Vikram Kohli
Chief Operating Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Advisory Services at CBRE
Executive
About Vikram Kohli
Vikram Kohli, age 45, is CBRE’s Chief Operating Officer (since April 2023) and Chief Executive Officer, Advisory Services (since January 2025). He joined CBRE in June 2001 (India, Transactions team), with prior senior roles including CEO, CBRE Platform; Global Group President, Business Intelligence; and COO, South East Asia. He holds a B.B.A. from Delhi University (College of Business Studies) and an M.B.A. from Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management . In 2024, CBRE delivered Core EPS of $5.10 (certified) and achieved 111% of its Core EBITDA target (global), driving above-target annual bonus outcomes; company TSR for 2024 was 214 vs. 122 for the peer group .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes/Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBRE | Chief Operating Officer | Apr 2023–present | Enterprise COO; named CEO, Advisory Services in Jan-2025 |
| CBRE | Chief Executive Officer, Advisory Services | Jan 2025–present | Oversees Advisory Services segment |
| CBRE | CEO, CBRE Platform | Jan 2023–Apr 2023 | Platform leadership |
| CBRE | Global Group President, Business Intelligence | Jul 2021–Dec 2022 | Global BI leadership |
| CBRE | Vice President, Corporate Finance | Jul 2020–Jul 2021 | Finance leadership |
| CBRE | Chief Operating Officer, South East Asia | Apr 2019–Jul 2020 | Regional operations |
| CBRE | Regional Managing Director, South East Asia | Apr 2018–Apr 2019 | Regional leadership |
| CBRE | Executive Director, Sales Management, Asia Pacific | Apr 2014–Apr 2018 | APAC sales mgmt. |
| CBRE | Senior Director, Global Transactions | Aug 2012–Apr 2014 | Global transactions |
| CBRE (India) | Transactions team (occupier advisory, office leasing) | Jun 2001–2012 | Joined CBRE in India |
External Roles
- No external public-company directorships or external executive roles disclosed for Mr. Kohli in the 2025 Proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary Rate ($) | Salary Earned ($) | Target Annual Bonus ($) | Actual Annual Bonus ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 850,000 | 809,615 | 1,275,000 | 1,835,850 |
- Annual bonus plan (EBP) structure: 50% financial (Core EBITDA vs plan for enterprise roles) and 50% strategic objectives; the 2024 global financial component achieved 111% of target, paying 138% on that half. Mr. Kohli’s total EBP payout equaled ~$1.836m (≈144% of his $1.275m target) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus (EBP) – Mechanics and 2024 Outcome
| Component | Weight | Target | Actual 2024 | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial (Core EBITDA – global) | 50% | $2,443m | $2,721m | 111% achievement → 138% payout (on financial half) |
| Strategic objectives | 50% | Pre-set per NEO | Determined via scorecard | 0–150% range; CEO awarded 150% for 2024 (reference for framework); Kohli total EBP was ~$1.836m (≈144% of target) |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 Grants (3/5/2024)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target Units (#) | Max Units (#) | Vesting | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Vesting RSUs | 03/05/2024 | 23,808 | n/a | 25% on each of Mar 5, 2025/26/27/28 | 2,187,479 |
| Relative TSR PSUs | 03/05/2024 | 11,904 | 20,832 (175% of tgt) | Earned vs 3-yr rTSR; full vest Mar 5, 2027 | 1,282,656 |
| Core EPS PSUs (FY2024) | 03/05/2024 | 11,904 | 23,808 (200% of tgt) | Earned on FY2024 Core EPS; full vest Mar 5, 2027 | 1,093,740 |
- 2024 Core EPS PSUs certified at 200% of target based on Core EPS of $5.10 vs $4.40 target; shares vest Mar 5, 2027, subject to forfeiture conditions .
