Charles A. Brawley, III
CAMPBELL'SAbout Charles A. Brawley, III
Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of The Campbell’s Company (CPB). Company-level performance for fiscal 2025: net sales $10.253B (+6% YoY), EBIT $1.124B (+12% YoY), GAAP EPS $2.01 (+6% YoY), cash flows from operations $1.131B; adjusted EBIT $1.487B (+2% YoY) and adjusted EPS $2.97 (-4% YoY) . Three-year LTI outcomes paid at sub-target: TSR ranked 8th of 11 peers (50% payout) and adjusted EPS CAGR 1.6% vs an adjusted 3.3% target (48% payout) for awards ending FY2025 . Campbell maintains robust clawbacks (including non-restatement events), anti-hedging, and anti-pledging policies, with stock ownership guidelines of 3.5x salary for NEOs and stated compliance with retention requirements .
Past Roles
No prior-role biography for Mr. Brawley is disclosed in the latest proxy; he is listed among NEOs as EVP, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary .
External Roles
No external directorships or public company roles for Mr. Brawley are disclosed in the latest proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | Fiscal 2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 591,846 | Salary paid FY2025 |
| AIP Target (% of Base) | 80% | Set by Compensation Committee |
| AIP Target ($) | 483,200 | 80% of base |
| AIP Payout ($) | 375,446 | Based on Company 74% score and individual 105% |
| Perquisites – Personal Choice Program ($) | 32,000 | Cash allowance for planning/services |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Mechanics and 2025 Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target Range | Over-Achievement | Exceptional | Actual FY2025 | Assessment | Score | Weighted Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales ($mm) | 40% | 9,986 | 10,459–10,564 | 11,247 | 11,457 | 10,253 | Threshold | 81% | 32% |
| Adjusted EBIT ($mm) | 40% | 1,429 | 1,556–1,619 | 1,714 | 1,746 | 1,487 | Threshold | 75% | 30% |
| Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 20% | 610 | 704–732 | 826 | 862 | 652 | Threshold | 58% | 12% |
| Total Company Performance Score | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 74% | — |
Brawley’s AIP payout calculation:
| Component | Value |
|---|---|
| Target ($) | 483,200 |
| Company Score | 74% |
| Individual Score | 105% |
| Payout ($) | 375,446 |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Structure and Grants
- Target LTI increased from 170% to 185% of base salary for FY2025 to align with market and functional leader parity .
- FY2025 LTI mix: 30% TSR PRSUs, 30% EPS PRSUs, 40% time-lapse RSUs .
FY2025 LTI grant detail (October 1, 2024):
| Instrument | Units | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| TSR Performance RSUs | 6,043 | 277,066 | Performance period FY2025–FY2027; payout schedule per rank |
| EPS Performance RSUs | 6,043 | 292,239 | Performance period FY2025–FY2027; payout schedule per EPS CAGR |
| Time-lapse RSUs | 8,057 | 389,637 | Vests 1/3 each on 9/30/2025, 9/30/2026, 9/30/2027 |
| Total | — | 1,019,840 | — |
Selected outstanding/earlier awards and vesting:
- Additional RSUs granted 12/1/2023: 12,300 units; vest 100% on 12/1/2025 .
- Earlier PRSUs (FY2023 grants) shown at threshold pending full-period results; FY2023–FY2025 TSR paid 50% of target and EPS paid 48% of target based on outcomes .
Performance payout curves (FY2025–FY2027 awards):
| TSR Rank vs Peer Group (11 companies) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Payout % of Target | 200% | 200% | 175% | 150% | 125% | 100% | 75% | 50% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Adjusted EPS CAGR | <2.8% | 3.8% | 4.8% | 5.8% | 6.8% | 7.8% | 8.8% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Payout % of Target | 0% | 33% | 67% | 100% | 133% | 167% | 200% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares beneficially owned | 12,224 |
| Shares acquirable within 60 days (options/unvested RSUs vesting) | 5,925 |
| Total beneficial ownership | 18,149; less than 1% of outstanding shares |
| Phantom units in deferred comp | 0 |
| Stock ownership guideline | 3.5x salary for NEOs; NEOs compliant with retention requirements |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers |
Deferred compensation and retirement credits:
- Supplemental Retirement Plan registrant contributions FY2025: $126,536; aggregate balance $489,495 .
- Executive Retirement Contribution credited FY2025: $90,580; Brawley’s ERC is 100% vested per age/service schedule .
Upcoming vesting creating potential selling pressure:
- Time-lapse RSUs vest on 9/30/2025, 9/30/2026, 9/30/2027 (FY2025 grant); 12/1/2025 (12/1/2023 grant) .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance (Executive Severance Pay Plan) | 2x base salary; two years of medical and life insurance benefits; subject to non-compete/non-solicit and release; paid bi-weekly over two years . |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Double trigger; lump sum 2.5x base salary; 2.5x AIP target plus pro-rata current-year AIP; continued benefits up to 30 months or to age 65; pension/401(k)/ERC lump-sum with specified assumptions . |
| Equity on CIC | Performance awards convert to time-lapse RSUs with vesting at greater of target or actual for open periods; time-lapse RSUs and options fully vest; special provision if awards not assumed/substituted . |
| Clawbacks | Mandatory restatement recovery; discretionary recovery for fraud/intentional misconduct/material violations; performance award clawback for breach of duty of loyalty; expanded 2025 policy beyond restatements . |
| Insider trading | Strict policy; trading windows; no hedging/pledging; short-sales prohibited . |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AIP and LTI tied to net sales, adjusted EBIT, free cash flow, TSR, and EPS CAGR; FY2025 outcomes produced below-target Company score (74%) and sub-target LTI vesting (50% TSR; 48% EPS), indicating disciplined payout governance .
- Retention risk appears mitigated: Elevated ERC vesting (fully vested for Brawley), robust severance (2x salary) and double-trigger CIC (2.5x salary and AIP target) reduce near-term turnover risk; strict clawbacks and ownership guidelines reinforce alignment .
- Insider selling pressure: Scheduled RSU vests on 9/30/2025, 9/30/2026, 9/30/2027 and 12/1/2025, alongside dividend equivalents payable at vest, can create predictable liquidity events; monitor Form 4s around these dates for flow-driven technical pressure .
- Governance strengths: Anti-hedging/pledging, enhanced clawbacks, and stated NEO ownership compliance support shareholder alignment; absence of CIC tax gross-ups reduces red-flag risk .