Tami Stevenson
About Tami Stevenson
Tami E. Stevenson is Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary at Crawford & Company (CRD‑A); she has served in this role since June 2020 and is 58 years old . She previously served as Deputy General Counsel beginning in January 2019 and originally joined Crawford in 2006 as counsel for Broadspire (Crawford TPA) . Company performance context for compensation alignment: in 2024, revenue before reimbursements was $1,293.9 million, adjusted operating earnings were $82.5 million, and adjusted operating margin was 6.4% . The company’s pay-for-performance design emphasizes revenue, adjusted operating earnings, and adjusted operating margin in the annual plan, with EPS as the metric for PSUs; these are presented in the Pay vs. Performance section of the proxy alongside a five‑year TSR comparison chart .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crawford & Company | Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary | Appointed June 2020 – present | Company’s chief legal officer and corporate secretary; signatory on multiple SEC reports, reflecting oversight of legal and governance processes |
| Crawford & Company | Deputy General Counsel | Jan 2019 – Jun 2020 | Progression to senior legal leadership role |
| Broadspire (Crawford TPA) | Counsel | 2006 – 2019 | Joined the Company as counsel supporting TPA operations |
External Roles
- No external public company directorships or roles disclosed in the proxy materials for Stevenson. (No disclosure located in 2025 DEF 14A executive officer section.)
Fixed Compensation
- Stevenson is not identified as a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in the proxy; therefore, individual base salary and cash compensation details are not disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table .
Performance Compensation
Company STIP design (applies to executive officers, including NEOs; Stevenson is an executive officer but individual payout amounts for her are not disclosed):
| STIP Metric (2024) | Weight | Threshold Goal (% of target) | Target | Maximum Goal (% of target) | 2024 Actual and Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 25% | 95% | Company plan target | 110% | $1,293.9m actual; revenue factor funded at 90.3% of target |
| Adjusted Operating Earnings | 50% | 90% | Company plan target | 115% | $82.5m actual; earnings factor funded at 31.1% of target |
| Adjusted Operating Margin | 25% | 95% | 7.0% target | 110% | 6.4% actual; margin factor funded at 0% |
Additional STIP features:
- Funding thresholds for any payout: operating earnings ≥ $68.6m and revenue ≥ $1,172.6m in 2024 .
- Overall achievement for metrics measured on a total company basis in 2024: 38.2% of target; individual NEO actual awards reflected that factor (Stevenson’s specific payout is not disclosed) .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) design (applies to executive officers in 2024):
| Vehicle | Weight | Vesting | Performance Metric | 2024–2026 Targets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Share Units (PSUs) | 50% of target LTI value | Earned over 2024–2026; performance-vesting | Cumulative EPS (adjusted per LTIP) | Threshold $2.64 (30% earned); Target $2.95–$3.11 (100% earned); Max ≥$3.42 (200% earned) |
| Time-Vested RSUs | 50% of target LTI value | Vest ratably over 3 years based on continued employment | N/A | Time-based vesting only |
- 2024 grants to NEOs did not include stock options (option columns were blank/“—” in the Grants of Plan-Based Awards table) .
- Prior PSU cycle (2022–2024) paid 0% due to EPS performance below threshold, highlighting downside risk in performance equity .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive stock ownership guidelines | Senior Vice Presidents: 1.0x base salary or 45,000 shares; until met, must retain at least 75% of net shares from option exercises/RSU or PSU vesting . |
| Hedging and pledging | Broad prohibition on speculative/hedging transactions; directors and officers may not pledge Company securities or hold them in margin accounts . |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback adopted July 28, 2023; recovery of incentive compensation upon restatement; also permits recovery for certain misconduct even without restatement . |
| Individual beneficial ownership | Stevenson’s specific share holdings are not itemized in the Security Ownership table (table lists directors and NEOs and the group in aggregate) . |
Employment Terms
- The proxy summarizes employment and severance arrangements for certain NEOs; however, an individual employment agreement, severance multiple, or change‑of‑control terms for Stevenson are not disclosed in the filing .
- General policy note: executives are “party to employment arrangements that provide severance and change‑in‑control protection,” but specific terms disclosed in the proxy apply to the listed NEOs only .
Additional Indicators and Governance Context
- Say‑on‑Pay: At the 2023 annual meeting, approximately 92.1% of votes cast supported executive compensation, signaling broad shareholder approval of the program design .
- Related party transactions: No related party transactions disclosed in 2024 (and similarly none in 2023), mitigating governance conflict risk .
- Insider trading policy: Robust policy filed as an exhibit to the 10‑K; prohibits trading while in possession of MNPI; reinforces compliance culture .
- Section 16 filings: No Form 4 filings for Stevenson were found in our document search, limiting visibility on her trading cadence and potential selling pressure (monitor going forward) [Search: no 4s found].
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong alignment mechanisms (ownership guidelines, no hedging/pledging, clawback) reduce risk of misaligned incentives; as an SVP subject to these policies, Stevenson’s equity incentives and retention requirements should support long‑term value creation .
- Pay-for-performance sensitivity: 2024 STIP outcome (38.2% of target on corporate metrics) and a 0% PSU payout for the 2022–2024 cycle underscore that variable pay is sensitive to performance; if 2024–2026 EPS meets or exceeds targets, PSU accruals could improve, otherwise equity value at risk remains meaningful .
- Retention risk: Stevenson’s long tenure (with the Company since 2006; in current role since June 2020) and multi‑year vesting on RSUs/PSUs suggest moderate retention risk; lack of disclosed individual severance/CIC terms leaves some uncertainty on exit economics relative to NEO peers .
- Trading signals: Absence of located Form 4 filings for Stevenson reduces near‑term insight into personal trading; combined with the no‑pledging rule, this implies low observable selling pressure, but investors should continue to monitor Section 16 reports for any changes [Search: no 4s found].
Note: Stevenson is not an NEO in the proxy; therefore, base salary, target bonus, individual equity grant values, and severance/CIC specifics for her are not disclosed. The compensation structures, metrics, and policies summarized above apply company‑wide to executive officers and are cited directly from the company’s proxy.
Citations:
- Executive status, age, career progression:
- STIP design, thresholds, 2024 performance and payout factor:
- LTIP design and PSU targets; time‑based RSU vesting; 2022–2024 PSU outcome:
- Ownership guidelines, retention requirement; hedging/pledging ban; clawback:
- Related party transactions:
- Say‑on‑pay support:
- Insider trading policy reference:
- Security ownership table (scope):
- SEC filing signatory evidence of role: