Chad J. Doellinger
Chief Legal & Administrative Officer and Corporate Secretary at CBRE
Executive
About Chad J. Doellinger
CBRE’s Chief Legal & Administrative Officer and Corporate Secretary (since January 2025); previously EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary (Aug 2023–Jan 2025), Chief Transformation Officer (May–Aug 2023) and SVP, Deputy General Counsel (May 2020–May 2023). Age 49; B.A. and B.S. from the University of Iowa; J.D. from Yale Law School . Company performance context for incentive alignment: 2024 Core EPS was $5.10 vs. $3.84 in 2023 and exceeded the 2024 Core EPS target of $4.40; CBRE’s indexed TSR outperformed its peer group each year over 2020–2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBRE | Chief Legal & Administrative Officer and Corporate Secretary | Jan 2025–present | Enterprise risk, legal leadership, and corporate governance oversight . |
| CBRE | EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary | Aug 2023–Jan 2025 | Led legal function; supported board refresh (three directors added) . |
| CBRE | Chief Transformation Officer | May 2023–Aug 2023 | Transformation initiatives across corporate functions . |
| CBRE | SVP, Deputy General Counsel | May 2020–May 2023 | Senior legal leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greenberg Traurig, LLP | Partner | Nov 2018–May 2020 | Complex legal advisory; foundational expertise for CBRE roles . |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus ($) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 600,000 | 850,000 (combined target under SMBP and EBP, pro‑rated) | 1,181,400 (combined SMBP and EBP, pro‑rated) | Annual cash awards split 50% financial (Core EBITDA) and 50% strategic; financial payout 138% (111% achievement), strategic payout 140% . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (2024)
| Component | Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial | Core EBITDA | 50% | Internal target | 111% of target | 138% of financial component |
| Strategic | Strategic objectives (legal leadership rebuild, efficiency, cost savings, board refresh) | 50% | Qualitative | Achieved | 140% of strategic component |
| Total Payout | — | — | 2024 target $850,000 (pro‑rated) | — | 2024 payout $1,181,400 (pro‑rated) |
Long-Term Incentive Design (granted March 5, 2024)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target Units/Shares | Vesting | Performance Curve / Goal | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Vesting RSUs | 03/05/2024 | 8,434 RSUs | 25% per year on Mar 5, 2025–2028 | N/A | 774,916 |
| Relative TSR PSUs | 03/05/2024 | 4,217 target; 7,379 max | Earned shares vest Mar 5, 2027 | 25th–75th percentile; 175% max; linear interpolation | 454,382 |
| Core EPS PSUs (2024 one-year) | 03/05/2024 | 4,217 target; 2,108 threshold; 8,434 max | Earned shares vest Mar 5, 2027 | Threshold $3.74; Target $4.40; Max $5.06 Core EPS; 0–200% payout | 387,458 |
| Totals | — | — | — | — | 1,616,756 (total stock awards, accounting value) |
Certified results: 2024 Core EPS was $5.10 (payout = 200% of target for 2024 Core EPS PSUs) . Company closing price on grant date (for context): $91.88 (03/05/2024) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 4,831 shares directly/indirectly owned; 736 acquirable within 60 days; total 5,567 . |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | ~0.0019% (5,567 / 299,856,558 shares outstanding as of Mar 24, 2025; calculation based on disclosed figures) . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Required minimum 3x base salary for NEOs (including Mr. Doellinger) . |
| Trading/Hedging/Pledging Policy | Section 16 officers prohibited from hedging, shorting, and pledging company stock; trades limited to windows and pre‑clearance or 10b5‑1 plans . |
| Deferred Compensation | Elected to defer $1,181,400 of 2024 bonus into the DCP; no company contributions reported; no year‑end balance reported for him . |
2024 Award Vesting Schedule and Potential Selling Pressure
| Date | Instrument | Shares/Units | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 5, 2025 | Time RSUs | 2,108 (25% of 8,434) | Annual tranche; similar tranches on Mar 5, 2026/2027/2028. |
| Mar 5, 2027 | Core EPS PSUs (2024 grant) | 8,434 earned (200% of 4,217 target) | Full vest on 3/5/2027. |
| Mar 5, 2027 | Relative TSR PSUs (2024 grant) | 4,217 at target; 7,379 max (actual TBD) | Earned amount vests on 3/5/2027. |
Valuation reference: Hypothetical death/disability table values Mr. Doellinger’s 2024 award package at $2,768,250 using $131.29 year‑end 2024 stock price and certified performance assumptions (Core EPS 200%; rTSR at target) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Plan Coverage | Participant in CBRE Severance Plan; CEO is Tier I; other NEOs (incl. Doellinger) are Tier II . |
| Cash Severance Multiple | Tier II: 1.5x (base salary + target bonus) on Qualifying Termination outside CIC window . |
| Pro‑Rata Bonus | Pay pro‑rated annual bonus for year of termination based on actual performance for executive officers . |
| Change‑in‑Control | Double‑trigger only (no single‑trigger payments or automatic vesting) . CIC protection window: 120 days before to 2 years after CIC . |
| Equity on Qualifying Termination (non‑CIC) | Pro‑rated acceleration for time‑vest RSUs; pro‑rated continued eligibility for performance RSUs with deferred delivery; 18‑month “restricted period” for Tier II; 50% delivery deferral and forfeiture if covenants breached . |
| Equity on CIC (if employed at CIC) | Performance awards convert to vesting‑eligible shares; if not assumed, immediate vest; if assumed, convert to time‑vest and vest on original schedule (subject to Qualifying Termination provisions) . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Non‑solicit of customers and employees; compliance required through restricted period (18 months for Tier II) . |
| Clawback | Applies to cash‑ and performance‑based equity for Section 16 officers upon certain restatements (3‑year lookback), irrespective of misconduct . |
| “Cause”/“Good Reason” | Defined terms include willful failure/misconduct and specified adverse changes (material duty change, >10% pay/bonus reduction, equity grant failure, >50‑mile relocation, etc.) . |
Hypothetical Severance Economics (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Pro‑Rata Bonus ($) | Accelerated/Continued Equity ($) | Health/Welfare ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying Termination (no CIC) | 2,325,000 | 1,181,400 | 2,552,671 | 42,856 | 6,101,927 |
| Qualifying Termination (during CIC protection period) | 2,325,000 | 1,181,400 | 3,526,975 | 42,856 | 7,076,231 |
Notes: Figures assume no 280G cutback; equity values use $131.29 year‑end 2024 price and certified performance assumptions .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 cash incentive tied 50% to Core EBITDA and 50% to strategic goals; 2024 Core EPS PSUs paid at 200% on $5.10 Core EPS vs $4.40 target, reinforcing earnings sensitivity in equity mix .
- Retention vs. selling pressure: Low current ownership (5,567 shares; ~0.0019% of outstanding) but substantial unvested equity with a 2027 cliff (Core EPS PSUs at 200% and rTSR PSUs) plus annual time‑vest tranches through 2028 suggests strong near‑term retention incentives and potential concentrated selling windows around March 2027–2028 .
- Governance and risk controls: Robust clawback, hedging/pledging prohibitions, and double‑trigger CIC treatment mitigate misalignment/entrenchment risk; severance multiple at 1.5x for Tier II appears moderate by market standards and is conditioned on covenants .
- Execution track record: 2024 strategic achievements include legal leadership rebuild, function efficiencies, corporate cost savings, and board refresh—consistent with high strategic bonus payout (140%), indicating strong internal execution; company TSR outperformed peers consistently over 2020–2024, supporting incentive outcomes .