Andrew Bart
About Andrew Bart
Andrew J. Bart is Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer, International Operations at Crawford & Company, appointed effective January 1, 2022. He is 62 and previously held leadership roles including Senior Vice President and President, Loss Adjusting International; President, Global Technical Services; and President, Asia Pacific, after extensive experience as a loss adjuster handling large, complex losses . His employment agreement (UK Executive Contract of Employment dated March 16, 2021) provides for STIP and LTIP participation and set his initial base salary at £325,000, increased to £335,000 with his promotion in 2023 . Pay-for-performance outcomes include STIP payouts of $222,405 (88.2% of target) for 2024 and $350,109 (146.2% of target) for 2023, and no payout from the 2022–2024 PSU cycle; company metrics used to drive incentives in 2024 were revenue before reimbursements of $1,293.9 million, adjusted operating earnings of $82.5 million, adjusted operating margin of 6.4%, and EPS of $0.74 for PSU calculations .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crawford & Company | EVP & CEO, International Operations | Since Jan 1, 2022 | Leads global international operations |
| Crawford & Company | SVP & President, Loss Adjusting International | — | Led global loss adjusting internationally |
| Crawford & Company | President, Global Technical Services | — | Led complex/technical claims services |
| Crawford & Company | President, Asia Pacific | — | Led regional growth and operations |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Andrew Bart in the latest proxies .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $410,020 | $416,563 | $446,999 |
| STIP Target (% of Salary) | 57.5% | 57.5% | 57.5% |
| STIP Threshold / Max (% of Salary) | 17.25% / 115% | 17.25% / 115% | 17.25% / 115% |
| Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value, $) | $457,253 | $455,954 | $474,257 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $150,020 | $149,113 | $154,665 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $1,138,511 | $1,371,739 | $1,298,326 |
Perquisites detail (2024): pension costs $35,351; private travel $16,863; housing and incremental living expenses $79,183; life insurance premiums $3,217; company car allowance $20,051 . 2023 perquisites included pension costs $32,944; private travel $16,419; housing and living $77,095; life insurance $3,132; car allowance $19,523 . 2022 included pension costs $32,220; private travel $16,323; housing and living $76,647; life insurance $1,200; tax accountant $4,221; car allowance $19,409 .
Performance Compensation
Annual STIP design and outcomes
| Item | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Corporate STIP Metrics & Weights | Revenue 25%; Operating Earnings 50%; Operating Margin 25% | Revenue 25%; Adjusted Operating Earnings 50%; Adjusted Operating Margin 25% |
| Corporate Metric Targets vs Actual | Rev: Target $1,159.8m; Actual $1,226.864m; Op Earnings: Target $84.5m; Actual $86.291m; Op Margin: Target 7.3%; Actual 7.0% (FX-adjusted) | Company 2024 actuals used: Revenue $1,293.9m; Adjusted Op Earnings $82.5m; Adjusted Op Margin 6.4% |
| Andrew Bart STIP Payout ($) | $350,109 (146.2% of target) | $222,405 (88.2% of target) |
LTIP structure and metrics
| Award Year | Target LTIP Value ($) | Vehicles | Performance Metric & Payout Curve | Settlement Election |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $500,000 | 50% Performance (cash or PSUs); 50% Time-vested (cash or RSUs) | 2023–2025 cumulative EPS (adjusted per plan) | CEO elected shares; other NEO elections not specified |
| 2024 | $500,000 | 50% PSUs; 50% Time-vested RSUs (ratable over 3 years) | 2024–2026 cumulative EPS: 30% at $2.64; 100% at $2.95–$3.11; 200% at ≥$3.42 (ratable between thresholds; none earned < $2.64) | All NEOs elected units settled in shares |
| 2022–2024 PSU Outcome | — | — | Company EPS below threshold; no PSU payout for 2022–2024 cycle | — |
2024 Grant specifics (plan-based awards)
