Christopher Levendos
About Christopher Levendos
Christopher D. Levendos is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer—Fiber at Crown Castle, a role he has held since January 23, 2024; he previously served as EVP & COO overseeing both operating segments and earlier as EVP & COO—Fiber (Dec 2020–Nov 2023) and VP of Fiber Operations (Jun 2018–Dec 2020) . He is 57 years old and has over three decades of wireline and fiber operating experience at Verizon (26 years), Google Fiber (2015–2017), and Frontier (2017–2018) before joining Crown Castle in 2018 . 2024 company performance outcomes tied to pay included Adjusted EBITDA of $4,161 million (99.52% of target) and AFFO per share of $6.98 (113.54% of target), yielding a 106.53% annual incentive achievement for NEOs including Mr. Levendos; PSUs for the 2022–2024 cycle were forfeited due to underperformance versus the S&P 500 peer set, demonstrating downside pay-for-performance . In March 2025, Crown Castle agreed to sell its Fiber Business for $8.5 billion as part of a strategic shift to a pure‑play towers model; compensation design has been evolving to emphasize profitability and capital discipline (ROIC, Adjusted EBITDA) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crown Castle | EVP & COO—Fiber | Jan 2024–present | Leads Fiber segment operations; prior period led both operating segments, aligning operations to profitability-focused metrics . |
| Crown Castle | EVP & COO (both segments) | Late 2023–Jan 2024 | Oversaw both towers and fiber during leadership transition . |
| Crown Castle | EVP & COO—Fiber | Dec 2020–Nov 2023 | Led Fiber operations through changing demand/priorities . |
| Crown Castle | VP, Fiber Operations | Jun 2018–Dec 2020 | Scaled Fiber operating efficiency post-acquisitions . |
| Frontier Communications | EVP, Field Operations | Jun 2017–Jun 2018 | Ran nationwide field service delivery, maintenance and repair . |
| Google Fiber | Executive (Head of Network Deployment & Operations) | Apr 2015–May 2017 | Led deployment/operations of high‑speed fiber builds . |
| Verizon | Various roles; Region President (NYC wireline) | ~1989–2015 | Deep wireline ops leadership culminating in NYC region president role . |
External Roles
- No current external public company board roles disclosed in the executive officer biography section of the 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
Multi‑year summary for Mr. Levendos (as reported):
| Metric (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $519,231 | $525,000 | $585,577 |
| Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value) | $2,849,862 | $4,160,858 | $4,498,170 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (AIP) | $735,656 | $380,835 | $639,180 |
| All Other Compensation | $58,554 | $59,194 | $62,076 |
| Total Compensation | $4,163,303 | $5,125,887 | $5,785,003 |
Base salary setting and increase:
| Title | 2023 Base | 2024 Base | % Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| EVP & COO—Fiber | $525,000 | $600,000 | 14% |
2024 target and actual cash incentive:
| Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Target STI (AIP) | $600,000 |
| Actual STI Paid (2024) | $639,180 |
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (AIP) – 2024 framework and results:
- Corporate metrics and outcomes
- Adjusted EBITDA: Target $4,163m; Actual $4,161m; Payout 99.52% .
- AFFO per share: Target $6.91; Actual $6.98; Payout 113.54% .
- Overall AIP achievement factor applied to NEOs: 106.53% .
- Individual payout for Mr. Levendos: Target $600,000; Actual $639,180 (106.53%) .
Long‑Term Incentives (LTI) – 2024 design and Mr. Levendos’ awards:
- LTI vehicle mix and performance metrics
- 60% performance‑based RSUs (two equal components): Relative TSR vs S&P 500 and Average ROIC, measured over 2024–2026; cliff vest post‑performance with continued service requirement to February 19, 2027 .
- 40% time‑based RSUs; ratable vesting over three years .
- Note: 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid 0% (TSR below threshold vs S&P 500) .
- 2024 grants to Mr. Levendos:
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Units (Target) | Grant-Date Fair Value (USD) | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time RSUs | 2/21/2024 | 16,189 | $1,743,393 | Ratable over 3 years . |
| Performance RSUs – Relative TSR | 2/21/2024 | 12,142 | $1,447,205 | 0–200% based on TSR rank vs S&P 500 over 2024–2026; cliff vest with service to 2/19/2027 . |
| Performance RSUs – Average ROIC | 2/21/2024 | 12,142 | $1,307,572 | 0–200% based on Avg ROIC over 2024–2026; cliff vest with service to 2/19/2027 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 21,641 common shares; <1% of outstanding .
- 2024 stock vested: 8,358 shares; value realized $904,503 .
