Andrew Cobb
About Andrew Cobb
Andrew F. Cobb is Executive Vice President – Accounting at CBL, promoted to this role in September 2021 after serving as Senior Vice President – Director of Accounting (2015–2021), and Vice President roles since 2002; he is 56 as of April 2025, a CPA licensed in Tennessee, and serves on CBL’s Benefits Committee . He joined CBL in June 2002 after 11 years at Arthur Andersen LLP where he was an audit manager (1996–2002); he holds a B.S. in Accounting from Tennessee Technological University and is a member of the Tennessee Society of CPAs . Company performance context: CBL reported a 28.5% total stockholder return in 2024, and executive incentive metrics emphasize AFFO, NOI, leasing activity, and ESG execution .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. | Executive Vice President – Accounting | 2021–present | Senior leadership over accounting; member of Benefits Committee |
| CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. | Senior Vice President – Director of Accounting | 2015–2021 | Led corporate accounting and reporting processes |
| CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. | Vice President – Director of Accounting | 2007–2015 | Scaled accounting leadership through expansion cycles |
| CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. | Vice President – Accounting | 2002–2007 | Established internal accounting controls post-IPO growth |
| Arthur Andersen LLP | Audit Manager | 1996–2002 | Led audit engagements; SEC reporting experience |
| Arthur Andersen LLP | Audit staff/manager-in-training | 1991–1996 | Foundation in GAAP/REIT audit practices |
External Roles
No external directorships or public board roles disclosed for Andrew Cobb in the latest proxies .
Fixed Compensation
- Base salary, target bonus, and actual bonus for Andrew Cobb are not disclosed; CBL’s proxy provides detailed compensation only for Named Executive Officers (CEO, President, CFO, COO, CLO) .
Performance Compensation
While Andrew Cobb’s individual incentive structure is not disclosed, CBL’s AIP and LTIP frameworks set performance alignment for executive officers and NEOs:
| Program | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 AIP – Corporate Goals | Financial Goals (AFFO, NOI, mortgage maturities) | 36% for other NEOs | Threshold 50%; Target 100%; Stretch 150% | Company explains payout scaling; quantitative results set by Committee | |
| 2024 AIP – Corporate Goals | Operational Goals (leasing sq ft; redevelopment/anchor transactions; ESG goals) | 24% for other NEOs | 4.2mm sq ft; 9 projects/transactions; 4 ESG goals | 4.48mm sq ft; 3 projects + 8 transactions; all 5 ESG goals; Overall Operational Payout 143.3% | |
| LTIP 2024–2026 PSUs | Absolute Annualized TSR | 70% | Threshold 6.0%; Target 12.0%; Max 20.0% | Earned at end of 3-year period; dividend equivalents accumulate; then full vest 1 year post-issuance | |
| LTIP 2024–2026 PSUs | Relative TSR vs. FTSE NAREIT Retail sector (ex free-standing) | 30% | 50th percentile target; 75th percentile max | Earned at end of 3-year period (pro-rata on terminations without cause/death/disability/CIC) | |
| Annual Restricted Stock (NEOs) | Time-based | 30% CEO; 40% others | N/A | Dividends and voting during restriction | Vests ratably over 3 years; full acceleration on termination without cause, death/disability, or Company termination within 24 months post-CIC |
Notes:
- 2025 AIP retained the structure with 60% corporate goals for other NEOs and adjusted target bonuses +5% vs. 2024; metrics include AFFO (as adjusted), NOI, leasing sq ft, development/anchor transactions, and ESG goals .
- Beginning 2025 LTIP, Committee added discretion for pro-rata vesting upon voluntary retirement; 2024 LTIP removed the prior 2-year post-vesting holding requirement on net shares for PSUs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (latest individual) | Andrew Cobb was not individually listed in the 2025 or 2024 security ownership tables; executives and directors as a group owned 1,065,053 shares as of April 8, 2025 . |
| Historical ownership (post-Ch. 11 emergence) | Andrew F. Cobb and spouse received 183 new common shares in exchange for cancelled legacy holdings under the Plan in 2022; not indicative of current ownership . |
| Ownership guidelines (executives) | Executive Vice Presidents must hold CBL stock valued at least 3x prior calendar year’s base salary within 5 years from the later of Nov 10, 2022 or becoming an executive officer . |
| Hedging policy | Officers and directors (VP and above) are prohibited from hedging/monetization activities (short sales, options, derivatives, exchange funds, collars, etc.); indirect transactions via third-party-managed vehicles excluded . |
| Pledging | No pledging-specific disclosure located in scanned proxies for executive officers; anti-hedging policy does not expressly address pledging . |
| Clawback | Updated Oct 2, 2023 to comply with SEC/NYSE; applies to Section 16 officers (including NEOs) for incentive comp tied to financial metrics in prior 3 fiscal years if restatement required . |
| Compliance status | Individual compliance progress versus ownership guidelines for Andrew Cobb not disclosed . |
Employment Terms
Andrew Cobb’s individual employment agreement terms are not disclosed in the proxy; summary terms below reflect NEO agreements and equity award terms for context:
| Provision | Terms (NEOs) |
|---|---|
| Agreement term and renewals | Initial term to April 1, 2024 with automatic 1-year renewals; November 2023 amendments clarified post-restructuring terms . |
| Severance – termination without cause or for Good Reason post-CIC | 2x sum of base salary + specified target bonus; insurance continuation 18 months (24 months CEO) . |
| Death/disability | 2x base salary (CEO: 1x base + $953k); AIP pro-rata target payout in certain cases . |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | 6-month non-compete; 1-year non-solicit post-termination . |
| Restricted stock vesting on separation | For 2023/2024 LTIP RSAs: 100% acceleration on termination without cause, death/disability, or Company termination within 24 months post-CIC . |
| PSU treatment on separation | Pro-rata shares earned for terminations without cause, death/disability, or certain CIC-related terminations within 24 months, based on performance to date . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Executive ownership guidelines (3x salary for EVPs) and strict anti-hedging policy support long-term alignment; clawback coverage strengthens pay-for-performance discipline, though pledging exposure is not addressed explicitly in disclosures .
- Retention risk: NEO-level non-compete and severance structures are robust; Andrew’s specific agreement is not disclosed, limiting precision on his protections—however, EVP-level roles typically follow similar frameworks, reducing near-term retention risk .
- Trading signals: Lack of disclosed individual ownership and no Form 4 visibility in proxies constrain analysis of near-term selling pressure; consider monitoring Section 16 filings for Andrew Cobb for real-time insider activity. Company TSR-driven PSU hurdles at the high end for REITs create sensitivity to stock performance outcomes over 2024–2026 and 2025–2027 cycles .
- Execution track record: Two-decade tenure through restructuring and emergence indicates continuity in accounting leadership; company-level AIP metrics tied to AFFO/NOI/leasing, with 2024 operational overachievement, suggest operational discipline supporting incentives, though Cobb-specific payouts are not disclosed .
Key data gaps: Individual compensation (base, bonus, grants), current beneficial ownership, pledging status, and any Form 4 activity for Andrew Cobb are not disclosed in proxies scanned; targeted monitoring of SEC Section 16 filings is recommended for trading signal analysis.