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Djalma Novaes Jr.

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at CROWN HOLDINGSCROWN HOLDINGS
Executive

About Djalma Novaes Jr.

Djalma Novaes Jr. is President – Americas Division at Crown Holdings (CCK), serving in this role since 2015; he is 64 years old per the company’s most recent 10-K executive officer table . As a Named Executive Officer (NEO), his annual incentive pay is tied to economic profit (EP) and modified operating cash flow (MOCF), with division-level and company-level metrics applied to his bonus formula . Company performance context: for 2024, Crown reported ROIC of 13.2%, net income of $560 million, and a $100 investment value of $118.70 vs $136.68 for the peer TSR index; Say‑on‑Pay support exceeded 96% in 2024, and the long‑term plan emphasizes ROIC and relative TSR .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Crown Holdings (CCK)President – Americas Division2015–present Division-level EP and MOCF metrics drive his bonus under the EP Plan

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)650,000 680,000 725,000
Target Bonus (% of Salary)80% 80% 80%
Target Bonus ($)520,000 544,000 580,000
Actual Bonus Paid ($)557,960 680,544 1,160,000
Stock Awards ($, grant-date fair value)1,137,547 1,224,028 1,449,949
Change in Pension Value ($)0 0 319,008
All Other Compensation ($)46,141 8,250 26,842
Total Compensation ($)2,391,648 2,592,822 3,680,799
  • 2024 “All Other Compensation” detail for Novaes: FICA on change in SERP valuation $21,667 and defined contribution plan company contribution $5,175; total $26,842 .

Performance Compensation

Annual cash bonus under the EP Plan is based on two measures: economic profit and modified operating cash flow; each can pay up to 125% of target with a plan cap at 200% of target . For Novaes (division-level NEO), thresholds/targets include both division and company metrics; the applicable divisional targets and actuals are below, with realized payout as disclosed.

YearMetricThresholdTargetActualPayout vs Target
2022Economic Profit ($mm)245.7 307.1 351.8 107.3%
2022Modified Operating Cash Flow ($mm)431.3 539.1 154.8 107.3% (overall; 0% MOCF; 107.3% EP)
2023Economic Profit ($mm)253.7 317.1 305.1 125.1% (37.9% EP; 87.2% MOCF)
2023Modified Operating Cash Flow ($mm)662.8 828.5 859.5 125.1% (37.9% EP; 87.2% MOCF)
2024Economic Profit ($mm)262.9 328.6 382.1 200% (cap)
2024Modified Operating Cash Flow ($mm)697.4 871.8 1,007.5 200% (cap)

Long-term incentives are delivered approximately one-third time-based RS and two-thirds performance-based RS, with the performance portion split between ROIC and relative TSR; the 2024 grants use a three-year performance window (2024–2026) . Grant details:

Grant YearGrant DateTime-Based RS (shares)Time-Based Fair Value ($)PSU Target (TSR) (shares)TSR Fair Value ($)PSU Target (ROIC) (shares)ROIC Fair Value ($)Vest Schedule
20231/4/20235,035 408,036 4,372 407,995 5,079 407,996 Time-based: 1/4/24, 1/6/25, 1/5/26; PSUs: 1/5/2026 (0–200% of target)
20241/3/20245,388 483,357 4,833 483,300 5,448 483,292 Time-based: 1/6/25, 1/5/26, 1/4/27; PSUs: 1/4/2027 (0–200% of target)

Additional vesting outcomes:

  • 2024 vesting: Novaes had 12,765 stock awards vest with $1,071,807 realized value .
  • For 2022-cycle PSUs, TSR-based shares vested at 0% (3,263 forfeited for Novaes), while ROIC-based shares vested at 2,455 for Novaes on Feb 27, 2025 (values based on 12/31/24 stock price) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership114,513 shares; less than 1% of outstanding as of March 11, 2025
Unvested Time-Based RS (12/31/2024)9,913 shares; $819,706 market value at $82.69 close
Unearned PSUs at Target (12/31/2024)26,502 shares; $2,191,450 market/payout value at $82.69
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for Directors and Officers
Holding/Ownership GuidelinesMust retain 50% of after-tax shares for two years after vest; NEOs at year-end were in compliance with guidelines

Vesting calendar relevant for supply/timing:

  • Time-based tranches: 1,678 (2023 grant) on 1/6/2025 and 1,678 on 1/5/2026; 1,796 (2024 grant) on 1/6/2025, 1/5/2026, and 1/4/2027 .
  • PSU endpoints: 2023 grant vests 1/5/2026 (0–200%); 2024 grant vests 1/4/2027 (0–200%) .

