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Dale Foster

Dale Foster

Chief Executive Officer at Climb Global Solutions
CEO
Executive
Board

About Dale Foster

Dale Foster (61) is Chief Executive Officer of Climb Global Solutions and a director since January 2020. He holds a Bachelor of Technology in Electrical Engineering from Rochester Institute of Technology and an Associate’s in Electrical Engineering from Alfred State College . Under his tenure, Climb’s pay-versus-performance disclosure shows cumulative TSR turning a $100 initial investment on 12/31/2021 into $374.98 by 12/31/2024, with 2024 net income of $18.6 million versus $12.3 million in 2023 . Board leadership is separated, with John McCarthy serving as independent Board Chair (appointed January 2025), while Foster serves as CEO and director—mitigating CEO/Chair dual-role concerns .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Climb (Lifeboat Distribution subsidiary)PresidentJul 2019 – Jan 2020Led distribution business prior to CEO appointment .
Climb Global SolutionsExecutive Vice PresidentJan 2018 – Jul 2019Executive leadership ahead of CEO role .
Promark Technology (later Ingram Micro subsidiary)EVP & GMNov 2012 – Jan 2018Ran value‑added distribution operations under Ingram Micro .
Promark TechnologyPresident & CEO1997 – 2012Built value‑added distributor focused on emerging data storage and virtualization .

External Roles

No additional public company directorships or external committee roles are disclosed for Foster in the proxy .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary (approved annual rate)Salary actually paidBonus (discretionary)Non-Equity Incentive (Annual bonus paid for year)
2022$375,000 $376,922 $361,000
2023$500,000 $500,000 $552,000
2024$550,000 $539,583 $825,000

Notes:

  • In 2024, the Board increased Foster’s annualized base salary to $550,000 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive (STI)

YearMetricsWeightingTarget rangeActual outcomePayout
2022Adjusted EBITDA; EPSNot stated split (both used) 0–125% each EBITDA 122%; EPS 114% $361,000
2023Adjusted EBITDA; Gross profit margin % of Adjusted Gross Billings80%; 20% 0–150% each EBITDA 113%; Margin 100% $552,000
2024EBITDA100% 0–150% Achieved 150% $825,000

Long-Term Equity Incentives (LTI)

Grant yearInstrumentStructurePerformance metrics and weightsPerformance windowVesting terms
2023RSUs (time-vested) + PSUs40% time; 60% performanceEPS 70%; ROE 30%FY2023–FY2025RSUs vest in 3 equal annual installments; PSUs vest Jan 1 after period based on results (0–150%) .
2024RSUs (time-vested) + PSUs40% time; 60% performanceEPS 70%; ROE 30%FY2024–FY2026Same vesting mechanics as 2023 .

Additional details:

  • Company states no options are currently granted; equity is via restricted stock/RSUs and PSUs .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of April 7, 2025)

HolderShares beneficially owned% of outstandingNotes
Dale Foster82,740 1.8% Includes 18,004 unvested restricted stock .

Outstanding Unvested Awards (as of 12/31/2024; CLMB $126.75)

CategoryUnvested units (#)Market value ($)
Time-based RSUs/Restricted Stock24,977 $3,165,835
Performance-based RSUs (PSUs)23,109 $2,929,066

Vesting schedules and cadence:

  • Time-vested RSUs: 2024 grants vest in 3 equal annual installments; some older grants vest quarterly (details by grant year in footnotes) .
  • PSUs: 2024 grant of 12,668 PSUs vests at end of FY2026; 2023 grant of 10,441 PSUs vests at end of FY2025, subject to EPS/ROE performance and continued service through Jan 1 following the period .

Stock vested in 2024:

NameShares vested (#)Value realized ($)
Dale Foster13,681 $980,014

Hedging/pledging and insider policy:

  • Short-selling, hedging, and pledging of Company stock are prohibited for directors and executives .
  • Insider Trading Policy is in effect and enforced; Clawback Policy adopted and compliant with SEC/Nasdaq rules .

Ownership guidelines:

  • No specific executive stock ownership guidelines are disclosed in the 2025 proxy .

Employment Terms

Executive Severance and Change in Control Plan (adopted April 14, 2023):

  • Foster is designated Tier 1. Outside a Change in Control Period: 18 months base salary continuation, Company-paid COBRA through the severance period, and a prorated annual bonus based on actual performance for time served .
  • Within Change in Control Period (60 days before to 12 months after): lump sum equal to 24 months base salary, target annual bonus, Company-paid COBRA for the CIC severance period, and double-trigger full acceleration of unvested equity upon qualifying termination .

