Emma E. Giamartino
CBRE GROUPAbout Emma E. Giamartino
CBRE’s Chief Financial Officer since July 2021, age 42, with a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Duke University and an MBA from Columbia Business School . Under her finance leadership in 2024, CBRE delivered 14.2% net revenue growth, 22.4% Core EBITDA growth, and a 41% one‑year TSR (vs. 25% for the S&P 500), supporting a strong pay‑for‑performance outcome .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBRE | Chief Financial Officer | Jul 2021 – Present | Led investor relations repositioning; rebuilt finance leadership; supported major transactions (Turner & Townsend combination; Industrious acquisition); drove cost/transformation initiatives . |
| CBRE | Chief Investment Officer | Jan 2021 – Jul 2021 | Advanced capital allocation and strategic investments . |
| CBRE | EVP, Corporate Development & Global Head of M&A | Jun 2020 – Jan 2021 | Led global M&A; strategy execution . |
| CBRE | Head of M&A, Americas | Feb 2018 – Jun 2020 | Led CBRE’s Americas M&A pipeline and execution . |
| Verizon Communications | Director, Corporate Development | Mar 2016 – Feb 2018 | Corporate development and deal execution . |
| Nomura | TMT Investment Banking | Jun 2010 – Mar 2016 | Advisory and capital markets in TMT . |
| Assured Guaranty (FSA) | RMBS group | Early career | Structured finance experience . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBRE Acquisition Holdings, Inc. | Director | Prior to merger with Altus Power | Served on SPAC board that merged with Altus Power . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 680,000 | 695,000 | 754,808 |
| 2024 Target Base Salary ($) | — | — | 775,000 (increased $75,000 in 2024) |
| 2024 EBP Target Bonus ($) | — | — | 1,160,000 (increased $60,000 in 2024) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash (Executive Bonus Plan, EBP) – FY 2024
| Component | Weight | Metric/Target Design | Actual | Payout Factor | Dollar Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial | 50% | Core EBITDA vs plan (global) | 111% of target | 138% | — |
| Strategic | 50% | Finance function strategy, support transformation | Committee rating | 140% | — |
| Total EBP | 100% | Max 175% of target | — | — | 1,612,264 (vs. $1,160,000 target) |
Long‑Term Incentives (granted 3/5/2024)
| Award Type | Target Units/Value | Performance Curve | Vesting | Status/Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time‑Vesting RSUs | 22,121 units; $2,032,477 grant‑date fair value | N/A | 25% per year on 3/5 in 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028 | Service‑based |
| Relative TSR PSUs | 11,060 target units; $1,191,715 grant‑date fair value | 0% at ≤25th; 100% at 50th; 175% at ≥75th percentile; linear between | Cliff on 3/5/2027 (after 3‑yr period) | In‑flight; SEC table shows 175% maximum potential (19,355 units) per disclosure rules |
| Core EPS PSUs (2024 plan) | 11,060 target units; $1,016,193 grant‑date fair value | 50% at threshold ($3.74), 100% at target ($4.40), 200% at max ($5.06) | Cliff on 3/5/2027 | Achieved 200% (22,120 units) on $5.10 Core EPS certified 2/27/2025 |
Additional outstanding performance awards:
- 2023 Core EPS PSUs: Earned at 60.1% of target; 12,266 units scheduled to vest 3/10/2026 .
Multi‑Year Pay Mix and Equity Design
- 2024 NEO mix (ex‑CEO): 50% time‑vesting RSUs, 25% rTSR PSUs, 25% Core EPS PSUs .
