Kristine Wellman
About Kristine Wellman
Kristine M. Wellman (age 55) is Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of The Chemours Company (NYSE: CC). She was appointed SVP, GC & Corporate Secretary in October 2022 and joined Chemours in December 2014 after legal leadership roles at Capital One, ING Bank, and BB&T; within Chemours she also held operating roles including Plant Manager at the Chambers Works site and VP, APM Sustainability, before leading strategic planning prior to her current role . Her pay is heavily at-risk and tied to company performance via an Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) weighted 50% to Adjusted EBITDA and 20% to cash/working capital, plus a performance-based LTIP using Economic Value Added (EVA, 70%) and relative TSR (30%), aligning compensation with shareholder value drivers . The company reports strong pay governance with clawbacks, anti-hedging/anti-pledging, and executive ownership guidelines .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chemours | SVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary | Oct 2022–present | Leads legal, governance, ethics & compliance; Corporate Secretary function . |
| Chemours | VP, Strategic Planning | 2021–Sep 2022 | Drove strategic analysis/planning amid dynamic regulatory environment . |
| Chemours | VP, APM Sustainability | Dec 2020–Nov 2021 | Positioned APM for leadership in responsible chemistry and sustainability initiatives . |
| Chemours | Plant Manager, Chambers Works | Mar 2019–Nov 2020 | Led site operations through the initial pandemic phase, maintaining full production . |
| Chemours | Associate GC & Assistant Corporate Secretary; VP (Mar 2018–Feb 2019) | Jul 2015–Feb 2019 | Helped stand up Chemours at spin-off and develop corporate governance framework . |
| Capital One | SVP & Chief Counsel | Feb 2012–Nov 2014 | Senior legal leadership in financial services . |
| ING Bank, fsb (ING Group N.V. subsidiary) | General Counsel | Aug 2010–Feb 2012 | Led legal function for U.S. bank subsidiary . |
| BB&T (now Truist) | Legal roles to SVP & Deputy GC | 2006–2010 | Increasing responsibility culminating in Deputy GC role . |
| Private Practice | Corporate/M&A/Securities Attorney | 1995–2006 | Focus on M&A, corporate/securities law and governance . |
External Roles
- No public company board roles disclosed for Ms. Wellman .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 491,667 | 541,667 |
| Target Bonus (% of salary) | 70% | 70% |
| Actual AIP Payout ($) | 80,850 | 324,555 (Corporate AIP achievement 84.3%) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 45,367 | 60,164 |
Notes: 2024 salary increase to $550,000 effective year-end for ongoing rate-setting .
Performance Compensation
AIP Design and Results (Corporate plan for GC/Corporate roles)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | Weighted Funding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chemours Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $818mm | $1,004mm | $1,190mm | $844mm | 28% |
| Discretionary Free Cash Flow | 10% | $193mm | $370mm | $556mm | $213mm | 6% |
| Net Working Capital Days (avg) | 10% | 76.3 | 69.3 | 62.3 | 73.5 | 7% |
| Sustainability – Great Place to Work | 5% (of total 10%) | 71% | 75% | 77% | 68% | 0% |
| Sustainability – Energy Efficiency | 5% (of total 10%) | 1.3 | 1.75 | 2.8 | 1.72 | 5% |
| Corporate Functions Cost | 20% | $(538)mm | $(533)mm | $(508)mm | $(510)mm | 38% |
| Overall Corporate AIP Achievement | — | — | — | — | — | 84.3% |
- 2024 AIP redesigned to prioritize “One Chemours”: 80% corporate metrics; 50% weight to Adjusted EBITDA; cash metrics reduced to combined 20%; sustainability retained at 10% .
- Committee permitted limited adjustments for extraordinary items (e.g., Mexico drought, TT transformation costs, asbestos reserve true-up) consistent with long-term shareholder interest .
2024 Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Awards — Wellman
| Vehicle | Grant Date | Number/Value | Price/Strike | Vesting | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | May 8, 2024 | 7,727 units | — | Ratable over 3 years | 212,493 |
| PSU (2024–2026 cycle: EVA 70%, rTSR 30%) | May 8, 2024 | Target 7,727 (Thr 3,864; Max 15,454) | — | Cliff at 3 years | 253,214 |
| Non-Qualified Stock Options (NQSO) | May 8, 2024 | 20,671 options | $27.50 | Ratable over 3 years | 212,498 |
| Performance Stock Options (PSO) | May 8, 2024 | 21,498 options | $30.25 (10% premium) | Ratable over 3 years | 216,055 |
Program notes:
- 2024–2026 PSU metric transitioned from Adjusted Net Income to EVA to reinforce capital efficiency; rTSR weight reduced to 30% .
