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Clifford Skelton

Clifford Skelton

President and Chief Executive Officer at CONDUENTCONDUENT
CEO
Executive
Board

About Clifford Skelton

Clifford Skelton is President & CEO of Conduent (age 69), serving as CEO since February 25, 2020 after interim CEO (Aug 2019–Feb 2020) and COO (Jun–Aug 2019) . He holds a BA from USC and an MPA from Harvard Kennedy School, is a former Navy fighter pilot (20+ years), and brings client services, financial, and operational leadership from Fiserv, Ally Financial, and Bank of America . Conduent reported approximately $3.4B revenue in 2024 and ~$3.7B in 2023, with 2024 compensation metrics tied to Adjusted Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA margin, Net ARR and multi‑year PRSUs for Revenue Growth and rTSR; the APIP funded at 72% of target for 2024 based on results (Adjusted Revenue $3,605M; Adjusted EBITDA margin 8.27%; Net ARR $106.5M) . Say‑on‑pay support remained strong: 96.41% in 2024 and 96.8% in 2023 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
ConduentCOOJun 2019–Aug 2019Operational leadership prior to appointment as interim CEO
ConduentInterim CEOAug 2019–Feb 2020Stabilized leadership; led transition to permanent CEO
ConduentPresident & CEOFeb 2020–presentGrowth/efficiency plan execution; pay aligned to revenue growth, rTSR
Fiserv Output SolutionsPresidentMar 2017–Jun 2019Led client service operations; transformation experience
FiservGroup President & CIOApr 2012–Mar 2017Technology and operations leadership; enterprise scale
Ally Financial; Bank of AmericaVarious leadership rolesNot disclosedFinancial services operations, client services expertise

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No other public company directorships disclosed

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)826,808 835,000 835,000
Stock Awards ($)4,249,995 4,999,996 4,999,997
Non‑Equity Incentive ($)789,075 638,775 901,800
All Other Compensation ($)15,000
Total ($)5,865,878 6,473,771 6,751,797
2024 Target Pay Design (as of 12/31/2024)Value/Percent
Base Salary$835,000
Target Short‑Term Incentive (% of Salary)150%
Target Long‑Term Incentive$5,000,000
Target Total Direct Compensation$7,087,500
CEO pay mix variable/at‑risk88%

Performance Compensation

APIP 2024 MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaxActual ResultAchievementFunding Contribution
Adjusted Revenue ($M)40% 3,540.5 3,650.0 3,759.5 3,605.0 69.2% 28%
Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%)40% 8.08 8.50 8.93 8.27 58.5% 23%
Net ARR Activity ($M)20% 89.3 105.0 120.8 106.5 104.8% 21%
Total APIP Funding72%
CEO Payout vs Target$901,800 (72% of $1,252,500 target)
2024 LTIP StructureDetails
Vehicles and mix35% RSU; 45% PRSU—Revenue Growth; 20% PRSU—rTSR
RSU vesting1/3 on Dec 31, 2024/2025/2026 (Apr 1, 2024 grants)
PRSU—Revenue Growth3‑year cliff vest 12/31/2026; annual growth targets: 2024 −1.9% target, (3.27)% threshold; 2024 actual −3.14% → 54.74% for first year; averaged over 2025/2026
PRSU—rTSR3‑year cliff vest 12/31/2026; payout 50% at 25th percentile, 100% at median, 150% at ≥75th; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative; total value cap 6x target
CEO 2024 grants (shares)RSU 535,168; PRSU—Revenue Growth: 344,037 (thresh), 688,073 (target), 1,032,110 (max); PRSU—rTSR: 156,193 (thresh), 312,385 (target), 468,578 (max)
Outstanding Equity at FY‑end 2024UnitsMarket Value (at $4.04)
RSU (4/1/2024)356,779 $1,441,387
RSU (4/1/2023)242,954 $981,534
PRSU—Revenue Growth (4/1/2024)Target 688,073 $2,779,815
PRSU—rTSR (4/1/2024)Max 468,578 $1,893,055
PRSU—Revenue Growth (4/1/2023)Threshold 255,102 $1,030,612
PRSU—rTSR (4/1/2023)Target 254,169 $1,026,843
Stock Vested in 2024SharesValue Realized
Clifford Skelton557,824 $2,253,609 (includes tax withholding)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership2,069,340 shares (1.28% of outstanding as of 3/24/2025)
Ownership guidelines (officers)CEO 6x salary; retain 50% of net shares until met
Hedging/pledgingProhibited; trading limited to window periods; no 10b5‑1 plans as of 12/31/2024
Director ownership guidelinesNot applicable to Skelton as employee; non‑employee directors: 6x cash retainer
Alignment featuresHigh equity mix (88% at‑risk); PRSUs tied to multi‑year Revenue Growth and rTSR

