Beth W. Cooper
About Beth W. Cooper
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Assistant Secretary of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation (CPK). Age 58; executive officer since 2005; CFO since September 2008; EVP since February 2019; Treasurer since January 2022; Assistant Corporate Secretary since March 2015 . Company performance context: 2024 GAAP net income was $118.6M (EPS $5.26); Adjusted EPS $5.39; 2024 total shareholder return (TSR) was top quartile at 17%; 5-year EPS CAGR 6.4%; 5-year dividend CAGR 9.6% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chesapeake Utilities Corporation | EVP (Finance), CFO, Treasurer, Assistant Corporate Secretary | EVP (2019–present), CFO (2008–present), Treasurer (2022–present), Assistant Corporate Secretary (2015–present) | Senior finance leadership through Florida City Gas acquisition and multi-year growth and rate initiatives |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | Not disclosed in the 2025 Proxy or 2024 10-K reviewed |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Key Perquisites/Contributions |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 425,375 | 67,018 | 401(k)/NQDC contributions $33,706; life insurance $480; vehicle $3,648; dividends (from 2022 grant) $29,184 |
| 2023 | 443,415 | 54,987 | 401(k)/NQDC $46,658; life insurance $480; vehicle $7,849 |
| 2024 | 483,180 | 60,358 | 401(k)/NQDC $53,887; life insurance $480; vehicle $5,991 |
Notes:
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5x salary; other NEOs (incl. CFO) 3x salary .
- Clawback policy compliant with Dodd-Frank/NYSE; applies to incentive awards .
- Hedging and pledging prohibited for directors, executive officers, employees; no pledged shares by any director or NEO .
Performance Compensation
Summary Compensation (multi-year)
| Year | Bonus ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | — | 472,214 | 201,033 | 1,165,640 |
| 2023 | 100,000 | 595,640 | 211,816 | 1,405,858 |
| 2024 | — | 707,849 | 372,285 | 1,623,672 |
Note: 2023 discretionary bonus related to Florida City Gas acquisition efforts under the 2015 Cash Plan .
2024 Short-Term (Cash) Incentive Detail
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Base Salary (4/1/2024) | $495,000 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 55% (Target $272,250) |
| Weighting | 20% Non-financial; 80% Financial (EPS) |
| Financial metric | EPS band centered at $5.35; aligned to public guidance |
| Achievement multipliers | Non-financial achievement range for NEOs 133%–144%; EPS multiplier 127.5% (applied to both components) |
| Actual payout | $372,285 (≈136–139% of target) |
2024 Cash Incentive payout components (company disclosure):
| Component | Payout ($) |
|---|---|
| Non-financial component payout | 94,590 |
| Financial (EPS) component payout | 277,695 |
| Total | 372,285 |
Long-Term (Equity) Incentives
Design and metrics:
- 100% performance-based PSUs over 3-year periods; 2024 changes: Growth in Long-Term Earnings and ROE each 50% weighting; TSR now a +/-20% modifier; ROE must exceed 8% to pay above target .
- Payout scale: 0–200% vs peer group percentiles; TSR modifier bounded to keep maximum ≤200% .
