Collin R. Jones
About Collin R. Jones
Collin R. Jones is Executive Vice President, Corporate Strategy & Development and President of Westwood One at Cumulus Media. He oversees strategic initiatives, investor relations, corporate development, Westwood One, the Cumulus Podcast Network, and IncentRev/Sweet Deals; he became President of Westwood One in January 2024 and joined Cumulus in November 2011 after investment banking roles at Macquarie Capital and Argentum Group; he holds a B.S. in Economics from Duke University and is age 38 as of February 2025 . Company performance context during his recent tenure includes a 2024 stock price decline; a debt exchange extending maturities and reducing principal by ~$33 million; DMS revenue up 27% year-over-year; streaming impressions +15%; record revenues from NFL Playoffs/Super Bowl; and fixed cost reductions of $43 million (plus $120 million since 2019), all of which shape incentive outcomes and value creation levers .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulus Media | Director, Corporate Strategy & Development; EVP, Corporate Strategy & Development | 2011–2025 | Led strategy, investor relations, and corporate development; expanded remit to Westwood One and podcast network leadership |
| Macquarie Capital | Investment Banking | Not disclosed | TMT transaction experience supporting corporate development acumen |
| Argentum Group | Investment Banking | Not disclosed | Growth equity/investment background aiding deal execution |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Association of Broadcasters | Radio Board Chair | Not disclosed | Industry policy leadership; influence on radio sector standards |
| Radio Music License Committee | Vice Chair (prior) | Not disclosed | Music licensing negotiations; cost and compliance leadership |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $650,000 | Increased from $500,000 upon appointment as Westwood One President effective Jan 1, 2024 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 80% | Set by employment agreement |
| Target Bonus ($) | $520,000 | Calculated from 80% × $650,000 |
| Actual Bonus Paid – STIP ($) | $401,440 | 77.2% of target based on FY2024 Adjusted EBITDA achievement |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) – FY2024
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold (50% payout) | Target Range (100% payout) | Maximum (200% payout) | Actual | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (USD mm) | 100% | $74.4 | $93.0–$102.5 | $120.9 | $84.518 | 77.2% of target; paid $401,440 |
Note: For 2025, the STIP “target” payout was reduced to 75% of target (vs. 100% previously), with 100%+ only for substantial outperformance, tightening pay-for-performance alignment .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – Grants in 2024
| Component | Target Grant Value ($) | Vesting | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | $222,811 | 25% per year over 4 years | Time-based |
| PRSUs | $53,473 | Annual tranches 2024–2027 | 60% Adjusted EBITDA; 20% Adjusted Controllable Expense; 20% DMS Revenue; linear interpolation |
| CPUs (cash) | $169,338 | Annual tranches aligned to PRSU design | Same metrics as PRSUs |
| Total LTI | $445,622 | Mixed time/performance | Diversified, multi-metric design |
2024 PRSU tranche achievement by metric:
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target Range | Max | Actual | Weighted Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (USD mm) | 60% | $74.4 | $93.0–$102.5 | $120.9 | $84.5 | 46.3% |
| Adjusted Controllable Expense (USD mm; lower is better) | 20% | $487.5 | $480.0 | $472.5 | $461.0 | 30.0% |
| DMS Revenue (USD mm) | 20% | $49.1 | $54.6 | $60.0 | $49.9 | 11.4% |
| Total Payout | 100% | — | — | — | — | 87.7% |
PRSU shares earned for 2024 tranches:
| Award Cohort | Target PRSUs (2024 tranche) | Earned PRSUs (2024 tranche) |
|---|---|---|
| 2021–2024 PRSU | 1,875 | 1,020 |
| 2022–2025 PRSU | 4,675 | 2,541 |
| 2023–2026 PRSU | 2,573 | 1,399 |
| 2024–2027 PRSU | 3,419 | 2,999 |
CPU cash earned for 2024 tranches:
| Award Cohort | Target CPUs ($, 2024 tranche) | Earned CPUs ($, 2024 tranche) |
|---|---|---|
| 2021–2024 CPU | $36,560 | $19,889 |
| 2023–2026 CPU | $41,230 | $22,429 |
| 2024–2027 CPU | $42,335 | $37,127 |
| Total Earned CPUs ($) | — | $79,445 |
2025 LTI program changes: performance-based awards now measured on adjusted EBITDA margin (ex-political) for three one-year periods (70% weighting) and relative TSR vs. Russell 2000 over 3 years (30% weighting); all targets set upfront; awards cash-denominated due to share availability; double-trigger vesting retained; change-in-control performance multipliers apply only if stock price ≥300% ($2.64) or ≥500% ($4.40) of grant price ($0.88), increasing payout opportunity by 50% or 100% respectively, with linear interpolation .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Apr 11, 2025) | 81,534 Class A shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Shares Outstanding (Class A) | 17,128,043 |