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey Terms
Employment contractNo written employment contract; NEOs serve at will
U.S. Executive Severance Policy52 weeks base salary; continued health benefits (excl. disability/401k); continued vesting during severance; subject to release
CIC Severance (double trigger)CEO: 2.5x base + target bonus lump sum; 12 months welfare benefits + lump‑sum value of 12 months premiums; accelerated vest at target; cut to avoid excise tax if beneficial
Retirement provisions (LTIP)If eligible (Skelton eligible as of 12/31/2024): RSUs continue per schedule; PRSUs vest per schedule based on actual performance, pro‑rated except 2024 PRSU—Revenue Growth continues without proration; conditions apply
ClawbackSEC/Nasdaq‑compliant policy for restatements; additional detrimental‑activity rescission and recovery
Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024)RetirementInvoluntary (No Cause)CIC + Qualifying TerminationDeath/Disability
Cash Severance ($)835,000 5,218,750
Non‑Equity Incentive ($)901,800 901,800 901,800
Equity Incentive Awards ($)6,650,103 6,286,309 9,552,893 8,214,495
Healthcare Benefits ($)
Total ($)6,650,103 8,023,109 15,673,443 9,116,295

Board Governance

  • Board service history: Director since 2019; non‑independent (management) . Independent Chairman: Scott Letier; executive sessions include independent‑only sessions each meeting .
  • Committees: All standing committees composed solely of independent directors (Audit; Compensation; Corporate Governance; Risk Oversight) .
  • Attendance: Board met 11 times in 2024; all incumbent directors attended at least 98.5% of Board and committee meetings; all attended the 2024 Annual Meeting .
  • Director compensation: Skelton receives no additional fees for board service as an employee . Non‑employee director cash and DSU program detailed (retainers, chair/member fees, $190k DSU grants) .
  • Independence/dual‑role implications: CEO serving as director is mitigated by an independent Chairman structure and independent committees, reducing dominance risk while enabling alignment between management and Board .

Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking

  • Compensation Committee members (2024–2025): Independent directors; retained FW Cook as independent advisor; reviews market medians; sets multi‑metric plans .
  • Peer groups: 2023/2024 peers include ALIT, CACI, GIB, CNXC, CSGS, EXLS, G, ICFI, MMS, TIXT, TNET, MDRX; TaskUs added; Leidos and Veradigm removed in Aug 2024 .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 execution: APIP funded at 72% driven by Adjusted Revenue $3,605M (below target), Adjusted EBITDA margin 8.27% (below target), Net ARR $106.5M (slightly above target); strong year in new capabilities sales, pipeline, and client retention; repurchased 52M shares and prepaid term loans using divestiture proceeds .
  • Prior LTIP outcomes: 2022 PRSU—Share Hurdle awards were not earned and were forfeited by 12/31/2024 for NEOs; 2023 PRSU—Revenue Growth achieved 66.25% for 2023, 0% for 2024 (averaged with 2025) .

Risk Indicators & Policies

  • No option repricing; no tax gross‑ups; anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging; trading windows only; robust clawback .
  • Related party transitions: Icahn agreement terminated in June 2024 after repurchase of ~38M shares from Icahn shareholders; Icahn‑affiliated directors resigned then; transactions disclosed .
  • Director independence: All directors except Skelton independent under Nasdaq and company guidelines .

Equity Ownership & Director/Officer Share Data

Beneficial OwnerShares% Class
Clifford Skelton2,069,340 1.28%

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance alignment: High equity mix (88% variable), multi‑year PRSUs tied to Revenue Growth and rTSR, capped rTSR if absolute TSR negative; supports shareholder alignment while balancing downside .
  • Retention risk: Retirement eligibility with favorable LTIP continuation could facilitate an orderly transition but heightens timing sensitivity; double‑trigger CIC protection at 2.5x pay provides stability in change‑of‑control scenarios .
  • Insider selling pressure: Material vesting ($2.25M realized in 2024; 557,824 shares) implies ongoing sell‑to‑cover needs in windows; absence of 10b5‑1 plans as of YE2024 concentrates any discretionary sales into open windows .
  • Governance mitigants for CEO/director dual role: Independent Chairman, independent committees, and high meeting attendance mitigate independence concerns; strong say‑on‑pay support indicates investor acceptance of program design .
  • Execution watch‑items: 2024 revenue and margin under targets drove APIP below 100% (72% funded); 2024 PRSU‑Revenue Growth first‑year outcome at 54.74% and prior share‑hurdle PRSUs not earned suggest performance headwinds—monitor revenue trajectory and rTSR relative peers through 2026 .