Sri Maddipati
About Sri Maddipati
Sri (“Srikanth”) Maddipati is being elevated to President, Electric Supply at Consumers Energy effective July 1, 2025; he was the current Vice President of Electric Supply at the time of the announcement and previously served for years as Vice President and Treasurer, signing numerous financing agreements for CMS Energy and Consumers Energy . As of the 2024 Form 10-K (filed Feb 11, 2025), the roster of named executive officers did not include Maddipati, indicating he was not a 2024 NEO in the 2025 proxy disclosure . For incentive context, CMS reported 2024 Adjusted EPS of $3.34 versus a target of $3.29, driving an Annual Incentive Plan payout of 133% of target; long-term incentives tied to the 2022–2024 TSR component paid 105.3% of target, with LTI EPS still pending at the proxy filing date .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consumers Energy Company | President, Electric Supply | 2025–present (effective Jul 1, 2025) | Leads Energy Supply, Generating Plants/Resources, and Supply Development |
| Consumers Energy Company | Vice President, Electric Supply | 2025 (at announcement) | Operational leadership of electric supply ahead of promotion |
| Consumers Energy Company | Vice President and Treasurer | 2018–2023 (documented signatory) | Executed supplemental indentures and credit facilities, reflecting treasury/capital markets leadership |
| CMS Energy Corporation | Vice President and Treasurer | 2018 (documented signatory) | Executed revolving credit agreements for the parent corporation |
Performance Compensation
Company incentive design (applies to NEOs; design signals likely framework for senior officers)
| Program | Metric | Weighting | Performance period | Vesting/payout mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) | Annual Incentive EPS | 70% | 1 year | Cash; payout based on EPS goal attainment approved annually |
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) | Annual Incentive Utility (People/Planet/Prosperity operating metrics) | 30% | 1 year | Cash; six operating metrics for operational success and sustainability |
| Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | Relative TSR vs Performance Peer Group | 50% of performance-based LTI (75% of total LTI is performance-based) | 3 years | 3-year cliff vest; payout schedule ranges 50% at 30th percentile to 200% at 90th percentile |
| Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | Relative LTI EPS growth vs Performance Peer Group | 50% of performance-based LTI (75% of total LTI is performance-based) | 3 years | 3-year cliff vest; performance shares settle per schedule above; no dividends on unvested PSUs |
| Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | Tenure-based restricted stock | 25% of total LTI | 3 years | Time-based vesting at 3rd anniversary; shares sold at vest to cover tax withholdings |
Recent company performance outcomes (for incentive context)
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| AIP payout (% of target) | — | 133% |
| Adjusted EPS vs AIP target | — | $3.34 actual vs $3.29 target |
| LTI TSR payout (% of target) | — | 105.3% (for 2022–2024 tranche) |
Notes: Maddipati was not disclosed as a 2024 NEO in the 2025 proxy; individual target/pay outcomes for him are not provided in the proxy. These company-level outcomes frame incentive conditions senior leaders operated under .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines are in place for NEOs; unvested performance-based restricted stock is excluded when assessing compliance (reinforces focus on realized ownership) .
- Hedging and pledging of company securities are prohibited for officers (reduces misalignment/credit risk red flags) .
- No dividends are paid on unvested performance-based stock; dividend equivalents accrue and vest only if/when performance vesting conditions are met (tightens pay-performance linkage) .
- Individual beneficial ownership for Maddipati is not presented in the 2025 proxy because the NEO list disclosed covers other executives (ownership tables in proxies typically present directors/NEOs) .
Employment Terms
- Separation (non‑CIC): Officer Separation Agreements (OS Agreements) for NEOs provide lump‑sum severance based on executive level; tenure-based RSUs vest pro‑rata; performance-based RSUs vest pro‑rata at end of period based on actual performance; release/non‑disparagement/confidentiality required .
- Change‑in‑Control (CIC): Double‑trigger required (CIC plus qualifying termination within two years); cash severance typically set in multiples of salary and target bonus by level; performance-based RSUs vest pro‑rata at target; “best net benefit” applies (no 280G/4999 tax gross‑up) .
- Program boundaries: Executive agreements are limited to separation/CIC; base salary and annual incentive separation amounts do not exceed 3x, with an average of ~2x; no tax gross‑ups; policy explicitly prohibits hedging/pledging by officers .
Disclosure note: These terms are disclosed for NEOs. Maddipati was not a 2024 NEO in the 2025 proxy; his individual agreement status is not specified therein .
Work History & Expertise Signals
- Capital markets/treasury: As Vice President and Treasurer, Maddipati executed parent and utility revolving credit agreements and supplemental indentures, indicating deep experience in liquidity, corporate finance, and creditor relations .
- Operations leadership: As VP of Electric Supply, and now President of Electric Supply, he is accountable for energy supply, generating resources, and supply development, a core operational profit/risk lever for CMS/Consumers .
Investment Implications
- Scope expansion: The promotion to President of Electric Supply places Maddipati over generation/supply—key drivers of reliability, fuel cost management, and execution of clean energy transition plans (material to EPS/allowed returns in a regulated framework) .
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Company incentive architecture is heavily tied to EPS (AIP 70%) and to relative TSR and multi‑year EPS growth (LTI), which should align senior operator incentives, including Electric Supply leadership, with shareholder value creation and peer-relative execution .
- Limited governance red flags: Officer hedging/pledging are prohibited; equity uses double‑trigger vesting under CIC; no tax gross‑ups; strong say‑on‑pay approval (~95% CMS, 100% Consumers) supports low governance risk on comp design .
- Technical flows watch: Company policy notes shares are sold at vest for tax withholdings; LTI awards vest on three-year cycles, which can create predictable, modest insider selling around vest dates across the executive cohort (monitor Form 4s once Maddipati is a reporting officer) .
Bottom line: Maddipati’s finance-to-operations trajectory plus the incentive design suggests alignment toward EPS growth, reliability, and TSR. Near-term signal to watch is execution in Electric Supply (fuel/resource strategy, plant performance) against EPS and operational metrics that drove a 133% AIP payout in 2024 and a 105.3% TSR-based LTI payout for the last cycle .