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Michael Krawitz

Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary at CONDUENTCONDUENT
Executive

About Michael Krawitz

Michael Krawitz, 55, is Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of Conduent, serving in this role since November 2019; he holds a BA in Economics and Government from Cornell University and a JD from Harvard Law School . Conduent’s pay design ties executive incentives to Growth, Efficiency and Quality via Adjusted Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA Margin, Net ARR Activity (annual bonus) and multi‑year Revenue Growth and relative TSR metrics (LTIP); the 2024 APIP funded at 72% on results including Adjusted Revenue of $3,605M, Adjusted EBITDA Margin of 8.27%, and Net ARR Activity of $106.5M, with long‑term awards weighted 65% performance (45% revenue growth, 20% rTSR) and 35% time‑based RSUs . Conduent reported approximately $3.4 billion of revenue with about 56,000 associates, framing the operating context for his compensation alignment .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
York Risk Services Group (Onex portfolio company)EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary2015–2019Led legal and corporate governance at an insurance services firm, supporting risk, compliance, and transactions
Veriteq Corp (biotech)Chief Legal Officer2014–2015Directed legal oversight in a regulated healthcare technology context
Public/private tech and finance companiesLegal/executive leadership roles1999–2014Senior roles across technology and finance sectors, building broad corporate legal/compliance expertise
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLPBegan legal careerNot disclosedFoundational training at a major law firm

External Roles

No external public company directorships or committee roles are disclosed for Mr. Krawitz in Conduent’s filings .

Fixed Compensation

Year-end base salary and target bonus

Metric202220232024
Annual Base Salary ($)$500,000 $500,000 $525,000
Target Bonus (% of Base)75% 75% 85%

Actual annual bonus paid

Metric202220232024
Actual Bonus ($)$242,000 $200,813 $342,000

Summary Compensation Table components (USD)

Metric202220232024
Salary$493,173 $500,000 $521,876
Stock Awards$999,998 $999,993 $1,099,997
Non-Equity Incentive Plan$242,000 $200,813 $342,000
All Other Compensation$3,050 $3,630 $15,000
Total$1,738,221 $1,704,436 $1,978,873

Notes:

  • 2024 salary and bonus targets increased (base to $525,000; target bonus to 85%; LTI target to $1,100,000) to align closer to market medians .

Performance Compensation

Short‑term (APIP) 2024 design and outcomes

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaximumActualAchievement (%)Funding %
Adjusted Revenue ($M)40% $3,540.5 $3,650.0 $3,759.5 $3,605.0 69.2% 28%
Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%)40% 8.08 8.50 8.93 8.27 58.5% 23%
Net ARR Activity ($M)20% 89.3 105.0 120.8 106.5 104.8% 21%
Total Funding72%

Individual payout

ExecutiveTarget Bonus ($)Actual Bonus ($)Actual as % of Target
Michael Krawitz$440,215 (prorated) $342,000 78%

Long‑term (LTIP) 2024 structure and metrics

  • Mix: 35% RSUs (time‑based), 45% PRSU—Revenue Growth, 20% PRSU—rTSR, each with 3‑year performance/service periods .

  • 2024 PRSU—Revenue Growth targets and 2024 actual: | Metric | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | |---|---|---|---| | Threshold Growth (%) | (3.27%) | 0.5% | 1.0% | | Target Growth (%) | (1.9%) | 2.0% | 3.0% | | Maximum Growth (%) | 0.1% | 4.5% | 6.0% | | Actual (reported) | (3.14%) | — | — | | Component Achievement (first year) | 54.74% | — | — |

  • 2024 PRSU—rTSR payout matrix (cliff vesting end of performance period): | rTSR Percentile vs Peer Group | Payout % | |---|---| | ≥75th | 150% | | Median | 100% | | 25th | 50% | Note: Payout capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative; total value cap 6× target .