| Grant Date | STIP Target ($) | STIP Max ($) | PSU Threshold (#) | PSU Target (#) | PSU Max (#) | Time-Vested RSUs (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 7, 2024 | $252,285 | $504,570 | 6,178 | 20,593 | 41,186 | 20,593 | $474,257 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 198,151 Class A shares as of March 14, 2025; less than 1% of outstanding Class A |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | EVP guideline: 2.0x base salary or 120,000 shares; retention of 75% of net shares until guideline met |
| Guideline Compliance Status | Deadline to achieve new target ownership: Feb 10, 2025 ; as of Mar 14, 2025, 198,151 shares exceed the 120,000-share guideline |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Company prohibits hedging and pledging; insider trading policy filed with SEC |
| Deferred Compensation | No participation reported for Bart in nonqualified deferred comp tables (2024) |
Outstanding Equity Awards at Dec 31, 2024
| Type | Quantity | Key Terms | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Options (exercisable) | 15,000 @ $6.52 exp 5/11/2026; 17,959 @ $9.22 exp 2/08/2027; 18,005 @ $8.60 exp 2/07/2028; 19,440 @ $9.70 exp 2/11/2029; 21,160 @ $9.01 exp 2/10/2030 | All exercisable; no unexercisable shown | — |
| RSUs (unvested) | 40,783 (vest 100% 12/31/2025) | Time-vest schedule | $471,451 |
| RSUs (unvested) | 13,867 (33% vested 12/31/2023; 33% vested 12/31/2024; 34% vest 12/31/2025) | Ratable vesting | $160,303 |
| RSUs (unvested) | 20,593 (vest 100% 12/31/2026) | Cliff vest | $238,055 |
| RSUs (unvested) | 13,798 (33% vested 12/31/2024; 33% vest 12/31/2025; 34% vest 12/31/2026) | Ratable vesting | $159,505 |
| Stock Awards Vested (2024) | 31,179 shares vested, value realized $360,429 | — | $360,429 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreement Date & Type | UK Executive Contract of Employment, March 16, 2021 |
| Base Salary (GBP) | £325,000; increased to £335,000 effective Jan 1, 2023 with promotion to CEO — International Operations |
| Incentive Eligibility | Eligible for STIP and LTIP |
| Benefits | Executive-level benefits; company car; pension; life and health benefit premiums |
| Termination Notice | 12 months written notice by either party; company may pay a sum equal to base salary for unexpired notice period plus fair value of other contractual benefits |
| Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality, non-competition, non-disclosure, non-solicitation during employment and up to 12 months post-termination |
| Change-in-Control / Severance Economics (Dec 31, 2024) | Cash severance $661,162; stock awards $709,524; death life insurance $1,755,028; disability benefits $263,254; total cash+equity severance $1,370,686 for termination in connection with change-in-control or without cause |
| Equity Vesting on CIC/Other | Unvested earned LTIP awards continue to vest on death/disability/retirement; pro‑rata vesting on CIC; subject to plan terms |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Bart’s cash incentive outcomes tracked company operational metrics; 2024 STIP payout was below target at 88.2% as revenue growth and adjusted margins moderated, while 2023 payout was well above target (146.2%), indicating sensitivity to segment and corporate execution .
- Long-term incentives tied to cumulative EPS: Zero PSU payout for the 2022–2024 cycle underscores the stringent EPS hurdle; 2024–2026 PSU curve requires sustained EPS improvement (≥$2.95–$3.11 for target; ≥$3.42 for max), which could constrain equity realization if execution lags .
- Vesting and potential selling pressure: Material RSU cliffs in 2025 (40,783 shares) and 2026 (20,593 shares), plus ratable awards through 2026, create known vesting events that can coincide with Form 4 sales for tax or diversification; monitoring windows around December 31 and subsequent trading windows is prudent .
- Ownership alignment and risk controls: Beneficial ownership of 198,151 Class A shares suggests compliance with share-based guidelines; prohibition on hedging and pledging and a clawback policy mitigate misalignment and governance risk .
- Retention considerations: UK agreement’s 12-month notice/pay provision and defined severance schedule reduce abrupt departure risk; restrictive covenants (12 months) protect franchise post‑departure .