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Timothy Donahue

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer at CROWN HOLDINGSCROWN HOLDINGS
CEO
Executive
Board

About Timothy Donahue

Chairman, President & CEO of Crown Holdings, Inc. (CCK). Director since 2015; CEO since 2016; elected Chairman following the 2022 annual meeting; age 62. Prior roles include Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer, with 34+ years at the company, providing deep operational and financial expertise and international experience . Performance context: Revenues increased from $8.284B* in FY2016 to $11.801B* in FY2024, while EBITDA rose from $1.318B* to $1.898B* over the same period (see table below). The company’s Pay-versus-Performance table shows a $100 initial investment in CCK at 12/31/2019 would be $118.70 at 12/31/2024 (peer index $136.68), with 2024 net income $560M and ROIC 13.2% .

Revenues and EBITDA (FY, USD):

MetricFY 2016FY 2017FY 2018FY 2019FY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues ($)8,284,000,000*8,698,000,000*11,151,000,000*9,559,000,000*9,392,000,000*11,394,000,000*12,943,000,000*12,010,000,000*11,801,000,000*
EBITDA ($)1,318,000,000*1,378,000,000*1,586,000,000*1,475,000,000*1,448,000,000*279,000,000*1,746,000,000*1,820,000,000*1,898,000,000*
Values retrieved from S&P Global.*

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Crown Holdings, Inc.Chief Operating Officer (prior)Not disclosedLed global operations; brings in-depth understanding of international business
Crown Holdings, Inc.Chief Financial Officer (prior)Not disclosedFinancial stewardship; capital allocation and risk management experience

External Roles

  • Not disclosed in the proxy for Mr. Donahue; no additional public company directorships indicated in his biography section .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Target Bonus % of SalaryTarget Bonus ($)Actual Bonus Paid ($)Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value) ($)All Other Comp ($)Total Compensation ($)
20221,315,000 Not disclosedNot disclosed599,969 7,364,000 21,167 9,300,136
20231,370,000 Not disclosedNot disclosed2,820,488 7,671,945 65,790 11,928,223
20241,425,000 145% 2,066,250 4,132,500 7,979,960 80,690 13,618,150

Key design features:

  • CEO target total direct compensation for 2024: $11.471M; ~70% stock-based .
  • Benchmarking around 50th percentile of a 20-company peer group; Pay Governance LLC serves as independent advisor .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (EP Plan) – 2024 design and results:

  • Metrics: Economic Profit and Modified Operating Cash Flow (MOCF); corporate-level metrics for CEO .
  • Weighting/Mechanics: Each metric produced 125% of target; capped overall at 200% of target (actual payout: 200%) .
MetricThresholdTargetActualPayout vs Target
Economic Profit ($mm)455.8569.8639.3125% (pre-cap)
MOCF ($mm)1,104.01,380.01,692.3125% (pre-cap)
Total Bonus200% of target (capped)

Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – 2024 grants for Donahue:

  • Structure: ~2/3 performance-based stock (half TSR vs DJ U.S. Containers & Packaging Index; half ROIC vs 3-yr target), ~1/3 time-based RS; 3-year performance period; vest in 2027 .
  • Time-based vests in thirds annually (2025, 2026, 2027) .
Award TypeTarget SharesMin–Max SharesFair Value ($)Performance PeriodVesting/Date
Time-based RS29,6512,659,9911/3 on 1/6/25; 1/3 on 1/5/26; 1/3 on 1/4/27
TSR-based PS26,6000 – 53,2002,660,0001/1/2024–12/31/2026Vests 1/4/27 per percentile schedule
ROIC-based PS29,9850 – 59,9702,659,9691/1/2024–12/31/2026Vests 1/4/27 per ROIC schedule

Performance outcomes (recent):

  • 2025 vesting: 0% payout for TSR-based awards; ROIC-based awards 30% below target (i.e., under 100%) .
  • 2024 vesting: TSR-based awards vested at 54.4% below target; ROIC-based at 200% (max) .
  • 2022 grant vestings (completed in 2025): TSR PS forfeited (0%); ROIC PS vested (e.g., 15,893 shares for Donahue) .

Clawback:

  • NYSE/SEC-compliant Compensation Recovery Policy effective for incentive comp on/after Oct 2, 2023; applies irrespective of misconduct, in addition to general clawback policy .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership and unvested awards:

ItemAmount
Shares beneficially owned499,827 (<1% of outstanding)
Unvested time-based RS (12/31/24)58,255 shares; $4,817,106 market value at $82.69
Unearned performance shares at target (12/31/24)159,650 shares; $13,201,459 market value

Policies and guidelines:

  • CEO ownership guideline: 6x base salary; all NEOs in compliance or on track; must retain 50% of net shares for 2 years post-vest until guidelines met .
  • Hedging and pledging: prohibited for Directors and Officers (no pledging allowed; strong alignment) .

Key vesting dates that may create technical supply:

  • Time-based RS installments on 1/5/2026 and 1/4/2027 for 2024 grant; performance shares from 2024 grant vest 1/4/2027 subject to results. Withholding for taxes at vest can result in market transactions; monitor Form 4s around these dates .

Employment Terms

Contracts and restrictive covenants:

  • Non-compete: 2 years for Donahue; non-solicit applies; other NEOs generally 1 year pre-CIC and 2 years post-CIC .
  • No tax gross-ups; 280G “best-net” cutback provision to avoid excise tax unless full payment yields higher after-tax value .
  • Company policy (2023): no future cash severance >2.99x salary+target bonus without shareholder ratification .

