Nathan Creech
About Nathan Creech
Nathan Creech (age 49) is President, Americas Division at CRH, appointed January 2023. He joined CRH in 2011 and previously held roles including President of Building Products (2021), President of CRH’s Building Envelope business, Senior Vice President, Central Division (Americas Materials), and Vice President, U.S. Strategy & Development; he holds a BS in Business and an MBA . During 2024, CRH delivered net income of $3.5B (+15% YoY), Adjusted EBITDA of $6.9B (+12% YoY), basic EPS +16% YoY, and 12‑month TSR of 35.9%; 61% of 2024 revenues were attributable to the U.S., underscoring the strategic weight of Creech’s Americas remit . The Compensation Committee highlighted Creech’s role in advancing CRH’s customer‑connected solutions strategy, growth mindset, and succession planning in 2024 performance assessments .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRH | President, Americas Division | Jan 2023–present | Leads CRH’s largest region; aligns integrated solutions across Materials and Building Solutions in the U.S. market . |
| CRH | President, Building Products | 2021–2022 | Drove portfolio and solutions in value‑added products prior to elevation to Americas leadership . |
| CRH | President, Building Envelope business | n/a | Led the Building Envelope platform, integrating operations and customer‑connected offerings . |
| CRH | SVP, Central Division, Americas Materials | n/a | Regional leadership in aggregates/asphalt/ready‑mix, supporting operational excellence and RONA focus . |
| CRH | VP, U.S. Strategy & Development | n/a | Advanced M&A, capital deployment and strategy in the U.S. . |
External Roles
No external directorships or external roles are disclosed for Creech in company filings; his CRH bio lists only internal roles and education .
Fixed Compensation
| Component (2024) | Amount/Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $1,170,000 |
| YoY Base Salary Change | +4.00% vs. $1,125,000 in 2023 |
| Target Annual Bonus | 87.5% of base salary; maximum 175% |
| Actual Annual Bonus (Total/Cash/Deferred) | $2,019,654 total; $1,514,741 cash; $504,914 deferred into shares (25%) |
| “All Other Compensation” (key items) | Car allowance $14,400; Health checks $20,732; 401(k) match $17,250; SERP contribution $199,500; Death & disability premiums $8,074; Profit sharing/benefit on exercise $17,250 |
| Deferred Compensation (SERP) | Company contribution $199,500; Aggregate 2024 earnings $79,081; Year‑end balance $1,423,023 |
Performance Compensation
| Annual Bonus Metrics (2024) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Outcome | Payout vs Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EPS | 25% | 404c | 437c | 470c | 523c | 25.00% |
| Operating Cash Flow | 30% | $3.50bn | $3.79bn | $4.07bn | $4.04bn | 28.64% |
| RONA | 25% | 12.1% | 13.1% | 14.0% | 14.4% | 25.00% |
| Personal/Strategic | 20% | — | — | — | Committee assessment | 20.00% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | 98.64% |
| Long‑Term Incentive (PSP) Structure (2024 grants) | Weight | Threshold (25% vest) | Target/Max (100% vest) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Cash Flow | 45% | 92.5% of plan | >107.5% of plan | Adjusted to exclude M&A, financing, etc. |
| Relative TSR | 20% | Below median | Upper quartile | Tailored peer set; dividends reinvested |
| RONA | 20% | 92.5% of plan | >107.5% of plan | Pre‑impairment, IFRS‑based, seasonal |
| Sustainability Scorecard | 15% | Committee assessment | Committee assessment | CO2, circularity, engagement |
| 2024 Equity Grants to Creech | Grant Date | Target as % Salary | Target Amount ($) | Shares at Maximum (est.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Share Plan (PSUs) | Apr 2, 2024 | 65.45% | $760,902 | 36,066 |
| Deferred Shares (25% of bonus, DSBP) | Mar 5, 2024 | — | $599,172 | 7,341 |
| Prior PSU Cycle – Vesting Outcome (assessed 2024) | Interests Held | Vesting % | Interests Due to Vest | Vest Date | Est. Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSP (3‑yr perf. to 12/31/24) – Creech | 53,829 | 98.75% | 53,157 | Mar 2025 | $4,918,086 |
Additional plan features: annual bonus and deferred share awards subject to malus/clawback for three years ; clawback policy adopted per SEC/NYSE standards ; new Equity Incentive Plan operates with prohibitions on repricing, no single‑trigger CIC vesting (default double‑trigger), no dividends on unvested awards .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 99,896 CRH ordinary shares (less than 1% of class) as of March 12, 2025 .