| Options | 14,000 exercisable; $14.64 strike; expires Feb 13, 2025 |
| Outstanding RSUs/PRSUs (as of Dec 31, 2024) | See vesting schedule below |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | NEOs: 2× base salary; 6-year compliance window starting Mar 16, 2024 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for Section 16 officers and non-employee directors |
| Anti-repricing | No option repricing without shareholder approval |
Outstanding award vesting schedule (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Award Type | Shares/$ | Vesting Dates |
|---|---|---|
| RSU | 5,625 shares | Vests Feb 5, 2025 |
| PRSU | 1,875 shares (2024 tranche) | Vested Dec 31, 2024, subject to performance |
| RSU | 9,351 shares | Vests 50% Feb 3, 2025; 50% Feb 3, 2026 |
| PRSU | 9,351 shares (2024–2025 tranches) | Vests 50% Dec 31, 2024; 50% Dec 31, 2025, subject to performance |
| RSU | 32,164 shares | Vests 1/3 on Mar 3, 2025; 1/3 on Mar 3, 2026; 1/3 on Mar 3, 2027 |
| PRSU | 7,719 shares (2024–2026 tranches) | Vests in equal parts Dec 31, 2024/2025/2026, subject to performance |
| RSU | 56,985 shares | Vests 25% each Feb 17, 2025/2026/2027/2028 |
| PRSU | 13,676 shares (2024–2027 tranches) | Vests in equal parts Dec 31, 2024/2025/2026/2027, subject to performance |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreement Date / Role Change | Employment agreement executed Nov 29, 2023; EVP Corporate Strategy & Development and President, Westwood One effective Jan 1, 2024 |
| Term / Renewal | Initial term through Dec 31, 2026; auto-renews annually unless terminated per agreement |
| Base Salary | $650,000 |
| Annual Bonus Target | 80% of base; CEO may set higher amount; governed by executive incentive plan |
| Severance (without cause / good reason) | 6 months base salary + cash totaling 50% of target bonus over the severance period + 18 months COBRA at company expense |
| Enhanced Severance (CEO departure adjacency) | If terminated without cause within 1 month before or within 9 months after CEO Mary Berner resigns at Board request or is terminated without cause: 9 months base + 75% of target bonus |
| Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicit provisions; severance subject to forfeiture upon material breach |
| Equity Award Vesting (terminations) | 50% vesting of unvested CPUs/RSUs/PRSUs (75% if termination before first anniversary of grant); 100% vesting if termination without cause/for good reason within 3 months prior or 12 months after change in control; options vest to next annual date |
| Clawbacks | Dodd-Frank/NYSE/NASDAQ-compliant clawback policy; additional award-level forfeiture for misconduct/restatements and covenant breaches |
| Tax Gross-ups | No change-in-control excise tax gross-ups |
| Perquisites | None provided |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment tightened: 2025 STIP “target” payout reduced to 75% and 2025 LTI shifted to adjusted EBITDA margin (ex-political) and relative TSR with upfront multi-year targets, sharpening linkage to sustainable margin expansion and shareholder returns .
- Vesting supply and potential selling pressure: Multiple RSU/PRSU tranches vest in 2025–2028 with meaningful share counts; while anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies reduce alignment risk, upcoming vest dates could introduce episodic liquidity/selling dynamics absent lock-up or hold requirements beyond ownership guidelines .
- Retention and severance economics: Jones’ severance is modest versus CEO/CFO (6–9 months base plus 50–75% of target bonus), suggesting retention relies more on ongoing performance-based upside than guaranteed protection; double-trigger vesting and change-in-control multipliers on 2025 cash LTI create incremental strategic outcome sensitivity tied to stock price appreciation .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership is <1% of Class A; NEO 2× salary ownership guidelines with a 6-year runway and anti-pledging policy support alignment, though compliance status is not disclosed; options at $14.64 expiring in 2025 were deeply out-of-the-money at 2024YE, limiting near-term option-driven behavior .
- Governance and shareholder sentiment: 2024 say-on-pay support of ~35% prompted significant program changes and board refresh (Compensation Committee chaired by top shareholder Steven Galbraith), which should mitigate future vote risk and align incentives with investor priorities amidst 2024 stock headwinds .
Additional operating indicators relevant to Jones’s domains: DMS revenue +27% YoY; streaming impressions +15%; record playoff/Super Bowl revenue; and $43 million cost reductions underscore execution on growth and efficiency levers within his purview (Westwood One, podcast network, and corporate strategy) .
Organizational scope confirmation: Key podcasting leadership reports to Jones, reflecting accountability for digital/audio growth initiatives .