Mick J. Beekhuizen
CAMPBELL'SAbout Mick J. Beekhuizen
Mick J. Beekhuizen, age 49, is President & CEO of The Campbell’s Company (CPB) and a director since 2025; prior roles include EVP & President, Meals & Beverages (2023–Jan 2025) and EVP & CFO (2019–Feb 2023). He holds an M.Sc. in Industrial Engineering & Management from the University of Twente, and previously served as CFO of Chobani and spent 13 years at Goldman Sachs in merchant banking . Under his leadership in FY2025 (a 53‑week year), CPB delivered net sales of $10.253B (+6% YoY), EBIT $1.124B (+12%), GAAP EPS $2.01 (+6%), with adjusted EPS of $2.97 (-4%); Meals & Beverages grew (NS +15%, Op. earnings +10%) while Snacks declined (NS -4%, Op. earnings -14%) . Over the FY2023–FY2025 LTI cycle, CPB’s TSR ranked 8/11 among packaged foods peers (cumulative TSR -27.9%), driving 50% payout on TSR PSUs; EPS PSUs paid at 48% based on a 1.6% adjusted EPS CAGR vs a 3.3% adjusted target .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Campbell’s Company | President & CEO; Director | Feb 1, 2025–present | CEO transition from Mark Clouse; completed Sovos Brands integration; established Growth Office; FY2025 mixed results (NS +6%, EBIT +12%, adj. EPS -4%) with 74% AIP company score . |
| The Campbell’s Company | EVP & President, Meals & Beverages | Feb 2023–Jan 2025 | Division led NS +15% and Op. earnings +10% in FY2025; positioned portfolio for growth . |
| The Campbell’s Company | EVP & CFO | Sep 2019–Feb 2023 | Financial leadership through transformation and M&A (predecessor to CEO role) . |
| Chobani LLC | EVP & CFO | Mar 2016–Sep 2019 | Led finance at a high‑growth private CPG company . |
| Goldman Sachs | Merchant Banking (Managing Director among roles) | 13 years (ended 2016) | Capital allocation and transaction execution experience . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public company boards | None | — | No public company boards in past 5 years . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | FY2025 Detail | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | $1,200,000 (upon promotion effective Feb 1, 2025) | Committee benchmarked CEO package to peer medians . |
| AIP target | Pro‑rated FY2025 target $1,500,000 at 125% of base (reflecting time in both roles); full‑year CEO target = 150% of $1.2M ($1.8M) | CEO AIP target increased to 150% on promotion . |
| FY2025 actual cash AIP | $1,241,250 based on formula ($1,500,000 × 83% performance × 100% individual) | First half weighted 30% Company/70% M&B; second half Company only . |
| Total FY2025 reported compensation | $6,957,360 (Salary $1,013,831; Stock awards $4,366,663; AIP $1,241,250; All other comp $335,616) | Includes $40,000 Personal Choice perquisite; retirement/deferred contributions . |
Performance Compensation
| AIP metric | Weight | Threshold | Target (range) | Over‑achieve | Exceptional | FY2025 result | Score | Weighted contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales ($mm) | 40% | 9,986 | 10,459–10,564 | 11,247 | 11,457 | 10,253 | 81% | 32% |
| Adjusted EBIT ($mm) | 40% | 1,429 | 1,556–1,619 | 1,714 | 1,746 | 1,487 | 75% | 30% |
| Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 20% | 610 | 704–732 | 826 | 862 | 652 | 58% | 12% |
| Total Company Performance Score | — | — | — | — | — | — | 74% | — |
Long‑Term Incentive (structure and payouts)
- FY2025 LTI mix: 30% TSR PSUs, 30% EPS PSUs, 40% time‑based RSUs; dividends accrue and pay in cash only on vested units .
- FY2025 CEO promotion grant (Feb 1, 2025): $2,240,000; 17,082 TSR PSUs; 17,082 EPS PSUs; 22,776 RSUs (RSUs vest 1/3 on 9/30/2025, 9/30/2026, 9/30/2027; PSUs vest after FY2027 based on goals) .
