Robert E. Sulentic
About Robert E. Sulentic
Robert E. Sulentic, age 68, is Chair, President and Chief Executive Officer of CBRE. He became CEO in December 2012 and assumed the additional role of Board Chair in November 2023. He previously served as Group President (APAC, EMEA, Development Services), CFO, and President at CBRE, and earlier was CFO, CEO and Board Chair at Trammell Crow Company. He holds a B.A. from Iowa State University and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School . Under his leadership, 2024 revenue was $35.8B, net revenue $20.9B, and Core EBITDA $2.7B; total shareholder return (TSR) was 41% over 1 year, 21% over 3 years, and 114% over 5 years as of 12/31/2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBRE | President & CEO | Dec 2012–present | Led global platform across APAC, EMEA, development; drove scale, resilient/net revenue growth and capital deployment . |
| CBRE | Group President (APAC, EMEA, Development Services) | — | Built diversified, integrated services across geographies and segments . |
| CBRE | Chief Financial Officer | — | Strengthened financial stewardship and global operating discipline . |
| CBRE | President (all business segments) | — | Oversight of segment execution and margin focus . |
| Trammell Crow Company | CFO; CEO; Board Chair | — | Led the developer acquired by CBRE in 2006; strategic platform integration . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBRE Acquisition Holdings, Inc. (merged with Altus Power) | Board Chair | — | SPAC governance; transaction closed into Altus Power . |
| Staples, Inc. | Independent Board Chair | — | Oversight of large retail transformation . |
| Trammell Crow Company | Board Chair | — | Strategy and governance of development platform . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (target) | — | — | $1,350,000 (increase of $100,000) |
| EBP Target (annual bonus target) | — | — | $2,700,000 (increase of $200,000) |
| Annual Equity Target (grant value) | — | — | $15,450,000 (increase of $700,000) |
| Actual Salary Paid | — | — | $1,323,077 |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | — | — | $16,339,427 |
| Actual EBP Payout (Non-Equity Incentive) | — | — | $3,887,683 |
| Total 2024 Reported Compensation | — | — | $21,556,187 |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric/Design | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Executive Bonus Plan (EBP) – Financial | Core EBITDA vs plan; segment operating profit for segment leaders | 50% of EBP | 100% payout at target; 200% payout at ≥130%; eligibility threshold 70% of target | 2024 payouts above target for NEOs (CEO included); actual EBP payout for CEO $3,887,683 | Cash or stock; paid annually |
| Executive Bonus Plan (EBP) – Strategic | Pre-set strategic objectives (CEO & Section 16 officers) | 50% of EBP | Up to 150% payout component | Included in total EBP; Committee determines outcome | Annual |
| Relative TSR Equity Award (Performance RSUs) | TSR rank vs 100 S&P 500 “neighbors” by market cap | Part of LTI | 0% at ≤25th percentile; 100% at 50th; 175% at ≥75th | Earned amount cliff vests at 3-year mark post certification | Full vest on or after March 5, 2027 |
| Core EPS Equity Award (Performance RSUs) | FY2024 Core EPS (0–200% schedule) | Part of LTI | Threshold 50%; Target 100%; Max 200% | 2024 Core EPS Awards paid at 200%; 2023 Core EPS Awards paid at 60.1% | Full vest on March 5, 2027 (2024 awards) |
| Time-Vesting RSUs | Annual RSU grant | Part of LTI | — | — | 25% per year in 2025–2028 |
Additional 2024 CEO grant specifics: Relative TSR RSUs target units 56,051; Core EPS RSUs target units 56,051; grant date March 5, 2024. Aggregate grant-date fair values at maximum performance: TSR $10,569,090; Core EPS $10,299,932 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (shares) | 2019: 546,628 ; 2022: 638,795 ; 2023: 823,328 ; 2025: 987,097 (includes 37,600 held by Sulentic Family Foundation; CEO has no pecuniary interest in foundation shares). Each <1% of outstanding . |
| Stock Ownership Requirements (CEO) | 6x base salary; if below, must retain 100% of net shares from option exercise/RSU vesting until compliant . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Policy prohibits hedging, short-selling and pledging of CBRE stock (directors and officers) . |
| Outstanding CEO Grants (2024 cycle) | Time-vesting RSUs (25% annually 2025–2028); Relative TSR RSUs (earned 0–175%, vest 2027); Core EPS RSUs (earned up to 200%, vest 2027) . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment start (CEO) | CEO since December 2012; Board Chair since November 2023 . |
| Retirement eligibility | CEO became retirement eligible in September 2018; SEA treatment summarized below . |
| Severance/change-in-control framework | Under CBRE severance plan and Strategic Equity Award (SEA) terms: pro-rata vesting for time-vesting SEAs on SEA Qualifying Termination or certain retirements; full vesting on SEA QT following change-in-control; rTSR and rEPS SEAs earn/vest based on performance and specific measurement dates; 2023 summary details provided for CEO . |
| Historical severance illustrations (2019) | Hypothetical 12/31/2019: Cash severance $6,000,000; pro-rata bonus $2,415,000; accelerated vesting value $34,708,036; total $43,148,547; slightly higher under change-in-control protection period . |
| Clawback policy | Mandatory recovery of cash-based and performance-based equity incentive comp upon financial restatement; applies regardless of misconduct . |
| Anti-hedging/pledging; compliance | Strict prohibitions; securities compliance policy requires pre-approval and Rule 10b5-1 adherence . |
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 2012; Board Chair since Nov 2023; serves on Executive Committee .
