Torran B. Nixon
About Torran B. Nixon
Torran B. “Tory” Nixon (age 63) is Senior Executive Vice President of Columbia Banking System and Umpqua Bank President of Commercial Banking; he has served in this role since March 2023 following prior leadership roles at Umpqua Bank including President (2020–Feb 2023) and Chief Banking Officer (2018–2020) . Company performance in 2024 included net income of $533.7 million, operating PPNR of $870.7 million, and TSR of 8.0% (vs. KRX 13.2% and peer group 27.5%), which influenced incentive outcomes and PSU frameworks centered on operating PPNR, ROTCE and TSR .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Umpqua Bank | President | Jun 2020 – Feb 2023 | Led merger-related frontline readiness and integration; contributed to over $25.9 million of 2023 business unit cost synergies; supported account and profile conversions and commercial team growth . |
| Umpqua Bank | SEVP, Chief Banking Officer | Apr 2018 – May 2020 | Enterprise banking leadership ahead of elevation to President . |
| Umpqua Bank | EVP, Head of Commercial & Wealth | Oct 2016 – Apr 2018 | Directed commercial and wealth businesses . |
| Umpqua Bank | EVP, Commercial Banking | Nov 2015 – Oct 2016 | Led commercial banking platform . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the proxy statement for Nixon (no external public company directorships cited) .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | — | 715,000 |
| Base Salary YoY Change (%) | — | 4% |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Base) | 100% | 100% |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid ($) | 726,100 | 885,170 |
| Actual as % of Target | — | 124% |
Notes:
- In 2024, the Compensation Committee maintained Nixon’s target annual incentive at 100% of base salary; the final payout was 124% of target based on corporate and individual results .
- The 2024 base salary was harmonized with a peer internal role; Nixon’s salary increased 4% from prior-year level in 2024 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 Design and Outcomes
| Metric/Goal | Weight | Target | Actual/Outcome | Payout Treatment | Vest/Pay Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate: Operating PPNR | 80% | Company operating PPNR target set by Committee | Company reported operating PPNR of $870.7 million; AIP based primarily on operating PPNR (objective metric) | Contributed to total AIP at 124% of target for Nixon | Cash paid after year-end |
| Individual goals (Nixon) | 20% | - C&I loan growth 2–5% and +1ppt portfolio mix shift; - Core deposits growth with ≥33% noninterest-bearing; - Noninterest income ≥12% of operating revenue; - Q4’24 op. noninterest expense/avg assets <2.05% | - C&I loan growth improved but below target (paid at 50% for this metric); - Core DDA % exceeded target; - Fee income exceeded budget and neared 12%; - Cost-savings initiatives over-achieved to fund strategy | Individual component approved at 119% for Nixon | Cash paid after year-end |
| Total AIP | — | 100% of base ($715,000) | — | 124% of target; $885,170 paid | — |
Design features: minimum performance gate on company metric to earn payout; negative discretion and risk modifiers available to Committee .
Long-Term Incentives (Equity) – Structure and Grants
- Mix: 60% PSUs (relative ROTCE and relative TSR vs approved peer group), 40% RSUs; PSU payout scale: 50% at threshold (50%), 100% at target, 150% at max (≥150%) with straight-line interpolation .
- 2024 grant sizing vs base salary (Nixon): PSUs 77%, RSUs 56%, total 133% of base .
| Award | Grant Date | Shares/Units | Key Performance/Vesting Terms | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024) | Mar 1, 2024 | 33,574 target | Relative ROTCE and relative TSR vs peer; three-fiscal-year performance period; 2024 PSUs vest at end of performance period ending Dec 31, 2027 | Included in total stock awards; combined 2024 stock awards $951,941 |
| RSUs (2024) | Mar 1, 2024 | 22,383 | Time-vest: one-third on Mar 1, 2025, 2026, 2027 | Included in total stock awards; combined 2024 stock awards $951,941 |
| PSUs (2023) | Feb 21, 2023 | 21,464 target | Relative ROTCE and TSR vs peer; 2023–2025 performance period | — |
| RSUs (2023) | Feb 21, 2023 | 9,539 | Time-vest: 50% on Feb 15, 2025 and 50% on Feb 15, 2026 | — |
| RSUs (2022) | Feb 28, 2022 | 10,233 | Vested Feb 28, 2025 | — |
Additional notes:
- Nixon realized 40,580 shares from stock vesting in 2024 with value realized of $836,363 .
- 2023 equity mix for Nixon was 60% PSUs / 40% RSUs; 2024 equity mix remained 60% PSUs / 40% RSUs .
PSU Performance Mechanics (for reference):
- ROTCE Performance = Company Average ROTCE / Peer Group Average ROTCE (3-year average); TSR Performance based on 20-day measurement windows; 50% weighting each .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (3/17/2025) | 102,106 shares; includes 3,650 shares held in a family trust; represents less than 1% of outstanding shares . |
| Unvested/Outstanding | Unvested RSUs from 2023 and 2024 as shown above; PSUs from 2023 and 2024 performance cycles outstanding and unearned until end of respective performance periods . |
| 2024 Stock Vested (Shares/Value) | 40,580 shares; $836,363 value realized . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives must maintain holdings under corporate guidelines; compliance reviewed annually. At year-end 2024, Nixon complied with requirements . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and insiders; also no margin or pledging permitted; pre-clearance and quarterly trading windows enforced . |
Implications:
- Anti-hedging/pledging policies reduce alignment risk; meaningful unvested equity and guideline compliance support continued alignment .
