’s growth and operational complexity . During his tenure, Casey’s delivered strong performance: FY24 EBITDA reached $1,059,398,000 and GAAP net income was $501,972,000; a $100 Casey’s investment was valued at $217 by FY24, and FY23–FY25 LTIP PSUs vested at 250% of target driven by ROIC and EBITDA outperformance and a 25% rTSR modifier, with TSR of 120% at the 94th percentile vs. S&P 500; FY25 AIP paid out at 109% of target on record EBITDA of ~$1.2B .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
AramarkExecutive VP & CFO2015–2020Directed finance, M&A, procurement, IT, risk management and safety
Owens‑Illinois, Inc.SVP & CFO2012–2015Senior finance leadership at global packaging company

External Roles

  • No current public company board positions disclosed in the latest proxy .

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Salary ($)$720,000 $750,000 $780,000
Stock Awards ($)$1,648,674 $1,829,796 $1,906,171
Non‑Equity Incentive ($)$961,200 $1,177,500 $850,200
All Other Compensation ($)$65,908 $75,319 $115,168
Total ($)$3,395,782 $3,832,615 $3,651,539

AIP target and metrics

YearAIP Target Payout ($)Payout % of TargetKey Metrics
2023n/a178% 50% EBITDA; 25% same‑store inside sales; 25% fuel gross profit dollars
2024$750,000 157% 60% EBITDA; 40% same‑store inside sales
2025$780,000 (derived: $850,200 ÷ 109%) 109% 60% EBITDA; 40% same‑store inside sales

FY25 target derived from disclosed payout of $850,200 and payout ratio of 109%, implying a $780,000 target .

Perquisites detail (FY2023)

CategoryAmount ($)
401K match$18,203
Life insurance$0
Perquisites (auto allowance, identity theft, executive physical, financial planning, supplemental disability)$47,705
Total$65,908

Performance Compensation

LTIP structure and outcomes

ElementWeightingMetricrTSR modifierVesting
PSUs75% of LTIP 50% ROIC; 50% EBITDA ±25% based on top/bottom quartile TSR vs S&P 500 PSUs for FY2023–FY2025 awards vest in full on June 15, 2025–2027, respectively
RSUs25% of LTIP Time‑basedn/aVest in 3 equal annual installments from grant date

FY23–FY25 PSU payout (awards granted in FY2023, vested FY2025)

MetricTarget PayoutActual PayoutrTSR ModifierTotal PayoutVesting date
ROIC PSUs100% 200% +25% 250% June 15, 2025
EBITDA PSUs100% 200% +25% 250% June 15, 2025

PSU grant date maximum values (CFO)

YearMax PSU Grant Date Value ($)
2023$2,472,907
2024$2,744,807
2025$2,859,420

AIP performance goals vs actual (FY2024)

MetricThresholdTargetMaximumFY24 ActualWeighted payout
EBITDA$796M $937M $1,078M $1,059M 112%
Same‑store inside sales growth (%)1% 4% 7% 4.4% 45%
Aggregate payout157%

Option exercises and stock vested (FY2023)

MetricCFO
Options exercised (#)0
Stock awards vested (#)3,441
Value realized on vesting ($)$695,721

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership

As ofDirect401KTotal% of class
July 1, 2025 (shares outstanding: 37,180,985)26,754 369 27,123 <1%

Ownership guidelines compliance (Chief/SVPs required: 3x base salary)

MetricFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Requirement ($)$2,250,000 $2,340,000 $2,430,000
Owned ($)$5,346,350 $11,235,375 $15,435,157
StatusMet Met Met

Policies

  • Hedging and pledging of Company stock are prohibited .
  • No excise tax gross‑ups; “best net” approach under 280G; plans do not provide tax gross‑ups .
  • Compensation recovery (clawback) policy aligned to SEC restatement standards .

Employment Terms

Employment agreement

TermDetail
Agreement dateMay 12, 2020
RoleCFO until terminated
Base salary minimumAt least $675,000
AIP target opportunityAt least 75% of base salary
LTIP target grant valueAt least 175% of base salary
Non‑compete / non‑solicit18 months post‑termination; forfeiture of equity and unpaid severance upon breach
Special one‑time equity award (on appointment)Continues to vest for 24 months after involuntary termination not following a change‑of‑control (PSUs subject to performance)
Change‑of‑control provisionsDouble‑trigger per policy; separate change‑of‑control agreement governs

FY2025 termination benefits (as disclosed)

ScenarioSeverance Pay ($)Value of LTIs ($)AIP ($)Health Care ($)Disability ($)Total ($)
Voluntary resignation$850,200 $850,200
Retirement$850,200 $850,200
Death$6,919,421 $850,200 $7,769,621
Disability$6,919,421 $850,200 $4,071,957 $11,841,578
Involuntary for cause$850,200 $850,200
Involuntary not for cause/Good reason$1,170,000 $850,200 $31,823 $2,052,023
Change‑in‑control (not for cause/Good reason)$3,260,400 $9,209,242 $850,200 $42,430 $13,362,272
Change‑of‑control without termination$850,200 $850,200

Deferred compensation (FY2023)

MetricCFO
Executive contributions ($)$23,919
Aggregate earnings ($)$279
Aggregate balance at FY end ($)$49,506

Equity Ownership & Alignment Considerations

  • Beneficial ownership is modest (<1%), but Casey’s robust ownership policy requires 3x salary; CFO substantially exceeds requirements each year, strengthening alignment .
  • Company prohibits hedging and pledging, reducing misalignment risks; no stock options have been awarded since 2011, minimizing option‑related repricing risk .
  • Scheduled LTIP PSU vestings on June 15 across cycles and RSU annual vesting can create predictable taxable events that may result in Form 4 sales around vest dates; monitoring is warranted .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix is predominantly at‑risk: PSUs/RSUs comprise 75%/25% of LTIP across 2023–2025; AIP uses multi‑metric design centered on EBITDA and inside sales growth, with payout ranges evidenced by 178% (FY23), 157% (FY24), and 109% (FY25) reflecting rigorous targets and lower FY25 payout vs. prior years .
  • The LTIP’s ROIC and EBITDA metrics, with a ±25% rTSR modifier, delivered a 250% payout for FY23 grants based on 120% TSR at the 94th percentile, indicating strong pay‑for‑performance linkage .
  • No tax gross‑ups, clawback in the event of restatement, and prohibition on hedging/pledging are shareholder‑friendly governance features .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: CFO exceeds ownership guidelines by a wide margin and is compensated predominantly via PSUs and RSUs tied to ROIC, EBITDA, and rTSR, which historically have paid out at high levels due to strong performance—supportive for long‑term value creation .
  • Retention risk: Employment terms include 18‑month non‑compete and meaningful severance ($1.17M base + COBRA for standard involuntary termination; $3.26M under change‑in‑control), plus continued vesting of special one‑time equity post‑termination—reduces flight risk but increases change‑in‑control costs .
  • Trading signals: Predictable RSU/PSU vesting timelines (June 15 cycles; annual RSU tranches) can lead to periodic insider transactions to cover taxes; monitor Form 4 activity around vest dates and AIP payout windows for selling pressure .
  • Execution: Company’s FY24 EBITDA of $1.06B and FY25 record EBITDA (~$1.2B) coupled with top‑quartile TSR during FY23–FY25 underpin confidence in Bramlage’s financial stewardship; continued emphasis on EBITDA and inside sales in AIP sustains operational focus .
  • Governance: High say‑on‑pay approval (97.0%–97.9% across 2022–2024) and conservative policies (no options since 2011, no pledging, clawback, no gross‑ups) reduce governance risk .