- TSR PSU schedule: 200% at ranks 1–2; 175% rank 3; 150% rank 4; 125% rank 5; 100% rank 6; 75% rank 7; 50% rank 8; 0% ranks 9–11; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative .
- EPS PSU schedule (FY2025–FY2027): 0% <2.8% CAGR; 100% at 5.8%; 200% at 8.8% (target equitably adjusted to 5.8% for de/minimis transactions) .
- FY2023–FY2025 cycle results: TSR payout 50% (rank 8/11; cumulative TSR -27.9%); EPS payout 48% (1.6% adjusted EPS CAGR; excluding tariff impacts) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (9/24/2025) | 155,300 shares owned; 29,217 acquirable within 60 days; total 184,517 (<1%) . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO 6x salary; must retain ≥50% of after‑tax shares until met; progress assessed annually . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors/officers; no existing pledge agreements by executives/directors . |
| Clawbacks | Restatement‑based and misconduct‑based clawbacks (2025 expansion covers fraud/intentional misconduct/material policy violation even without restatement); duty‑of‑loyalty clawback in PSU agreements . |
Vesting schedule and outstanding awards (as of 8/1/2025)
| Grant | Units | Vesting | FY‑end market value |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU 10/1/2022 | 7,651 | 100% on 9/30/2025 | $247,357 |
| RSU 10/1/2023 | 14,929 | 1/2 on 9/30/2025; 1/2 on 9/30/2026 | $482,655 |
| RSU 10/1/2024 | 19,530 | 1/3 each on 9/30/2025, 9/30/2026, 9/30/2027 | $631,405 |
| RSU 2/1/2025 (CEO) | 22,776 | 1/3 each on 9/30/2025, 9/30/2026, 9/30/2027 | $736,348 |
| TSR PSUs (Oct 2024) | 7,323 (shown at threshold) | FY2025–FY2027; payout 0–200% vs peer ranks; shown at threshold at FY‑end | $236,753 |
| EPS PSUs (Oct 2024) | 7,323 (shown at threshold) | FY2025–FY2027; payout 0–200% vs EPS CAGR; shown at threshold at FY‑end | $236,753 |
| TSR PSUs (Feb 2025) | 8,541 (shown at threshold) | FY2025–FY2027; shown at threshold at FY‑end | $276,131 |
| EPS PSUs (Feb 2025) | 8,541 (shown at threshold) | FY2025–FY2027; shown at threshold at FY‑end | $276,131 |
Insider selling pressure indicators
- Multiple RSU tranches vest on 9/30/2025, 9/30/2026, 9/30/2027; company policy requires retaining at least 50% of after‑tax shares until ownership guideline met, reducing near‑term sell pressure; hedging/pledging banned .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None for CEO or other NEOs (policy stance) . |
| Executive Severance Plan | If involuntary termination without cause: 2× base salary paid over 2 years; 2 years medical/life insurance unless replaced; non‑compete and non‑solicit enforced for 12 months; pro‑rata AIP and pro‑rata/continued vesting of equity per plan rules . |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) | Double‑trigger; 2.5× base salary (lump sum), 2.5× AIP target (greater of current target or 2‑year avg actual), pro‑rata current year AIP, up to 30 months medical/life or until age 65; pension/401(k)/Executive Retirement Contributions credited for lesser of 30 months or to age 65; no excise tax gross‑ups . |
| Equity on CIC | Performance awards convert with performance deemed achieved (completed periods at actual; partial/future at greater of target or actual); all restrictions lapse; time RSUs vest; options (legacy) vest and become exercisable . |
| Deferred/retirement | Executive Retirement Contribution equals 10% of base + AIP, vests by age schedule (0% until age 55 with ≥5 yrs service; 100% at age 60 with ≥5 yrs); CEO’s FY2025 ERC credited $173,892; unvested ERC balance $1,062,521; 2029 program sunset for future credits . |
| Perquisites | Personal Choice Program ($40,000 in FY2025 for CEO); no personal aircraft allowance for CEO (former CEO had NetJets allowance) . |
Board Governance
- Role: Director since 2025; not independent (management director) .