- Outstanding/unvested awards at 12/31/2024:
| Award | Grant Date | Unvested Units | Market Value at 12/31/24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time RSUs | 2/17/2022 | 2,678 | $243,055 |
| Time RSUs | 2/22/2023 | 7,823 | $710,015 |
| Time RSUs | 2/21/2024 | 16,189 | $1,469,314 |
| PSUs – Relative TSR (target) | 2/22/2023 | 11,120 | $1,009,251 |
| PSUs – Absolute TSR (target, 2023 cycle) | 2/22/2023 | 12,999 | $1,179,789 |
| PSUs – Relative TSR (target) | 2/21/2024 | 12,142 | $1,102,008 |
| PSUs – Average ROIC (target) | 2/21/2024 | 12,142 | $1,102,008 |
- Ownership/retention policies and status
- Executive stock ownership guidelines: 3x base salary for executive officers; includes unvested time RSUs and performance RSUs subject only to time vesting; compliance required within five years; as of the record date, each NEO serving as an executive officer was in compliance .
- Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging: Directors and employees, including executive officers, are prohibited from hedging (short sales, options, derivatives) and from pledging company securities, including margin accounts .
- No stock options outstanding for NEOs; company does not currently grant options under its program .
Vesting cadence and potential selling pressure:
- Time RSUs vest ratably in three approximately equal annual installments on each grant’s anniversary; performance RSUs for 2024 grants cliff vest after the three‑year performance period, subject to continued service through February 19, 2027 and performance certification, which may concentrate vesting-related liquidity near anniversaries and end of performance periods .
Employment Terms
Severance structure (Severance Agreement; single‑trigger CIC not applicable; double‑trigger applies):
- General terms
- Qualifying termination (without CIC): Lump sum equal to one times base salary plus target annual bonus; prorated current‑year bonus and prior‑year unpaid bonus (if applicable); one year of benefits; continued 401(k) participation for year of termination; opportunity for up to two years of continued vesting of RSUs for NEOs (two years for CEO; one year for others) with performance awards subject to achievement; non‑compete and non‑solicitation provisions apply; no excise tax gross‑ups .
- Qualifying termination upon Change in Control (within two years): Lump sum equal to two times base salary plus target annual bonus; prorated current‑year bonus and prior‑year unpaid bonus (if applicable); two years of benefits; continued 401(k) participation for year of termination; treatment of equity as specified; double‑trigger requirement .
- Illustrative values for Mr. Levendos (as of 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Severance Amount | RSU Accelerated/Continued Vesting Value | Other (Benefits/401k/Bonus Timing) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying Termination (non‑CIC) | $1,200,000 | $2,147,778 | $643,901 | $3,991,680 |
| Qualifying Termination Upon Change in Control | $2,400,000 | $9,230,599 | $670,553 | $12,301,152 |
Clawback and recovery:
- Incentive Compensation Recovery Policy adopted Oct 2023 (mandatory recoupment upon restatement); legacy recoupment policy allows recovery in cases of misconduct causing financial or reputational harm .
Performance Compensation Details
Annual Incentive (2024) – metrics, targets, actuals, payout:
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($m) | $3,996 | $4,163 | $4,413 | $4,161 | 99.52% |
| AFFO per share | $6.63 | $6.91 | $7.32 | $6.98 | 113.54% |
| Overall AIP Factor | — | — | — | — | 106.53% |
Program evolution:
- For 2025, AIP shifts to 70% Adjusted EBITDA and 30% organic revenue growth (replacing AFFO/share) to align with profitability and growth focus; LTI also shifts in 2025 to cumulative three‑year AFFO/share and Average ROIC with a Relative TSR ±15% modifier .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 AIP paid slightly above target (106.53%) on balanced EBITDA and AFFO/share outcomes, while the 2022–2024 PSU cycle forfeited entirely due to TSR underperformance versus S&P 500 peers—evidence of real downside alignment on equity .
- Retention and selling pressure: Meaningful unvested RSU overhang (time and performance awards), with time-based tranches vesting annually and performance awards cliffing in 2027; policy prohibits hedging/pledging, and stock ownership guidelines (3x salary) with confirmed compliance reduce misalignment risk, but vesting events may drive periodic Form 4 activity as shares settle and taxes are covered .
- Change-in-control economics: Double‑trigger severance equals ~2x cash plus substantial equity acceleration/continuation under CIC, creating strong retention through potential strategic activity; non‑CIC severance at 1x provides moderate protection, limiting moral hazard while supporting continuity .
- Segment strategy execution: As COO—Fiber through 2024 and currently in role, his operating oversight sits at the center of the announced $8.5B Fiber Business divestiture; compensation design now emphasizes Adjusted EBITDA, ROIC, and (from 2025) cumulative AFFO/share, aligning incentives with the tower‑only value creation plan post‑transaction .
- Governance and shareholder support: Anti‑hedging/pledging, clawback policies, and strong say‑on‑pay support (95% approval in 2024) indicate a governance framework supportive of investor alignment during a period of strategic transition .