- Introduced rTSR into annual LTI starting 2024 after investor feedback .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 32,575 shares as of 3/24/2025 (<1%) . Outstanding shares: 299,856,558 . |
| Ownership as % of OS | ≈0.011% (32,575 / 299,856,558; figures cited) |
| Unvested Time‑based RSUs | 43,851 units; value $5,757,198 at $131.29 (12/31/2024) |
| Unearned/Performance RSUs | 53,741 units; value $7,055,656 at $131.29 (12/31/2024); includes 200%‑earned 2024 Core EPS and 60.1%‑earned 2023 Core EPS, and 2024 rTSR at disclosure basis |
| Options | No stock options outstanding; company has not granted options in recent years |
| Ownership Guidelines | 3x base salary requirement; as of 12/31/2024, all NEOs except a newly designated officer were in compliance (i.e., met) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers; trading pre‑clearance, windows, and Rule 10b5‑1 plan guidelines in place |
| 2024 Shares Vested (supply) | 45,523 shares vested to CFO in 2024, value realized $4,158,378 (dispositions not disclosed) |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Offer Letter (7/28/2021) | Base salary $680,000; target bonus $1,000,000; annual RSUs ≈$1,820,000 (50% time/50% performance starting 2022); $1,000,000 promotional cash award subject to clawback if certain terminations within 3 years; restrictive covenants (non‑compete, non‑solicit) |
| 2024 Target Changes | Base salary increased to $775,000; EBP target to $1,160,000; annual equity target to $4,065,000 to align with market/retention |
| Severance Plan (Tier II) | Upon Qualifying Termination: 1.5x (base + target bonus), pro‑rated actual bonus, up to 18 months health coverage at active rates (with reimbursement for excess and related taxes if COBRA), up to 12 months outplacement, and prorated/continued vesting of equity per plan; double‑trigger CIC acceleration; no single‑trigger benefits |
| Hypothetical Severance (12/31/2024) | No CIC: $13,627,658 total (Cash $2,902,500; Pro‑rata Bonus $1,612,264; RSU treatment $9,070,038; Benefits $42,856) . During CIC period: $16,281,422 total (Cash $2,902,500; Pro‑rata Bonus $1,612,264; RSU treatment $11,723,802; Benefits $42,856) |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery of cash‑based and performance‑based equity comp for restatements, regardless of misconduct/fault |
| Perquisites | Minimal: standard employee plans, out‑of‑country medical coverage, annual physical |
| Deferred Compensation | Not a participant in 2024; only two NEOs participated (Doellinger; Dhandapani) |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift in equity mix/rigor: Introduction of rTSR PSUs in 2024 and higher equity target (+$865k YoY) increase performance‑linked, multi‑year pay and retention alignment .
- Cash vs. equity: Base and target bonus increased modestly in 2024 (+$75k and +$60k), with larger increase in equity target; overall mix remains predominantly at‑risk .
- Performance stringency: 2023 two‑year Core EPS PSUs paid 60.1% amid tougher market; 2024 one‑year Core EPS PSUs paid 200% on $5.10 Core EPS vs. $4.40 target, showing sensitivity to operating environment and budgeted targets .
- Governance discipline: No single‑trigger CIC, strong clawback, ownership requirements, hedging/pledging bans; Say‑on‑Pay support ~94% in 2024 .
Performance & Track Record (selected 2024 highlights for CFO role)
- Led investor relations repositioning and talent upgrades, aiding positive re‑rating progress .
- Negotiated Turner & Townsend and Industrious transactions; rebuilt finance leadership .
- Drove transformation office/cost initiatives across CBRE .
- Company results: Net revenue +14.2%, Core EBITDA +22.4%, Core EPS $5.10, 1‑year TSR 41% vs. S&P 500 25% .
Related‑Party Transactions / Red Flags
- No CFO‑specific related‑party transactions disclosed for 2024; broader policy requires audit committee review/approval .
- Prohibited hedging/pledging and strong insider trading controls reduce alignment risks .
- No option repricings; company has not been granting options in recent years .
Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking reference)
- Accenture, AECOM, Aon, ADP, Cognizant, Cushman & Wakefield, DXC, FIS, Fiserv, Fluor, HPE, Jacobs, JLL, ManpowerGroup, Marsh & McLennan, BNY Mellon, Willis Towers Watson .
- CBRE does not target a specific percentile; uses market data among multiple factors .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑Pay approval ~94% at 2024 meeting; investor feedback influenced adding rTSR to LTI in 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment signals: High at‑risk pay, robust clawback/ownership rules, and prohibition of pledging/hedging suggest solid shareholder alignment and lower governance risk .
- Retention/capacity: Step‑up in 2024 equity target and multi‑year vesting across large unvested awards (time‑based and PSUs) support retention but create periodic vest‑related share supply (e.g., 45.5k vested shares in 2024); absent Form 4s, selling behavior unknown .
- Performance sensitivity: EBP and PSUs tied to Core EBITDA/Core EPS and relative TSR create direct leverage to fundamentals and market‑relative returns; 2024 outcomes (138%/140% EBP factors; 200% Core EPS PSUs) reflect improved environment and execution .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger structure and defined multiples (Tier II 1.5x) cap parachute risk; modeled severance values provide transparency to downside/transition scenarios .