- Ownership guidelines: Employment agreement requires holdings equal to 150% of base salary ; starting 2025, Company guidelines require 3× salary for other NEOs, with 5‑year compliance and 75% net retention until met; Committee is comfortable NEOs are compliant or on track .
- Anti‑hedging and pledging: Executives are prohibited from hedging, shorting, or pledging CRH shares (including margin accounts) .
Unvested/Outstanding Awards (potential supply and timing)
| Award Type | Vest Year | Unvested/Unearned Shares | Est. Market Value (at $92.52) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 DSBP (deferred shares) | 2025 | 7,406 | $685,203 |
| 2022 PSP (PSUs, max basis) | 2025 | 53,156 | $4,918,006 |
| 2023 DSBP (deferred shares) | 2026 | 9,726 | $899,850 |
| 2023 PSP (PSUs, max basis) | 2026 | 64,080 | $5,928,682 |
| 2024 DSBP (deferred shares) | 2027 | 7,459 | $690,107 |
| 2024 PSP (PSUs, max basis) | 2027 | 36,640 | $3,389,933 |
Note: The table reflects “Equity Incentive Plan Awards: Number of Unearned Shares” and market values estimated by the company at 12/31/24 close ($92.52) including dividend equivalents as applicable .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreement Effective | January 1, 2021 |
| Compensation Framework | Base salary; target bonus 87.5% (max 175%); 25% of earned bonus delivered in deferred shares while on GLT; participation in benefits and car allowance; 150% salary ownership requirement |
| Notice/Garden Leave | 6 months’ notice by either party; CRH may place on garden leave during notice; salary/benefits continue; pro‑rated target bonus for time employed in year |
| Severance | After notice period and release: 52 weeks of base salary (less any garden leave weeks) + pro‑rated target bonus (aligned to weeks of severance) + lump‑sum COBRA premiums for same period |
| Restrictive Covenants | 12‑month non‑compete and non‑solicit post‑termination, reduced by any garden leave weeks |
| Change‑in‑Control (equity) | New Equity Incentive Plan: default double‑trigger vesting; if not assumed, vesting immediately prior to CIC with performance awards settled at greater of target or actual to date; DSBP accelerates under 2014 plan rules |
| Clawback/Malus | Company clawback policy compliant with SEC/NYSE; malus/clawback applies to annual bonus and deferred share awards |
Illustrative termination/CIC values (Company estimates, as of 12/31/24): “Cash Payments” for Creech of $2,193,750 in good leaver resignation, other voluntary resignation, or involuntary termination without cause; unvested PSUs value $10,000,438 deemed for various qualifying scenarios; health & welfare benefits $45,915 (12 months COBRA) .
Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design (context)
- 2024 PSP TSR peer group included global building materials and construction peers (e.g., Holcim, Heidelberg Materials, Saint‑Gobain, Martin Marietta, Vulcan Materials) .
- 2025 U.S. compensation peer group (19 companies) spans large U.S. Industrials/Materials (e.g., Caterpillar, Deere, Eaton, Trane, Johnson Controls, Vulcan, Martin Marietta) to align with CRH’s U.S. listing and talent market .
Performance & Track Record
- Committee‑assessed achievements for Creech (with other operating leaders) in 2024: advancing customer‑connected solutions via collaboration/innovation/technology; fostering growth mindset and sustainable growth; supporting senior management succession processes .
- Company performance context in 2024 under the customer‑connected solutions strategy: net income +15% to $3.5B, Adjusted EBITDA +12% to $6.9B, basic EPS +16%; 12‑month TSR 35.9% .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 annual bonus paid at 98.6% of maximum on EPS, cash flow, RONA and personal/strategic goals; PSP emphasizes cumulative cash flow (45%), RONA (20%), and relative TSR (20%) with rigorous thresholds/upper‑quartile aims; sustainability at 15% embeds decarbonization/circularity/engagement .
- Retention and supply dynamics: Significant unvested PSUs/DSBP awards scheduled to vest across 2025–2027 (see Equity Ownership table), creating strong retention incentives; potential selling windows may cluster around vesting dates, though anti‑hedging/pledging policy reduces misalignment risk .
- Contractual protections: Severance equals one year’s base salary plus pro‑rated target bonus and COBRA, with 12‑month non‑compete/non‑solicit; Equity Incentive Plan uses double‑trigger CIC vesting and prohibits option repricing, supporting governance quality and reducing windfall risk .
- Ownership alignment: Contractual 150%‑of‑salary ownership requirement, new 2025 3× salary guidelines with 75% net retention until met, and explicit anti‑hedging/pledging strengthen alignment with shareholders .