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Denise Dignam

Denise Dignam

President and Chief Executive Officer at ChemoursChemours
CEO
Executive
Board

About Denise Dignam

Denise M. Dignam is President & CEO of The Chemours Company and a director since 2024; age 59; B.S. Chemical Engineering from Drexel University . Appointed interim CEO on Feb 28, 2024 and President & CEO on Mar 22, 2024, following leadership of the Titanium Technologies (TT) and Advanced Performance Materials (APM) segments . Under her tenure in 2024, Chemours reported Net Sales of $5.8B (down 5% YoY), Adjusted EBITDA of $786M (down 22% YoY), and returned $148M in dividends; TT delivered ~$140M in cost savings and APM launched a new PFA line supporting semiconductors . The Board affirmed an independent Chair structure and strengthened governance, remediating all previously identified material weaknesses by year-end 2024 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
The Chemours CompanyPresident & CEO2024–presentSet “Pathway to Thrive” pillars; focus on Adjusted EBITDA and capital efficiency; governance and controls remediation oversight .
The Chemours CompanyPresident, Titanium Technologies2023–2024Led TT Transformation Plan; achieved ~$140M 2024 savings; margin improvement .
The Chemours CompanyPresident, Advanced Performance Materials2021–2023Reshaped portfolio to Clean Energy & Advanced Electronics; record performance; PFA capacity expansion for semiconductor markets .
The Chemours CompanyVP, Global Operations, Fluoroproducts2019–2021Oversaw global operations; supply chain and manufacturing performance .
The Chemours CompanyGlobal Sr. Business Director, Fluoropolymers2016–2019Commercial leadership; portfolio and customer value initiatives .
The Chemours CompanyNorth America Business Director, Fluoropolymers2015–2016Regional business leadership .
DuPontDirector, Global Supply Chain, Fluoroproducts2013–2014Led global supply chain for fluoroproducts .
DuPontVarious management roles1988–2013Sales, marketing, operations, strategy across chemistries .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Kulicke & Soffa Industries (NASDAQ: KLIC)Director; Nominating & Governance Committee2023–presentSemiconductor/electronics board experience; governance oversight .
American Chemistry CouncilMember2024–presentIndustry policy and sustainability engagement .
National Mining AssociationMember2023–presentMaterials supply chain and policy engagement .
Society of Chemical Industry (America)Member2024–presentIndustry innovation network .
U.S. Chamber of CommerceBoard Member2022–2023Business policy perspectives .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)$462,500 $531,667 $904,167 (prorated; CEO as of 3/22/24)
Target Bonus ($)N/A in SCTN/A in SCT$1,170,000 target; 120% of $975,000 CEO salary (post-promotion design)
Actual Annual Incentive Paid ($)$442,913 $166,808 $864,923

Multi-year compensation mix (SCT):

Component ($)202220232024
Salary$462,500 $531,667 $904,167
Stock Awards$373,608 $1,046,719 $2,075,156
Option Awards$219,993 $412,480 $1,909,580
Non-Equity Incentive$442,913 $166,808 $864,923
All Other Compensation$71,650 $75,059 $134,154
Total$1,570,664 $2,232,733 $5,887,980

Performance Compensation

2024 AIP design and outcomes:

  • Metrics and weighting: Adjusted EBITDA 50%; corporate Discretionary Free Cash Flow (DFCF) and Average Net Working Capital Days (ANWC) combined 20%; role-specific focus metrics 20% (corporate functions emphasize cost); sustainability metrics included (Great Place to Work score, energy efficiency); max bonus 200% .
  • Outcomes: Corporate AIP achievement 84.3%; TT 59.6%; TSS 75.6%; APM 56.4% .
MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout Reference
Adjusted EBITDA (Corporate)50% Not disclosedContributed to Corporate AIP 84.3% CEO annual incentive paid $864,923
DFCF (Corporate)Part of 20% Not disclosedContributed to Corporate AIP 84.3% See above
ANWC Days (Corporate)Part of 20% Not disclosedContributed to Corporate AIP 84.3% See above
Role-specific focus (Corporate functions cost)20% Not disclosedNot separately disclosedSee above
Sustainability (GPTW score; energy efficiency)Incorporated Not disclosedNot separately disclosedSee above

2024–2026 LTIP structure:

  • Equal weighting among PSUs, PSOs, NQSOs, RSUs; PSUs transitioned to Economic Value Added (EVA) 70% weight; Relative TSR (rTSR) 30%; awards determined after 3-year period; PSOs/NQSOs/RSUs vest annually in three equal installments over 3 years; 10-year term for options .
  • 2022–2024 PSU payout: 0 shares earned; threshold not achieved on Adjusted Net Income and FCF conversion; rTSR modifier had no impact .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership (as of Feb 28, 2025):

CategoryShares% of Class
Direct19,067 <1%
Indirect
Right to Acquire within 60 days93,127 <1%
Total112,194 <1%

Outstanding/unvested equity (as of Dec 31, 2024; close $16.90):

InstrumentCountValue ($)
RSUs (unvested)35,269 $596,038
PSUs (unearned; equity incentive)35,739 $603,961
PSOs (unexercisable)95,792 @ $30.25 (exp. 5/8/2034) Not valued in table
NQSOs (unexercisable)92,108 @ $27.50 (exp. 5/8/2034) Not valued in table