Severance/change-in-control economics (as of 12/31/2024):

ScenarioSalary ($)Bonus ($)Accelerated Equity ($)Total ($)
Retirement/Disability/Death4,132,5004,817,1068,949,606
Resignation for Good Reason (pre-CIC)4,275,00010,331,25014,606,250
Termination without Cause (pre-CIC)4,275,00010,331,25014,606,250
Termination without Cause or Good Reason after CIC4,275,0006,444,45718,018,56428,738,021

Equity on CIC:

  • Time-based RS fully vest; TSR PS vest based on relative TSR to date; ROIC PS vest based on ROIC vs target to date .

Note on vesting trigger design:

  • “What we do” states double-trigger (CIC + qualifying termination) for stock compensation vesting , while the employment agreements section describes equity vesting “on a Change in Control” (single-trigger description) . Investors should seek clarification on current plan terms (potential governance sensitivity).

Board Governance

Board service and roles:

  • Director since 2015; Chairman since 2022; President & CEO; not independent .
  • Committee memberships: Executive Committee (E) .
  • Lead Independent Director (Stephen J. Hagge) appointed Feb 2025; broad authority including agenda approval, executive sessions, liaison duties, and Chair evaluation .
  • Attendance: Board met 6 times in 2024; all directors met at least 75% attendance; annual meeting attendance expected and met in 2024 .
  • Director pay: Donahue receives no additional fees for Director/Chair service .

Compensation Committee Analysis

Peer group and benchmarking:

  • 20-company peer group includes Amcor, Ball, Berry, Graphic Packaging, International Paper, Packaging Corp of America, Sealed Air, Silgan, Sonoco, Sherwin-Williams, PPG, Colgate-Palmolive, Campbell Soup, Keurig Dr Pepper, Eastman Chemical, Greif, O-I Glass, U.S. Steel, WestRock (removed after 2024 merger) .
  • Target positioning around the 50th percentile; Pay Governance LLC engaged as independent consultant with stated independence safeguards .

Pay-for-performance linkages:

  • Annual bonus based on Economic Profit (with cost of capital set at 9%, above actual WACC) and MOCF; no subjective individual modifiers; capped at 200% .
  • LTI split between relative TSR and ROIC with published vesting curves; 3-year performance period; no options outstanding .

Say-on-Pay and shareholder engagement:

  • Say-on-Pay approval >96% in 2024; program remained largely unchanged in 2024 .
  • Robust investor engagement and board refreshment described; eight new independent directors in last six years; 8 of 9 nominees independent (Donahue the exception) .

Director Compensation (for completeness)

  • Independent director retainers and committee fees disclosed; Lead Independent Director fee $35k; Donahue’s compensation appears solely as an executive (no director pay) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment (detail)

Ownership GuidelineRequirementCompliance/Policy
CEO stock ownership6x base salaryAll NEOs either met or in compliance; 50% net shares hold for 2 years; no hedging/pledging permitted .

Performance & Track Record

  • Company-selected measure in PVP: ROIC, 13.2% for 2024 .
  • PVP TSR for 2019–2024: $118.70 (peer group $136.68); 2024 net income $560M .
  • Record Segment Income in 2024 at $1.65B (cited as rationale within CEO compensation strategy) .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Positive: strong clawback; no tax gross-ups; anti-hedging/anti-pledging; capped annual bonus; robust ownership guidelines .
  • Governance sensitivity: CEO/Chair dual role mitigated by empowered Lead Independent Director and independent committees . Ambiguity between stated double-trigger policy and equity vesting language “on a Change in Control” warrants clarification .
  • Pay outcomes vary with performance: recent zero TSR PS vesting (2025) underscores performance sensitivity; prior-year ROIC PS hit max, indicating balanced metrics .

Compensation Peer Group

  • Amcor; Avery Dennison; Ball; Berry Global; Campbell Soup; Colgate-Palmolive; Eastman Chemical; Graphic Packaging; Greif; International Paper; Keurig Dr Pepper; O-I Glass; Packaging Corp of America; PPG Industries; Sealed Air; Silgan Holdings; Sonoco Products; Sherwin-Williams; United States Steel; WestRock (removed post-merger) .

Employment Contracts & Provisions (summary)

  • Donahue pre-CIC termination: lump sum equal to 3x (base + target bonus), plus pro-rated actual bonus; other NEOs generally 1x salary .
  • Post-CIC termination (within 12 months): 3x (base + 3-year average bonus); equity acceleration per plan; best-net 280G cutback .
  • Disability/death/retirement treatments detailed; disability benefits differ for Donahue vs others .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High equity exposure (large unvested PS/RS) with stringent anti-hedging/pledging and robust clawbacks supports shareholder alignment; CEO ownership guidelines at 6x salary and hold requirements strengthen alignment .
  • Performance sensitivity: Dual metrics (TSR and ROIC) have produced divergent outcomes (zero TSR vesting in 2025 vs high ROIC vesting), indicating balanced but volatile equity realizations; annual bonuses tightly linked to cash generation and economic profit with a hard cap .
  • Retention vs. technical flows: Material scheduled vesting over 2026–2027 (time-based) and 2027 (performance) may create predictable withholding-related selling; however, large unvested equity also serves as retention glue during this period .
  • Governance watch item: Clarify CIC vesting trigger language vs. policy to assess potential shareholder-friendly double-trigger design; CEO/Chair dual role is partially mitigated by a robust Lead Independent Director charter and independent committees .

Citations:

Values retrieved from S&P Global.*