Juan Pablo San Agustín
About Juan Pablo San Agustín
Juan Pablo San Agustín is Group Executive, Strategic Planning, Innovation and Venturing at CRH; he joined in October 2020 and is 56 years old. He has over 25 years in building materials across the Americas and Europe, with expertise in strategic planning, M&A, venture capital and digital innovation; immediately prior to CRH he served as EVP of Strategic Planning and New Business Development at CEMEX and holds a BS and an MBA . During 2024, CRH delivered net income of $3.5B (+15% YoY), adjusted EBITDA of $6.9B (+12% YoY), EPS of $5.06 (+16% YoY), and a 35.9% TSR, framing the performance environment for senior executives including San Agustín .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRH | Group Executive, Strategic Planning, Innovation and Venturing | Oct 2020–present | Leads corporate strategy, innovation and venturing; presented CRH’s M&A and growth platform approach, highlighting disciplined consolidation and optionality across roads, aggregates, water and cement; discussed ~$40B financial capacity over time with ~70% directed to growth capex and M&A . |
| CEMEX | EVP, Strategic Planning & New Business Development | Not disclosed (immediately prior to CRH) | 30+ year industry veteran with involvement in >$30B of M&A transactions (self-reported), underscoring deep capital allocation and integration experience relevant to CRH’s portfolio strategy . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No outside directorships or external roles disclosed for San Agustín in CRH’s 2025 DEF 14A . |
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary, target bonus, actual bonus and perquisites for San Agustín are not itemized in CRH’s 2025 DEF 14A, which provides detailed tables only for Named Executive Officers (CEO, COO, Presidents) and not for San Agustín .
Performance Compensation
Company program context (applies to NEOs and broadly signals performance levers for senior executives):
- Annual Bonus Plan metrics and FY2024 outcome
| Metric (FY2024) | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout vs Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EPS (cents) | 25% | 404c | 437c | 470c | 523c | 25.00% |
| Operating Cash Flow ($bn) | 30% | 3.50 | 3.79 | 4.07 | 4.04 | 28.64% |
| RONA (%) | 25% | 12.1 | 13.1 | 14.0 | 14.4 | 25.00% |
| Personal/Strategic | 20% | — | — | — | Max (Committee assessment) | 20.00% |
| Total payout vs maximum | 100% | — | — | — | — | 98.64% |
- Long-term incentives (2014 Performance Share Plan, for 2024 grant cohort)
| Measure | Weighting | Below Threshold | Threshold (25%) | Maximum (100%) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Cash Flow | 45% | <92.5% of plan | 92.5% of plan | >107.5% of plan | Based on IFRS cash flow adjusted to exclude items largely outside management control; Committee retains adjustment discretion . |
| Relative TSR | 20% | < Median | Median | Upper quartile | Peers per Performance Peer Group; 3-year measurement . |
| RONA | 20% | <92.5% of plan | 92.5% of plan | >107.5% of plan | Defined internally (pre-impairment); reflects seasonality . |
| Sustainability Scorecard | 15% | Committee assessment | Committee assessment | Committee assessment | Includes CO2 strategy progress, revenue from products with enhanced sustainability attributes, employee engagement . |
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2022 PSP (3-year performance to 12/31/2024) vested at 98.75% of maximum, reflecting strong performance across Cash Flow, RONA, TSR and Sustainability & Diversity; CEO and CFO awards subject to additional two-year post-vest holding through March 2027 .
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2025 program changes: shift to U.S.-style structure with 60% PSUs (Cash Flow 50%, RONA 25%, Relative TSR 25%, 3-year cliff) and 40% RSUs (3-year ratable), with annual bonus rebalanced (Cash Flow 30%, EPS 30%, RONA 20%, Sustainability/Strategic 20%); targets expressed vs “100% target” with max 200% .
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Equity Incentive Plan governance features: clawback, no dividends on unvested awards, fair-market strike for options/SARs, no repricing, non-transferability, and double-trigger change-in-control (CIC) vesting (awards vest only if terminated without cause or for good reason within two years post-CIC; unassumed awards vest at or above target/actual as of CIC) .