Employment Terms
Nixon Letter Agreement and Integration/Deferred Compensation
- Cash retention award of $400,000 (Nixon Integration Award): 34% vested with systems conversion (Apr 2023), and 33% vested in Apr 2024 and Apr 2025, subject to continued employment; full vest upon Qualifying Termination (with release) .
- Additional $860,000 cash payment and $1,740,000 credited to deferred compensation in Feb 2023; 50% vested in Feb 2024 and 50% in Feb 2025; forfeiture if not employed; full vest upon Qualifying Termination; vested amounts payable in 24 monthly installments; violation of restrictive covenants allows forfeiture/clawback of unpaid/paid installments .
Change-in-Control (CIC) Plan – Participation Agreement (effective Mar 1, 2025)
- Termination without cause or for good reason not in connection with CIC: cash severance equal to one year’s base salary (subject to release) .
- Termination within six months prior to, or within 24 months following a CIC: cash severance equal to 2x (base salary + target annual bonus), prorated target bonus, 18 months of health and welfare benefits, service-based equity vests in full; performance-based equity remains outstanding and eligible to be earned based on actual performance for the full period; customary non-compete and non-solicit during employment and up to two years after .
Illustrative Termination/CIC Benefits (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario (12/31/2024) | Cash/Severance ($) | Deferred Comp ($) | BOLI ($) | FMV Accelerated Equity ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death | 562,000 | 870,000 | 2,145,000 | 2,348,790 | 5,925,790 |
| Disability | 562,000 | 870,000 | — | 2,348,790 | 3,780,790 |
| Termination w/o Cause (not due to CIC) | 562,000 | 870,000 | — | 2,625,183 | 4,057,183 |
| Termination due to CIC | 562,000 | 870,000 | — | 2,625,183 | 4,057,183 |
Policy protections:
- Dodd-Frank clawback and supplemental company clawback with broader triggers (misconduct, materially inaccurate metrics, risk failures, restrictive covenant violations) apply to incentive compensation; no single-trigger CIC; no tax gross-ups; anti-hedging/pledging enforced .
Performance & Track Record
- Company-level 2024 performance: net income $533.7 million; operating PPNR $870.7 million; return on average assets 1.03%; ROTCE 15.31% .
- 2024 TSR 8.0% vs KRX 13.2% and peer group 27.5%, with underperformance early in 2024 tied to funding mix/NIM pressure and subsequent improvement on cost and operational initiatives; Board cited these dynamics in compensation discussion .
- Nixon’s 2024 individual outcomes reflected: over-achievement on cost-savings to fund strategy; improvement in fee income nearing 12%; core DDA exceeded target; C&I loan growth below target (50% payout for that metric), yielding a 119% individual component assessment and total AIP at 124% .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: For 2024, Nixon’s long-term equity opportunity equaled 133% of base (PSUs 77%, RSUs 56%), reinforcing at-risk pay orientation; AIP target remained at 100% of base; actual AIP payout at 124% reflects above-target results on weighted metrics .
- Shift to PSUs/RSUs: Program emphasizes PSUs with relative ROTCE/TSR and RSUs with multi-year vesting; no option repricing; dividends on equity awards paid only upon vesting .
- Clawback and risk features: Robust clawbacks (Dodd-Frank and broader company policy), negative discretion, and anti-hedging/pledging reduce risk of misalignment .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Detailed)
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Ownership guideline status | Nixon in compliance at year-end 2024 . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited; no margin/pledging; pre-clearance required; Rule 10b5-1 plans permitted under policy . |
| Upcoming vesting cadence | 2023 RSUs: 50% on Feb 15, 2026; 2024 RSUs: one-third on Mar 1, 2026 and Mar 1, 2027; 2024 PSUs: end of fiscal period Dec 31, 2027 (performance-based); 2023 PSUs: end of 2025 (performance-based) . |
| 2024 vested flow | 40,580 shares vested; value realized $836,363 . |
Employment Terms (Additional Governance)
- Non-compete/non-solicit apply during employment and up to two years post-termination under CIC Plan participation; release required for severance .
- No employment agreement for Nixon beyond CIC Plan participation and letter agreement; double-trigger CIC structure confirmed in governance summary .
Investment Implications
- Alignment strong: High proportion of at-risk, multi-year equity with relative ROTCE/TSR metrics, ownership guideline compliance, and prohibitions on hedging/pledging point to solid alignment and moderated agency risk .
- Retention moderate-strong: Material unvested RSUs and PSUs through 2027, plus prior integration/deferred comp arrangements (now substantially vested) and new CIC Plan economics (2x base+target bonus on double-trigger) reduce near-term departure risk, though performance-based PSUs preserve accountability .
- Potential selling pressure windows: RSU vesting dates (Feb 15 and Mar 1 cycles) create predictable liquidity events, but insider trading policy pre-clearance and window restrictions mitigate opportunistic sales risk; pledging banned .
- Pay-for-performance sensitivity: 2024 AIP at 124% and PSU designs tied to relative TSR/ROTCE suggest compensation will remain sensitive to both operating profitability (PPNR) and shareholder returns versus peers—key for modeling forward comp expense and management incentives .