Restrictive covenants and clawback:

  • Non-compete and non-solicit for one year following termination (or longer if the severance/CIC period is longer), plus indefinite non-disparagement and confidentiality; clawback applies to incentive-based compensation .

Excise tax:

  • “Best net” cutback—benefits reduced to avoid 280G excise tax if reduction yields better after-tax outcome .

Illustrative potential payments as of 12/31/2024:

ScenarioSalary+COBRAIncentive (bonus)Equity accelerationTotal
Termination outside CIC period$855,770 $825,000 $1,680,770
Termination within CIC period (double-trigger)$1,141,026 $825,000 $3,165,835 $5,131,861

Board Governance

  • Director since January 2020; currently CEO and director (non-independent); Board Chair is independent (John McCarthy since Jan 2025), and all committees are fully independent, with executive sessions without management .
  • Board met 10 times in 2024; all directors attended at least 75% of aggregate Board and committee meetings .
  • Committee roles: Audit (Bryant Chair; McCarthy; Boren → to be succeeded by Giovacchini post-meeting), Compensation (Gold Chair; McCarthy), Nominating & Gov (Boren Chair; Bryant; Scorziello → to be succeeded by Gold) .
  • Risk oversight consolidated into the Audit Committee in 2025 after disbanding the Risk and Security Committee .

Say-on-Pay and 2025 vote results:

  • Say-on-Pay approvals: 91% (2023), 88% (2024) .
  • 2025 Annual Meeting approvals: Say-on-Pay passed (For: 2,537,552; Against: 63,322; Abstain: 8,945); directors, including Foster, were elected; “annual” frequency preferred for Say-on-Pay .

Related party transactions:

  • Sales to a customer in which a family member of one executive had a minority ownership position totaled ~$0.7M in 2024 and ~$1.4M in 2023; the minority interest terminated during 2024; transactions on arm’s-length terms .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix shift to RSUs/PSUs, no current option grants—lower risk equity and clearer linkage to EPS/ROE targets (0–150% PSU payout range) .
  • Strong pay-for-performance linkage evident in 2024 with EBITDA-based STI at 150% and PSU metrics tied to multi-year EPS/ROE; 2023 STI used EBITDA (80%) and gross margin (20%) .
  • Governance enhancements since 2023 include double-trigger equity acceleration under the Severance Plan and adoption of a Nasdaq-compliant clawback policy .

Performance Compensation – Detailed Table

ComponentMetricWeightTargetActualPayoutVesting/Timing
2024 STIEBITDA100%0–150% range 150% $825,000 Cash, paid following year
2023 STIAdjusted EBITDA80%0–150% 113% Included in $552,000 Cash, paid following year
2023 STIGross margin % of AGB20%0–150% 100% Included in $552,000 Cash, paid following year
2023–2025 PSUEPS70%0–150% Not yet disclosedN/AVests Jan 1 after FY2025 if earned
2023–2025 PSUROE30%0–150% Not yet disclosedN/AVests Jan 1 after FY2025 if earned
2024–2026 PSUEPS70%0–150% Not yet disclosedN/AVests Jan 1 after FY2026 if earned
2024–2026 PSUROE30%0–150% Not yet disclosedN/AVests Jan 1 after FY2026 if earned
Time-vested RSUsService100%N/AN/AN/A3 equal annual installments (2023/2024 grants)

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and incentives: Significant unvested PSUs (23,109) and time-vested RSUs (24,977) align Foster with multi-year EPS/ROE and retention; anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies reduce misalignment risk .
  • Upside/downside symmetry: STI paid 150% in 2024 on EBITDA outperformance, while PSU designs scale 0–150% on EPS/ROE—clear pay-for-performance leverage tied to fundamentals .
  • Governance quality: Separation of Chair/CEO, fully independent committees, clawback policy, and double-trigger CIC terms are shareholder-friendly; Say-on-Pay support remains strong (88–91%) and 2025 SOP passed .
  • Retention/CIC economics: Tier 1 CIC benefits could reach ~$5.13M including full equity acceleration based on 12/31/2024 valuations; outside CIC severance at ~$1.68M—appropriate scale for a smaller reporting company yet noteworthy in M&A sensitivity analyses .