Note: CRH’s DEF 14A does not disclose San Agustín’s individual 2024 bonus or LTI awards; tables above describe the company’s disclosed design and outcomes for NEOs and plan features applicable to eligible employees.
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (ordinary shares) | 32,728 shares; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Hedging and pledging | Directors and executive officers are prohibited from hedging or pledging CRH shares, including margin accounts . |
| Ownership guidelines | New share ownership guidelines effective Jan 1, 2025 apply to NEOs (CEO 6x salary; other NEOs 3x) and non-management Directors (5x retainer); expectation to meet within 5 years; 75% net retention until met . |
| Executive group total | Directors and executive officers as a group hold 808,018 shares; each listed individual <1% . |
Employment Terms
- Role and term: Members of the Global Leadership Team (including San Agustín) are appointed to their roles and serve at the discretion of the Company, rather than for a specific term of office .
- Individual contract disclosure: The DEF 14A provides employment agreement summaries for other executives (CEO, COO, Presidents) but does not include an employment agreement summary for San Agustín; disclosed agreements typically include 6–12 month notice/garden leave mechanics, restrictive covenants, and severance for certain roles .
- Incentive plan mechanics: New Equity Incentive Plan provides double‑trigger CIC vesting treatment and robust clawback provisions; no single‑trigger acceleration; no dividends on unvested awards .
- Anti‑hedging/pledging: Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging by Directors and executive officers .
Performance & Track Record
- Strategy and M&A: At Investor Day 2025, San Agustín highlighted >$30B of M&A transactions in his career and articulated CRH’s disciplined platform-building and consolidation thesis across roads, aggregates, water and cement, with connected portfolio synergies and capital deployment optionality .
- Texas platform build: Detailed CRH’s Texas strategy from the Marble Falls quarry (2014) through Ash Grove (2018), import logistics scale in Houston, the Hunter assets opportunity, and Eco Material closing—positioning CRH as a market leader in Texas cementitious materials and integrated platforms .
- Capital capacity and deployment: Described CRH’s indicative ~$40B financial capacity and intent to direct 70% ($28B) toward growth capex and M&A, prioritizing high-growth markets and scalable platforms with synergy potential .
- Company performance context: 2024 TSR 35.9% and record financials (net income $3.5B, adjusted EBITDA $6.9B, EPS $5.06) underscore alignment between incentive outcomes and business results .
Compensation Committee, Peer Groups, and Shareholder Feedback
- Compensation governance: Committee of independent Directors; “what we do/what we don’t” practices include pay-for-performance, rigorous targets, robust clawback, and prohibition on hedging/pledging; no single-trigger CIC or dividend payments on unvested awards .
- Peer groups: 2025 executive compensation peer set (19 U.S.-listed Materials/Industrials, e.g., CAT, HON, ETN, VMC, MLM) informs program design; separate Performance Peer Group used for relative TSR in PSUs (e.g., Holcim, Saint-Gobain, Heidelberg, VMC, MLM) .
- Shareholder engagement: Board Chair and management engaged holders representing ~26% of shares outstanding to align compensation framework with U.S. practices (e.g., peer group changes, mix shift to RSUs/PSUs, higher share ownership guidelines) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: San Agustín’s role (strategy/M&A) sits squarely within value-creation levers CRH emphasizes; beneficial ownership and policy constraints (no hedging/pledging; clawbacks; double‑trigger CIC) support pay‑for‑performance alignment and reduce governance red flags .
- Retention dynamics: Company-wide LTI structure (multi-year PSUs/RSUs; strong performance orientation; post‑vest holding for top roles; new U.S.-aligned ownership framework) suggests ongoing retention hooks across senior leadership, though his personal grant/vesting schedules are not disclosed .
- Execution signal: His Investor Day remarks and track record in platform building and consolidation (Texas, cementitious and water adjacencies) reinforce CRH’s growth algorithm; monitoring future M&A cadence vs. performance targets (Cash Flow, RONA, TSR) is key for assessing incentive realization and potential insider selling pressure when awards vest .
- Governance risk: No evidence of pledging, tax gross‑ups, single-trigger CIC, or option repricing; policies and program design changes align with U.S. best practices, mitigating compensation-related governance risk .