Employment Terms

  • Severance (no CIC): Upon termination without Cause, Novaes receives 1x base salary (=$725,000), pro‑rated actual bonus, plus vested benefits .
  • Change-in-Control (CIC) severance (within 12 months post‑CIC upon qualifying termination): 3x base salary (=$2,175,000) plus 3-year average bonus (table value $2,186,856), accelerated equity treatment, and vested benefits; total estimated at $7,373,012 as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Equity on CIC: Time-based RS becomes fully vested; performance RS vests based on performance versus targets measured from the start of the period to the CIC date .
  • Restrictive covenants: Non-compete of one year post-employment pre‑CIC and two years post‑CIC; non-solicit also applies .
  • Clawbacks: Compensation Recovery Policy effective Oct 2, 2023; recovery of incentive comp in case of accounting restatement regardless of misconduct; complements existing clawback policies .
  • Tax gross-ups: Company states no tax gross-ups in executive employment agreements .

Retirement Benefits

PlanYears CreditedPresent Value of Accumulated Benefit ($)
U.S. Pension Plan14 623,629
Senior Executive Retirement Plan (SERP)25 6,320,311

Notes:

  • SERP vests upon earliest of five years of participation, specified retirement dates, total disability, or a change in control; benefits are lump-sum; amounts are interest-rate sensitive .
  • 2024 “All Other Compensation” includes FICA tied to SERP valuation changes ($21,667) and 401(k) plan contributions ($5,175) .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix shift and risk: No stock options granted; equity delivered via time-based and performance-based restricted stock, with ~two‑thirds performance-based (ROIC and relative TSR), increasing alignment but reducing optionality versus options .
  • Annual incentives consistently formulaic: EP and MOCF drive payouts; 2024 paid at plan cap (200% of target) given strong performance on both measures at company and division levels .
  • CIC equity treatment: Acceleration of time-based awards and performance‑to‑date vesting of PSUs on CIC can be shareholder‑unfriendly vs strict double‑trigger equity; however, company also highlights double‑trigger vesting principles in summary materials .

Performance & Track Record

  • Company-level results highlight ROIC at 13.2% in 2024 (up from 12.4% in 2023) and net income of $560 million (down from $587 million in 2023) .
  • Pay-for-performance calibration: For awards vesting in 2025, TSR-based PSUs paid 0% while ROIC-based PSUs were ~30% below target; prior 2024 vestings saw TSR at ~45.6% below target and ROIC at 200% of target, indicating balanced sensitivity to market-relative and internal capital efficiency metrics .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say‑on‑Pay received over 96% approval at the 2024 Annual Meeting; compensation approach remained largely unchanged, with emphasis on performance-based equity and EP/MOCF annual incentives .
  • Independent compensation consultant (Pay Governance) advises the committee; target pay levels benchmarked around the 50th percentile of the peer group .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High proportion of performance-based equity (ROIC and relative TSR) and strict hedging/pledging prohibitions support alignment and reduce risk of forced selling; Novaes beneficially owns 114,513 shares, with additional unvested/uneamed equity creating ongoing exposure to Crown’s results .
  • Incentive levers: Annual bonuses are tightly linked to EP and MOCF; 2024 paid at 200% cap, indicating strong execution on cash flow and capital returns in his purview (Americas Division plus company‑level overlays) .
  • Retention vs. overhang: Near‑dated vesting from 2023/2024 time‑based RS and multi‑year PSUs (2026/2027 endpoints) create retention hooks; 2024 vested shares (12,765) and 2025 ROIC vesting from 2022 cycle (2,455) suggest episodic, manageable supply events rather than structural selling pressure; hedging/pledging prohibitions further mitigate overhang risk .
  • Change-in-control economics: Post‑CIC severance (3x base plus average bonus) and equity acceleration could be material but are in line with market practice; investors should weigh equity vesting on CIC (including time-based acceleration and performance-to-date PSU vesting) when assessing potential transaction scenarios .