- 2024 rTSR PSUs remain performance-contingent with a 175% max; any earned shares vest Mar 5, 2027 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (3/24/2025) | 33,440 shares; <1% of outstanding (299,856,558) |
| Unvested time-vesting RSUs | 44,532 units; $5,846,606 market value at 12/31/24 |
| Unvested/unearned performance RSUs | 56,906 units; $7,471,189 market value at 12/31/24 |
| 2024 rTSR PSUs unvested at max | 20,832 units (175% of target) |
| 2024 Core EPS PSUs earned | 23,808 units (200% of target), vest 3/5/2027 |
| Ownership guideline | 3x base salary for NEOs (incl. Kohli) |
| Guideline compliance | As of 12/31/2024, all NEOs except Mr. Doellinger satisfied ownership requirements (implies Kohli satisfied) |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and Section 16 officers; also no short-selling; pre-clearance/trading windows required |
Vesting overhang and potential selling pressure: time-vesting RSUs vest annually (Mar 5, 2025–2028); performance awards from 2024 vest Mar 5, 2027 if/when earned, creating identifiable windows where supply could increase post-vesting .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Severance Plan Tier | Tier II (all NEOs other than CEO) |
| Cash severance (non-CIC) | 1.5x (base salary + target bonus) lump sum |
| Cash severance (CIC window) | Same multiple; enhanced equity vesting treatment during CIC protection period (120 days before to 2 years after CIC) |
| Pro-rata bonus | Pay pro-rated annual bonus for year of termination (based on actual performance for executive officers) |
| Equity on Qualifying Termination (non-CIC) | Pro-rata acceleration/continued eligibility based on service through termination plus 18 months (Tier II); 50% of accelerated time-based RSUs deferred until end of 18-month restricted period; performance RSUs 50% deferred to end of restricted period if earned |
| Equity on CIC (still employed) | If awards not assumed, unvested time-vesting awards vest in full; if assumed, continue per terms; performance awards convert based on projected performance or vest per assumptions |
| Restrictive covenants | Compliance required (e.g., non-solicit) during restricted period (18 months for Tier II); violations can forfeit/defer equity delivery |
| Clawback | Cash and performance-based equity subject to clawback upon financial restatement (three-year lookback) |
| Trading policy | Insider trading pre-clearance; no hedging/pledging; trading windows or 10b5-1 plans |
| Related-party transactions | None involving Mr. Kohli disclosed for 2024 |
Hypothetical Severance Economics (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Pro-Rata Bonus ($) | Accelerated/Continued Vesting ($) | Health/Welfare ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No Change in Control | 3,187,500 | 1,835,850 | 9,324,479 | 40,749 | 14,388,578 |
| During CIC Protection Period | 3,187,500 | 1,835,850 | 12,145,637 | 40,749 | 17,209,736 |
Notes: CIC treatment includes immediate full acceleration of all unvested equity (or as-assumed awards) with performance awards determined based on projected performance through CIC date .
Performance & Track Record (Company-level indicators relevant to pay-for-performance)
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Company TSR (index, base=100 in 2020) | 151.88 | 214.21 |
| Peer Group TSR (index) | 89.51 | 121.54 |
| GAAP Net Income ($000s) | 985,747 | 968,000 |
| Core EPS ($) | 3.84 | 5.10 |
| Core EBITDA (Target vs Actual, $m) | — | Target: 2,443; Actual: 2,721; 111% → 138% payout factor for financial bonus component |
Say-on-pay (shareholder support): ~94% approval at 2024 annual meeting for 2023 NEO pay .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: 2024 target LTI mix for Kohli split 50% time-vesting RSUs, 25% rTSR PSUs, 25% Core EPS PSUs, adding explicit market-relative and earnings metrics to the plan; rTSR added starting in 2024 after investor feedback .
- Annual bonus alignment: Financial half keyed to Core EBITDA vs plan (111% achievement, 138% payout for all enterprise roles), combined with strategic objectives (0–150%) to avoid pure short-term financial bias; Kohli’s total EBP payout was ~144% of target (reflects combined financial and strategic outcomes) .
- No hedging/pledging; robust clawback; no single-trigger CIC; strong governance practices reduce misalignment risks .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Kohli holds 33,440 shares and meets ownership guidelines (3x salary), with meaningful unvested equity set to vest through 2027, aligning incentives with TSR and Core EPS performance; hedging/pledging prohibitions further strengthen alignment .
- Retention risk and overhang: Significant unvested equity (time-based and performance) and multi-year vest dates (annual on Mar 5 through 2028; PSUs on Mar 5, 2027) provide retention hooks but also identify windows for potential selling post-vesting; severance protections (1.5x cash, equity vesting rules) mitigate turnover risk during transformation .
- Pay-for-performance signal: 2024 EBP financial payout (138% on financial half) tied to 111% Core EBITDA achievement and Core EPS PSUs paid at 200% based on $5.10 Core EPS, reinforcing linkage to operating and earnings recovery; rTSR PSUs add market-relative discipline .
- CIC/termination economics: In a CIC window, Kohli’s hypothetical total package would be ~$17.2m (with ~$12.1m from equity vesting), highlighting sensitivity to share price and award performance; outside CIC, total ~$14.4m (equity ~$9.3m) .
- Governance backdrop: Strong say-on-pay support (~94%) and formal clawback and trading restrictions lower governance red flags; no related-party issues disclosed for Kohli .