- Committees: None (all standing committees comprised entirely of independent directors) .
- Board leadership: Independent Board Chair; roles of Chair and CEO separated by policy; fully independent Audit, Compensation & Organization, Finance & Corporate Development, and Governance Committees .
- Director pay: Employee‑directors receive no additional director compensation; director ownership guideline is 5× cash retainer within five years .
- Attendance: All directors attended ≥85% of meetings in FY2025 .
Performance & Track Record
| Measure | FY2025 outcome |
|---|---|
| Strategy and execution | Completed Sovos Brands integration; launched Growth Office; continued cost savings and supply chain productivity initiatives . |
| Financials (GAAP) | Net sales $10.253B (+6%); EBIT $1.124B (+12%); EPS $2.01 (+6%); CFO $1.131B (vs $1.185B FY2024) . |
| Non‑GAAP benchmarks | Adjusted EBIT $1.487B (+2%); adjusted EPS $2.97 (-4%) . |
| AIP outcome | Company performance score 74% (below target) . |
| LTI outcomes (FY2023–FY2025 cycles) | TSR PSU payout 50% (rank 8/11; cumulative TSR -27.9%); EPS PSU payout 48% (1.6% adjusted EPS CAGR vs 3.3% adjusted target) . |
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑Pay approval: 96% support at 2024 meeting; no material program changes in FY2025 in response .
- Compensation governance: Independent consultant (FW Cook) to Compensation Committee; robust clawbacks; double‑trigger CIC; no gross‑ups; no option repricing .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: High at‑risk pay; CEO ~89% of target TDC at risk; other NEOs ~75% at risk .
- Shift to RSUs: Stock options removed from executive program in 2020, simplifying design and lowering risk; current mix is PSUs (60%) and RSUs (40%) .
- Metrics rigor: AIP uses Net Sales, Adjusted EBIT, and FCF with wide ranges reflecting macro uncertainty; LTI blends relative TSR and EPS CAGR with clear payout curves .
- Discretion: Committee retained discretion but did not adjust FY2025 AIP score beyond formulaic outcome .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Alignment risks mitigated by: strict anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging; robust clawbacks (expanded 2025); ownership guidelines with retention requirements; double‑trigger CIC; no CEO employment contract .
- Performance risk: TSR underperformance over recent 3‑year cycle and below‑target AIP score highlight execution risk, particularly in Snacks (NS -4%, Op. earnings -14%) .
- Ownership concentration: Significant family shareholders (e.g., Mary Alice D. Malone, Jr. 18.06%; Bennett Dorrance 15.08% beneficial) can influence outcomes, though board governance retains independent chair and committees .
Compensation Peer Group (context)
Committee benchmarks NEO pay to a food/CPG peer set and measures TSR vs S&P Packaged Foods peers; peer lists and methodology disclosed; FW Cook advises the Committee .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance calibration: Sub‑par AIP/LTI outcomes (74% AIP score; TSR/EPS PSUs ≤50% payouts) indicate incentives are biting, aligning realized pay with mixed operating results and TSR underperformance—constructive for governance and risk control .
- Retention and overhang: CEO holds substantial unvested RSUs and PSUs with scheduled vestings through 2027 and unvested Executive Retirement Credits (vesting only from age 55), supporting retention and limiting near‑term selling; anti‑hedge/pledge and 6× ownership guideline further align interests .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger CIC at 2.5× salary and target bonus, full equity vesting conversion, and benefits could be meaningful in a transaction; absence of gross‑ups is shareholder‑friendly .
- Execution watch‑items: Snacks turnaround, sustaining M&B momentum, and delivering EPS CAGR/TSR improvements will determine upside vs. continued underperformance; FY2025 integration of Sovos and Growth Office provide catalysts but results will be monitored through AIP and LTI outcomes in subsequent years .