- Dual-role implications: CBRE combines Chair and CEO roles; Board asserts strong lead independent director (Shira Goodman) with meaningful oversight; majority independent board; independent committee chairs; regular executive sessions without management .
- Committee memberships: Executive Committee member; other committees are fully independent; CEO is not on Audit/Comp/ Governance committees .
- Board meeting attendance: Board met 8 times in 2024; each incumbent director attended at least 75% of board/committee meetings (aggregate; Clancy joined Jan 2025) .
- Director compensation: Employee directors (including CEO) do not receive director fees .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 execution: Net revenue growth +14.2%; capital deployment ~$1.8B (including ~$1.1B M&A: J&J Worldwide Services, Direct Line Global) and $644M buybacks (5,110,624 shares); ended 2024 with <1.0x net leverage .
- TSR: 1-year 41% (vs S&P 500 25%); 5-year 114% (vs S&P 500 97%) .
- Recognition: Fortune Most Admired (15th consecutive), Ethisphere World’s Most Ethical (12th consecutive), Dow Jones Sustainability Index inclusion; multiple sustainability awards .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- 2024 adjustments raised CEO salary (+$100k), EBP target (+$200k), and equity target (+$700k) to align with market and retention needs .
- LTI mix enhanced with new Relative TSR performance RSUs beginning in 2024 after investor feedback; continued Core EPS PSUs and time-vesting RSUs strengthen pay-for-performance and retention balance .
- Strong shareholder support: ~94% say-on-pay approval at 2024 annual meeting; Board recommended “FOR” 2024 NEO compensation .
Compensation Peer Group & Governance
- Compensation Committee (independent) engages FW Cook as independent consultant; reviews pay design, market alignment, and governance; Committee members meet NYSE and SEC independence standards .
- Relative TSR peer comparison uses S&P 500 “adjacent” market cap cohort (50 above/50 below) for percentile ranking .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Alignment policies: strict anti-hedging/pledging; stock ownership requirements for executives and directors; clawback policy; majority independent board and committees; no poison pill .
- Dual-role Chair/CEO: mitigated by strong lead independent director, independent committees, executive sessions, and governance guidelines .
- Compensation risk assessment overseen by Compensation Committee; EBP tied to Core EBITDA with thresholds and caps .
Company Performance Context
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($USD) | $27,746,000,000 | $30,828,000,000 | $31,949,000,000 | $35,767,000,000 |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $2,092,000,000* | $2,030,000,000* | $1,828,000,000 | $2,151,000,000* |
Values with * retrieved from S&P Global.
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Annual EBP tied to Core EBITDA and strategic outcomes; LTI now includes both Relative TSR (peer-relative) and Core EPS PSUs, increasing sensitivity to both operating execution and shareholder returns .
- Retention and vesting overhang: Significant 2024 grants with cliff vest in 2027 and annual RSU vesting 2025–2028 create identifiable windows for potential insider selling pressure; however, ownership requirements and anti-pledging constraints moderate risk .
- Governance balance on dual-role risk: Strong lead independent director, independent committees, and regular executive sessions offset Chair/CEO combination; continued high say-on-pay support suggests investor confidence in program design .
- Performance momentum: 2024 Core EPS PSU paid at 200% and net revenue/Core EBITDA growth underscore cyclical recovery leverage; capital deployment and low net leverage support strategic flexibility .