2024 Grant details (Krawitz)

GrantInstrumentTarget SharesVesting Schedule
4/1/2024RSU117,737 1/3 on 12/31/2024, 12/31/2025, 12/31/2026
4/1/2024PRSU—Revenue Growth151,376 (target) Cliff vest 12/31/2026 subject to 3‑year avg performance
4/1/2024PRSU—rTSR68,724 (target) Cliff vest 12/31/2026 based on rTSR vs peers

Historical LTIP outcomes (alignment signal)

  • 2022 PRSU—Share Hurdle awards were forfeited when share price hurdles were not met by 12/31/2024 .
  • 2023 PRSU—Revenue Growth achieved 66.25% for 2023 and 0% for 2024, with final payout pending 2025 results .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership

DateShares Beneficially Owned% of Outstanding
2024‑03‑18562,121 <1%
2025‑03‑24634,869 <1%

Vested vs unvested (as of 12/31/2024)

CategoryShares/UnitsMarket Value ($)
Unvested RSUs78,492 $317,108 (at $4.04)
Unearned PRSU—Revenue Growth151,376 $611,559 (at $4.04)
Unearned PRSU—rTSR103,086 $416,467 (at $4.04)

Ownership policies and trading controls

  • Executive stock ownership guidelines: 6× base salary for CEO, 3× for CEO direct reports (applies to Krawitz as an EVP), 1× for other officers; retain 50% of net shares until compliant .
  • Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging: prohibited; executives trade only in window periods unless under a Rule 10b5‑1 plan; as of 12/31/2024, none of the named executives had 10b5‑1 plans .
  • Equity grant practices: no stock options currently granted; no spring‑loading/repricing .

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerm
EmploymentNEOs serve at will; severance judged by Compensation Committee if separated
Executive Severance Policy52 weeks base salary, continued health benefits (excluding disability/401(k)), and continued vesting of LTIP during severance; contingent on release
Change‑in‑Control (CIC)Double‑trigger; 2.0× base salary + target bonus for CEO direct reports (applies to Krawitz), benefits continuation, accelerated vesting (PRSUs at target), short‑term incentive payout for performance year; no excise tax gross‑ups; cutback if needed
ClawbackAmended Oct 2023 to comply with SEC/Nasdaq; recovers erroneously awarded incentive comp for prior 3 fiscal years in event of accounting restatement; additional recoupment for detrimental activity
Restrictive covenantsNon‑compete and non‑solicit agreements apply to NEOs where legally permitted
Retirement vestingContinued vesting rules apply only if retirement‑eligible; as of 12/31/2024, Krawitz was not retirement‑eligible

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and market alignment: Krawitz’s target pay increased in 2024 (base to $525k, target bonus to 85%, LTI to $1.1M) to align closer to median market levels; the program emphasizes variable pay and long‑term equity .
  • Performance metrics: Annual incentives focus on Adjusted Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA Margin, and Net ARR Activity; LTIP emphasizes multi‑year Revenue Growth and rTSR, reinforcing shareholder value creation .
  • Governance protections: Robust clawback, anti‑hedging/pledging, ownership requirements, and window‑period trading policies strengthen alignment and mitigate risk .
  • Realization discipline: Prior PRSUs tied to share price hurdles and revenue growth paid below target or were forfeited, indicating strong pay‑for‑performance linkage .

Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking) and Say‑on‑Pay

  • Peer group: Conduent benchmarked against a services/BPO set including Alight, CACI, CGI, Concentrix, CSG Systems, EXL, Genpact, ICF, Maximus, TELUS International, TriNet, with 2024/2025 changes removing Leidos, Veradigm (delisted) and adding TaskUs; median used as reference point for target pay levels .
  • Say‑on‑Pay: 96.41% approval at the 2024 Annual Meeting, indicating strong shareholder support .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Incentive design directly links realized pay to revenue growth, margin improvement and rTSR over multi‑year horizons, with governance safeguards (clawbacks, anti‑hedging/pledging, ownership guidelines) reducing agency risk .
  • Retention and change‑of‑control: Standard severance plus double‑trigger CIC benefits (2× salary+target bonus; equity acceleration at target) mitigate transition risk in strategic scenarios while preserving performance conditions outside CIC .
  • Realization risk: Historical forfeitures under share‑price and revenue PRSUs and below‑target APIP funding (72%) underscore rigorous hurdles; equity remains at risk pending 2025–2026 performance, tempering near‑term cash realization and aligning incentives with execution .
  • Trading pressure risk: RSUs vest through 2026 and PRSUs cliff‑vest at 2026, but insider trading windows and prohibitions on hedging/pledging help manage selling pressure; no 10b5‑1 plans at year‑end 2024 .