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Shane Hostetter

Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer at ChemoursChemours
Executive

About Shane Hostetter

Chemours’ Chief Financial Officer since July 1, 2024; age 43 at appointment. CPA; MBA in Finance from Villanova University; prior roles include CFO and CAO at Quaker Houghton, earlier finance leadership at Pulse Electronics, and audit at PwC . During his tenure in 2024, Chemours delivered Net Sales of $5.8B (-5% YoY) and Adjusted EBITDA of $786M (-22% YoY) as the company launched a refreshed “Pathway to Thrive” strategy; corporate AIP achievement was 84.3% for 2024 . The board reports material weaknesses were remediated and ICFR was effective as of Dec 31, 2024, with finance leadership strengthened by hiring Hostetter as CFO .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Quaker Chemical Corporation (Quaker Houghton)EVP, CFO (also CAO Oct 2023–Jan 2024)Mar 2023–Jun 2024Senior finance leadership at a global industrial process fluids company
Quaker HoughtonSVP, CFOApr 2021–Feb 2023Led finance through market cycles; investor relations and capital allocation
Quaker HoughtonVP Finance & Chief Accounting OfficerAug 2019–Apr 2021Oversaw accounting/reporting
Quaker HoughtonGlobal Controller & Principal Accounting OfficerSep 2014–Jul 2019Global controllership
Pulse ElectronicsFinance leadership rolesPrior to 2014Financial leadership at electronic components manufacturer
PricewaterhouseCoopersAuditorEarly careerAudit foundation; CPA credential

External Roles

No public company board roles disclosed for Hostetter in the company’s 2025 proxy or his appointment 8‑K/press release .

Fixed Compensation

Component2024 AmountNotes
Base salary$600,000Annual base per appointment 8‑K; effective July 1, 2024
Sign‑on cash bonus$50,000One‑time sign‑on
Salary actually paid in 2024 (SCT)$305,000Reflects partial‑year service

Performance Compensation

ProgramMetricWeightTargetActualPayout/OutcomeVesting
2024 AIP (corporate design)Adjusted EBITDA50%Not disclosedNot disclosedCorporate AIP achievement: 84.3%Cash, annual
2024 AIPDiscretionary FCF + Avg Net Working Capital Days20% (combined)Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in 84.3%Cash, annual
2024 AIPFunction‑specific metric (cost for corporate)20%Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in 84.3%Cash, annual
2024 AIPSustainability (Great Place to Work; energy efficiency)IncludedNot disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in 84.3%Cash, annual
2024 AIP payout (Hostetter)$193,873 (Non‑Equity Incentive Plan Compensation)Paid 2025 for 2024
2024 LTI (new‑hire)RSUsN/A$500,000 grant‑date value26,709 units (@ $18.72)Time‑vested1/3 each on Aug 6, 2025/2026/2027

Notes:

  • 2024 AIP design moved to 80% common corporate metrics with primary focus on Adjusted EBITDA (50% weight) and reduced cash flow weighting; added capital efficiency focus for long‑term alignment .
  • Hostetter did not receive PSUs/Options in 2024; his new‑hire equity was time‑vesting RSUs .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership (Feb 28, 2025)0 shares (direct/indirect/rights), i.e., <1% of outstanding
Unvested RSUs (Dec 31, 2024)27,081 units; market value $457,669
2024 RSU grant26,709 RSUs granted Aug 6, 2024; grant‑date value $499,992; vests 1/3 annually on Aug 6, 2025/2026/2027
2024 prorated LTI noted at appointmentOne‑time RSUs $500,000, vest 1/3 per year over three years (prorated 2024 LTI)
Stock ownership guidelinesOther NEOs: 3x base salary; five years to comply; executives are on track
Hedging/pledgingCompany prohibits hedging and pledging; insider trading policy in place
ClawbackExecutive Officer Clawback policy adopted per SEC Rule 10D‑1 and NYSE standards

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Appointment and roleAppointed CFO effective July 1, 2024; also serves as principal accounting officer
Base salary$600,000; target annual bonus 75% of salary; target LTI opportunity $1,000,000
One‑time grants$50,000 sign‑on cash; one‑time RSU award $500,000 for 2024 prorated LTI; RSUs vest 1/3 annually over 3 years
AIP design (2024)80% common corporate metrics; 50% weight on Adjusted EBITDA; 20% combined Discretionary FCF/Working Capital Days; sustainability metrics included
LTIP design (2024–2026)PSUs moved to 70% EVA and 30% rTSR; overall LTI remains 75% performance‑weighted (PSUs/PSOs/NQSOs) with RSUs for retention
Severance (non‑CIC) illustrative (as of 12/31/24)Involuntary termination without cause total ~$531,255 including cash components and equity treatment; see proxy scenario table
Change‑in‑control (double‑trigger)Plan benefit: lump sum cash equal to 2x (salary + target bonus), pro‑rated target bonus, 2 years benefits/outplacement (no gross‑ups); unvested equity vests at target
CIC illustrative payout (as of 12/31/24)Total ~$3,202,628, including salary and target bonus multiples, pro‑rated bonus $472,500, benefits $65,146, outplacement $8,600, equity $451,382

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance architecture tightened; 2024 AIP shifted weight to Adjusted EBITDA and introduced cash discipline metrics; LTIP moved PSUs to EVA (70%) plus rTSR (30%), reinforcing capital efficiency. This increases linkage to sustainable value creation but reduces reliance on revenue growth metrics .
  • Retention risk appears moderate near term: Hostetter holds unvested RSUs vesting through 2027 (26.7k+ units), creating selling pressure at vest dates but also alignment via service‑based equity; anti‑hedging/pledging and clawback policies further align behavior with shareholders .
  • Ownership alignment is still building (0 shares reported as of Feb 28, 2025) with five‑year 3x‑salary ownership guideline; monitoring progress to guideline is warranted as equity vests .
  • Governance context is supportive: the board reports remediation of prior material weaknesses and highlights strengthening of the finance team with Hostetter’s hire; high say‑on‑pay support historically (~94.8% five‑year average) reduces compensation controversy risk .
  • Company execution backdrop in 2024 was mixed (Net Sales -5%, Adjusted EBITDA -22%) amid portfolio and governance transitions; the AIP paid at 84.3% corporately, indicating incentives remained sensitive to underperformance while rewarding progress on key priorities .