Awards and vesting:
| Performance Period | Target Shares | Threshold (50%) | Maximum (200%) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024–2026 | 6,112 | 3,056 | 12,224 | Target grant value $594,000 (120% of salary) at $97.17 ref price |
| 2023–2025 | 4,609 | 2,305 | 9,218 | — |
| 2022–2024 (actual) | 3,818 target; paid 4,330 | — | — | Achieved 200% Growth; 124% ROE; 0% TSR; total ~113% of target; 4,330 shares vested 2/26/2025 ($548,091 at $126.58) |
Outstanding (unearned) PSUs and value at 12/31/2024:
| Unearned Shares | Value ($ at $121.35) |
|---|---|
| 21,442 | 2,601,987 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 109,303 common shares as of 3/10/2025 |
| Shares outstanding (for context) | 23,011,966 as of 3/10/2025 |
| Ownership % (computed) | ≈0.47% (=109,303/23,011,966) |
| Unvested performance awards | 21,442 unearned PSUs (max at 200% for 2023–2025 and 2024–2026 cycles) |
| Pledging/hedging | Pledging and hedging prohibited; no pledged shares by directors/NEOs |
| Stock ownership guideline | 3x base salary for NEOs (CEO 5x) |
| NQDC balances (2024) | Executive deferrals $390,315; company contributions $28,770; aggregate earnings $779,426; withdrawals $(12,897); year-end balance $5,281,437 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Evergreen 1-year auto-renewal unless notice; amended Oct 2, 2023 for clawback rule alignment |
| Clawback | Repayment if results materially inaccurate; unlimited recovery if misconduct; 3-year recovery window otherwise; recovery right ends on change-in-control unless asserted |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | 1 year post-termination (15 months if resignation for good reason after change-in-control) |
| Severance (without cause) | 1x then-current annual base salary (payable monthly over 12 months) plus continued medical/dental/vision benefits during severance period |
| Change-in-Control (double-trigger) | Lump sum: 2x current monthly base pay (24x monthly), plus 2x average bonus of prior 3 years; continued benefits; PSUs vest at target; Section 280G cutback vs pay-through decision to optimize net |
| CIC payout illustration (12/31/2024) | Base salary $990,000; cash incentive $465,653; healthcare/insurance $52,976; unearned equity at target $1,300,993; total gross $2,809,622; net payable $1,830,469 |
| Tax gross-ups | Company does not provide excise tax gross-up protections |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and leverage: For 2024, target cash incentive = 55% of salary; target LTI = 120% of salary in PSUs; majority of total direct compensation is at risk and equity-heavy .
- Metric rigor and alignment: 2024 STI financial target tied to EPS guidance band ($5.35 center); resulted in ~136–139% of target payout; non-financial goals emphasized Company imperatives; EPS multiplier 127.5% applied to components . LTI focuses on capital-driven growth (capex/capitalization), ROE vs peers with 8% absolute threshold, and TSR as a modifier, which paid zero for 2022–2024 cycle (downside sensitivity) .
- Governance protections: Robust clawback, no hedging/pledging, no excise tax gross-ups, stock ownership guidelines, capped plan payouts (200% max) .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2024 | Prior |
|---|---|---|
| GAAP Net Income ($M) | 118.6 | 87.2 (2023) |
| GAAP EPS (diluted) | 5.26 | 4.73 (2023) |
| Adjusted EPS (non-GAAP) | 5.39 | 5.31 (2023) |
| 2024 TSR | 17% (top quartile) | — |
| 5-year EPS CAGR | 6.4% | — |
| 5-year Dividend CAGR | 9.6% | — |
Context: 2024 outcomes driven by Florida City Gas (FCG) contribution, regulatory programs (GUARD/SAFE/SPP), organic growth, and pipeline expansions; company reaffirmed 2025 and 2028 EPS guidance and 2025 capex $325–$375M within a 2024–2028 capex plan of $1.5–$1.8B .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: CFO compensation is predominantly variable (55% target STI; 120% target LTI in PSUs). 2024 STI paid ~136–139% due to EPS/outperformance; 2022–2024 PSUs paid ~113% with zero TSR tranche—demonstrates downside linkage to relative returns .
- Retention and overhang: Moderate severance (1x salary) and CIC (2x salary + 2x bonus) are within utility norms; PSUs vest at target on CIC termination. Outstanding unearned PSUs (21,442) represent future equity overhang but are performance-contingent .
- Alignment and risk controls: Significant direct share ownership (109,303 shares), sizable deferred comp balance ($5.28M), strict anti-hedging/pledging, and ownership guidelines foster alignment; robust clawback mitigates risk .
- Execution capability: Tenured CFO through transformational FCG acquisition and active regulatory/capex agenda; 2024 net income +36% YoY and top-quartile TSR support continued confidence, with EPS growth anchored to capital deployment and allowed ROEs .