2024 grants (May 8, 2024):

Award TypeShares/OptionsExercise PriceGrant Date FV ($)Vesting
RSU34,431 N/A$946,853 3 equal annual tranches
PSU (target)34,431; 50–200% earn-out range N/A$1,128,304 3-year performance (FY2024–FY2026)
NQSO92,108 $27.50 $946,870 3 equal annual tranches; 10-year term
PSO95,792 $30.25 (10% premium) $961,710 3 equal annual tranches; 10-year term

Ownership policies and trading:

  • Executive stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5x salary; 5 years to comply; retain 100% of net shares until met .
  • Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies; pledging prohibited absent special exception .
  • Form 4 activity: routine RSU tax-withholding of 466 shares (Code F) on Aug 1, 2025 at $11.50; direct holdings post-event ~187,478 shares (no open-market sale) .

Employment Terms

  • Change-in-control (CIC) severance plan (double-trigger): lump sum equal to 3x salary + target annual bonus (CEO); pro-rated target bonus for year of termination; continued health/dental/financial counseling/outplacement for 3 years; 18-month non-compete and non-solicit for CEO; no tax gross-ups .
  • Equity treatment on CIC: full vesting; PSUs vest at target .
  • Potential payments table (CEO; illustrative as of Dec 31, 2024): termination w/o cause or resignation for good reason in connection with CIC totaling ~$9.52M, including cash and equity components (assumes $16.90 stock price) .

Board Governance

  • Board service: Director since 2024; principal occupation President & CEO; only non-independent director among 12 nominees; independent Board Chair; all committees comprised of independent directors .
  • Committees: As CEO/employee-director, not listed on standing committees; Audit, CLDC, NCG, and EHS&O are independent-only .
  • Meetings/attendance: Board met 19 times in FY2024; each director attended at least 75% of Board/committee meetings .
  • Director compensation program (non-employee directors): $105,000 cash retainer; $160,000 annual equity; chair and committee chair retainers; employee-directors (e.g., CEO) do not receive these director fees .
  • Governance developments: Material weaknesses remediated; strengthened finance leadership; adopted clawback policy compliant with SEC Rule 10D-1; anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies .
  • Board Chair transition: Dawn Farrell resigned effective Sep 2, 2025; successor Chair pending at filing date .

Director Compensation (program context)

ElementAnnual Amount
Cash Retainer$105,000
Equity Award$160,000
Non-Executive Chair Retainer$150,000
Audit Chair$22,500
CLDC Chair$17,500
NCG Chair$17,500
EHS&O Chair$17,500

Performance & Track Record

  • Strategic and operational execution: TT delivered ~$140M cost savings; APM completed PFA capacity expansion for semiconductors; TSS expanded Opteon YF capacity amid regulatory transitions .
  • Financial results (FY2024): Net Sales $5.8B; Adjusted EBITDA $786M; dividends paid $148M; context includes pricing pressure, FX, and corporate costs offset by TT savings .
  • Pay-for-performance: 2024 CEO pay elements 85% at-risk; NEOs 69% at-risk; 5-year average Say-on-Pay support ~94.8–95% .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Increased emphasis on capital efficiency via EVA (70% of PSUs) and reduced rTSR weight (30%) in LTIP; options and PSOs vest ratably over 3 years, aligning retention and performance .
  • AIP shifted to 80% common corporate metrics and reduced cash-flow weighting; instituted DFCF and ANWC Days (20%) to encourage sustained working capital discipline; Adjusted EBITDA at 50% weight .
  • No single-trigger CIC; no option repricing; no tax gross-ups (except limited circumstances); clawback policies adopted per SEC Rule 10D-1 .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Hedging/pledging prohibited; insider trading policy enforced .
  • Internal controls: all material weaknesses remediated as of Dec 31, 2024 .
  • 2022–2024 PSUs paid zero due to under-threshold performance—signals discipline but also cyclical execution challenges .

Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking)

Peer Companies
Albemarle; Avient; Axalta; Cabot; Celanese; DuPont; Eastman; Element Solutions; H.B. Fuller; Huntsman; Olin; Trinseo; Tronox; Westlake

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say-on-Pay support strong: 5-year ~94–96%; CLDC cites alignment of 2024 pay outcomes with performance .

Equity Ownership & Director Guidelines

  • Executive ownership guidelines (CEO 5x salary; 5-year window; 100% net share retention until met) .
  • Director guidelines: 6x cash retainer; 5-year compliance window .

Employment Contracts & Covenants

  • CIC plan: 3x salary+target bonus; pro-rata bonus; 3-year benefits; 18-month non-compete for CEO; PSUs vest at target; double-trigger only; no tax gross-ups .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Heavy at-risk pay and EVA-centric PSUs should push capital discipline and ROIC, with ratable option vesting balancing retention and performance .
  • Selling pressure: No discretionary open-market sales noted; RSU tax-withholding events are routine; anti-hedging/pledging and ownership rules reduce misalignment risk .
  • Execution risk: 2022–2024 PSUs earned at 0 highlights cyclicality and target-setting difficulty; however, TT savings and semiconductor-facing expansions provide operating offsets under the Pathway to Thrive strategy .
  • Governance: Independent Chair structure, remediated controls, and robust clawback/anti-pledging policies support quality of oversight; Chair transition in 2025 bears monitoring for continuity .