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Peter Sefzik

Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Banking Officer at COMERICACOMERICA
Executive

About Peter Sefzik

Peter L. Sefzik is Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Banking Officer at Comerica Incorporated (CMA), serving as an executive officer from 2015–2018 and 2019–present; he has held the CBO role since January 2023 and is 49 years old . His 2024 incentive pay reflected strong corporate funding from the AEI program (122% baseline) driven by MIP EPS and strategic initiatives, with his individual award at 122.4% of target . For long-term incentives, the 2022–2024 SELTPP performance delivered a 135% payout after a 150% ROCE achievement factor was reduced by a 15% TSR modifier vs. the KBW Bank Index; SELTPP ROCE averaged 16.0% over the period .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Comerica Incorporated / Comerica BankSenior EVP & Chief Banking OfficerJan 2023–presentFocused on customer experience and acquisition; targeted expansion across multiple lines of business and geographies; organizational changes to drive efficiencies; strengthening business line risk controls and digital transformation .
Comerica Incorporated / Comerica BankEVP, Commercial BankJul 2018–Jan 2023Led commercial banking with emphasis on expansion, risk control, and client engagement .
Comerica BankEVP and President – Texas MarketSep 2015–Jul 2018Built external presence with key stakeholders, helped drive outstanding CRA rating; enhanced onboarding and payment services operations .

External Roles

No external public company directorships or committee roles were disclosed in the 2025/2024 DEF 14A materials reviewed .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)597,077 646,346 683,039
Target AEI Bonus (% of base)90% (Other NEOs) 90% (Other NEOs) 90% (Other NEOs)
All Other Compensation ($)27,200 29,079 30,328
Change in Pension Value ($)198,364 49,315

Perquisites detail (2024):

  • Financial planning incremental cost: $16,528 for Mr. Sefzik .

Pension benefits (present value at FY-end 2023):

  • RIA: $846,847; SRIA: $188,291 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Executive Incentive (AEI) – Design and 2024 Outcome

MetricWeightTarget DefinitionActual vs GoalMetric FundingWeighted Funding
MIP EPS65% Non-GAAP EPS with defined adjustments $5.63 / $5.18 = 109% 136% (100% + 9×4%) 88% (136%×65%)
MIP Efficiency Ratio15% Non-GAAP efficiency ratio with collar/exclusions 68% / 69% = 99% 97% (100% − 1×3%) 14% (97%×15%)
Strategic Initiatives (Risk Mgmt, Growth, Human Capital)20% Qualitative scorecards 91%, 100%, 124% 9%, 5%, 6% 20% total
Total Corporate Funding122%

Individual award (2024):

NameTarget as % of BaseIndividual Award ($)Award as % of Target
Peter L. Sefzik90% $749,088 122.4%

Design notes:

  • AEI uses one-year prospective metrics; funding scales up/down around target; adjustments in 2024 increased net income by $82M after-tax and improved revenue/expense inputs to the efficiency ratio by $76M and $13M, respectively .

Long-Term Incentives (SELTPP, RSUs, Options)

LTI mix and 2025 change:

  • 2024 mix: 60% SELTPP, 30% RSUs, 10% options .
  • Beginning January 2025, stock options discontinued; LTI now 60% SELTPP and 40% time-based RSUs .

2024 grants (Jan 23, 2024):

Award TypeGrant Units/SharesExercise PriceGrant Date Fair Value ($)
SELTPP Units (Target)15,565 861,523
RSUs7,785 420,079
Stock Options7,910 $53.96 139,532

2023 grants (Jan 24, 2023):

Award TypeGrant Units/SharesExercise PriceGrant Date Fair Value ($)
SELTPP Units (Target)10,120 744,124
RSUs5,060 360,070
Stock Options5,855 $71.16 118,330

Performance plan (2022–2024 SELTPP):

  • Matrix based on absolute three-year average SELTPP ROCE and relative ROCE vs KBW Bank Index; TSR acts as a modifier .
  • Result: ROCE achievement factor 150%; TSR in fourth quartile reduced payout by 15% → final 135% payout; Sefzik distributed 9,625 performance-adjusted shares on the 2022 grant .

2024 vesting and realized value:

Award TypeShares Vested in 2024Value Realized ($)
RSUs + SELTPP (combined)16,865 $848,679

Summary Compensation (Total and Components)

Component ($)202220232024
Stock Awards1,009,608 1,104,194 1,281,602
Option Awards111,870 118,330 139,532
Non-Equity Incentive (AEI)960,000 426,573 749,088
Total Compensation2,705,755 2,522,886 2,932,904

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (Feb 28, 2025)85,264 shares; includes 21,282 RSUs and 17,998 options exercisable by Apr 29, 2025; less than 1% of class .
Pledging/HedgingNone pledged; CMA prohibits hedging and pledging of company stock for directors/employees .
Stock Ownership GuidelinesSr. EVP/EVP (Level II): 3× salary; new 2025 rule requires retention of 50% of after-tax shares from vestings/exercises until the multiple is met .
Compliance Status (as of Dec 31, 2024)All NEOs exceed guideline levels except Mr. Goldman (new hire) .