- 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid 0% (Adjusted Net Income and FCF Conversion below threshold; rTSR modifier not applicable), underscoring rigor in performance targets (Wellman was not eligible in 2022 PSU grant) .
2024 Vesting Activity (realized)
| Item | 2024 Quantity | 2024 Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Stock awards vested (RSUs/PSUs + dividend equivalents) | 5,817 shares | 123,719 |
| Options exercised | 0 | 0 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric (as of Feb 28, 2025 unless noted) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Directly owned shares | 20,627 |
| Right to acquire within 60 days (options/units) | 66,853 |
| Total beneficial ownership | 87,480 |
| Percent of class | <1% |
| RSUs not vested (12/31/2024) | 7,915 units; $133,763 value (using $16.90) |
| PSUs unearned (12/31/2024) | 8,020 units; $135,545 value (using $16.90) |
| 2024 NQSOs outstanding | 20,671 unexercisable @ $27.50; exp. 5/8/2034 |
| 2024 PSOs outstanding | 21,498 unexercisable @ $30.25; exp. 5/8/2034 |
| Policy: Anti-hedging/anti-pledging; pledges prohibited absent special exception | Policy in place |
| Executive ownership and holding guidelines | Policy in place |
Commentary:
- No option exercises in 2024 and modest annual RSU vesting indicate limited near-term forced selling pressure; anti-pledging and anti-hedging reduce alignment risk .
- Beneficial ownership includes significant “right to acquire,” reflecting vested/near-vested equity and aligning incentives with share price performance .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key Terms / Amounts |
|---|---|
| Role appointment | Appointed SVP, GC & Corporate Secretary in Oct 2022 . |
| Involuntary termination without cause | Illustrative severance items include salary/bonus-related amounts; table shows salary $106,651 and target bonus $385,000 components (see Company disclosure table) . |
| Change-in-control (CIC) design | Company does not provide single-trigger CIC; severance requires double-trigger (termination without cause or resignation for good reason following CIC) . |
| Double-trigger CIC cash multiples | 2x base salary ($1,100,000) and 2x target bonus ($770,000) for Wellman (reflecting 2× on $550,000 salary and 70% target bonus) . |
| Double-trigger CIC total | Total estimated $2,737,614 (includes equity treatment and other components as disclosed) . |
| Equity treatment in certain terminations | RSUs $253,956; PSUs $101,631 shown under specified scenarios (see disclosure table) . |
| Clawback | Executive officer clawback policy adopted per SEC Rule 10D-1 and NYSE standards; explicit linkage to Code of Conduct . |
| Deferred compensation (2024) | Executive contributions $36,124; Company contributions $36,124; Aggregate earnings $13,899; Year-end balance $178,349 (RSRP) . |
Note: The company maintains robust insider trading and equity granting policies, including prohibition on hedging and pledging (unless special exception), routine grant timing, and executive share ownership requirements .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Wellman’s AIP is driven by EBITDA (50%) and cash/working-capital metrics (20%) with sustainability goals (10%); LTIP uses EVA (70%) and rTSR (30%), promoting profitable growth and capital efficiency. The 0% payout on the broader 2022–2024 PSU cycle underscores target rigor and reduces windfall risk .
- Selling pressure and alignment: No option exercises in 2024 and limited RSU vesting minimize near-term selling overhang; anti-hedging/anti-pledging and ownership guidelines strengthen alignment, though personal beneficial ownership is <1% of shares outstanding (typical for non-CEO roles) .
- Retention and change-in-control risk: Double-trigger CIC at 2× salary and 2× target bonus plus equity treatment provides competitive protection without single-trigger features, balancing retention with shareholder-friendly safeguards and clawbacks .
- Governance backdrop: Company-wide governance improvements (internal control remediation in 2024), strong say-on-pay support (~95%), and tightened policies (clawbacks, anti-hedging/pledging) reduce governance and compensation risk premia .