Outstanding equity awards (key tranches and vesting):

InstrumentUnexercisable/Exercisable (if applicable)Exercise PriceExpirationUnvested RSUs/UnitsVesting Schedule
Options (2024 grant)7,910 unexercisable $53.96 1/23/2034 Options vest 25% annually (remaining dates: 1/23/2025–1/23/2028) .
Options (2023 grant)4,392 unexercisable; 1,463 exercisable $71.16 1/24/2033 25% annually (remaining dates: 1/24/2025–1/24/2027) .
RSUs (2024 grant)7,785 50% year 2, 25% years 3 & 4; vest dates: 1/30/2026, 1/29/2027, 1/31/2028 .
RSUs (2023 grant)5,060 50% on 1/24/2025; 25% on 1/24/2026, 1/24/2027 .
RSUs (2022 grant)1,783 25% on 1/25/2025 and 25% on 1/25/2026 (50% vested on 1/25/2024) .
SELTPP (2024 grant target)15,565 Vests after 3-year period ending 12/31/2026 upon determination of performance vs ROCE metrics and TSR modifier .

Market value references at FY-end 2024 for unvested awards appear in the Outstanding Equity Awards table (e.g., RSUs and equity incentive plan awards market values) .

Employment Terms

ProvisionDetails
Employment AgreementNone; NEOs participate in standard severance plan for salaried employees .
Involuntary Not-for-Cause Severance (no CoC)Annual base salary plus COBRA and outplacement; unvested equity forfeited; vested options exercisable up to 90 days . Estimated: $694,081 for Mr. Sefzik (as of 12/31/2024) .
Change-of-Control (CoC) Agreements30-month employment period post-CoC; if terminated without cause or for good reason, lump-sum severance equal to 3× base salary + highest annual bonus, proportionate bonus, pension make-whole, 3 years of benefits, outplacement; awards pre-4/24/2018 single-trigger; post-4/24/2018 double-trigger if not assumed . Estimated CoC termination payout: $9,913,513 (as of 12/31/2024) .
Disability/DeathAcceleration of unvested RSUs/SELTPP; options treatment per policy; benefits as detailed in proxy .
Clawbacks/ForfeitureDodd-Frank compliant Compensation Recovery Policy; discretionary Recoupment Policy; equity plan clawbacks and forfeiture provisions for misconduct/risk failures .
Hedging/Pledging & Insider Trading PolicyHedging and pledging prohibited; structured insider trading policy with MNPI considerations .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 AEI payout at 122.4% of target reflects corporate funding discipline and individual performance; structurally, AEI weights MIP EPS (65%), efficiency (15%), and strategic initiatives (20%)—investors should monitor non-GAAP adjustments (net charge-offs substitution, interest rate collar) that influenced funding in 2024 .
  • Equity incentives and risk/reward: The move to eliminate options in 2025 shifts LTI mix to PSUs and RSUs, reducing convexity to upside and potentially lowering executive propensity to sell options-linked shares; however, PSU design retains robust ROCE and TSR relative modifiers vs KBW index, maintaining performance linkage .
  • Ownership alignment and selling pressure: Sefzik’s unvested RSUs have scheduled vest dates in Jan 2025–2028; upcoming 1/24/2025 vest and SELTPP determinations can coincide with Form 4 tax-withholding transactions; note hedging/pledging prohibitions and 50% post-vesting retention requirement until 3× salary ownership guideline is met, which mitigates misalignment and dampens discretionary sales .
  • Change-of-control economics: A substantial double-trigger CoC package (3× cash severance plus full acceleration of in-the-money awards if not assumed) may reduce retention risk in transactions but can create shareholder dilution concerns if a deal occurs; investors should factor the $9.9M estimate in M&A scenarios .
  • Performance track record signal: The 2022–2024 SELTPP payout at 135% shows high ROCE achievement but weaker relative TSR, indicating execution on profitability targets amid harder share-price context; watch forward PSU calibration and TSR modifiers for alignment with bank peers .
  • Governance and shareholder support: Say-on-pay support ~94% in 2024 and robust clawbacks/ownership policies suggest low governance risk; compensation peer group unchanged for 2025 stabilizes benchmarking but warrants ongoing review for inflationary ratcheting .

All figures and terms cited are sourced from Comerica’s 2025 and 2024 DEF 14A and related tables and sections .