Peter Buckley
About Peter Buckley
Peter Buckley is President, International Division at CRH; age 60; education: Bachelor of Commerce (BComm). He joined CRH in 2009 and has held senior roles across Asia-Pacific, Europe Materials East, Ash Grove Cement, and UK & Ireland, becoming President of Europe West prior to his current appointment in 2024 . CRH’s 2024 performance was strong: revenues $35.6bn (+2% YoY), adjusted EBITDA $6.9bn (+12%), basic EPS $5.06 (+16%), and a 12‑month TSR of 35.9% to year-end 2024, aligning pay outcomes with company results .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRH | President, International Division | 2024–present | Leads International across Europe/Australia with focus on execution of customer-connected solutions strategy and sustainability targets |
| CRH | President, Europe West | Not disclosed | Regional leadership driving operational and commercial excellence |
| CRH | SVP roles across Asia-Pacific; Europe Materials East; Ash Grove Cement; UK & Ireland | Not disclosed | Senior operational and portfolio management roles contributing to growth and integration |
| CRH | Country Manager, China | 2009 onward (start year) | Established and scaled CRH’s presence and operations in China |
External Roles
No external public company directorships disclosed in the proxy for Peter Buckley .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Amount/Term | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $876,244 | Set and paid in euro; converted to USD at average 2024 rate |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 87.5% | Maximum 175% of salary; 25% of earned bonus delivered in deferred shares |
| Holiday Allowance | 8% of base salary | Per employment agreement (Feb 20, 2024) |
| Allowances | Housing and mobility allowance; car or allowance | Per agreement |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Bonus Plan – Targets, Actuals, Payout
| Measure | Weighting (% of bonus) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | % of Max Awarded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRH EPS | 25% | 404c | 437c | 470c | 523c | 25.00% |
| Operating Cash Flow | 30% | $3.50bn | $3.79bn | $4.07bn | $4.04bn | 28.64% |
| RONA | 25% | 12.1% | 13.1% | 14.0% | 14.4% | 25.00% |
| Personal/Strategic | 20% | — | — | — | Committee assessed “maximum” | 20.00% |
| Total Outcome | 100% | — | — | — | — | 98.64% |
Notes: The 2024 Annual Bonus Plan combined payout equaled 98.6% of maximum; the program uses straight-line payouts between threshold (0%), target (50%), and max (100%) achievement, with targets adjusted for major development activity .
2024 Annual Bonus – Payout Details (Peter Buckley)
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $876,244 |
| Target Bonus % | 87.5% |
| Target Bonus Amount | $766,714 |
| Maximum Potential Bonus | $1,533,427 |
| Actual Bonus Earned (Total) | $1,512,572 |
| Cash Element | $1,134,429 |
| Deferred Shares Element | $378,143 |
Long-Term Incentives – 2024 PSP Award Structure and Grant
| Metric | Weight | Threshold Payout | Target/Max Payout Definition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Cash Flow | 45% | 25% payout at 92.5% of plan | 100% payout above 107.5% of plan |
| RONA | 20% | 25% payout at 92.5% of plan | 100% payout above 107.5% of plan |
| Relative TSR | 20% | 0% below median | 100% at upper quartile |
| Sustainability Scorecard | 15% | Committee assessment | Committee assessment |
| Grant Detail (2024) | Value |
|---|---|
| Target as % of Salary | 53.89% |
| Target Value ($) | $469,187 |
| Date of Grant | April 2, 2024 |
| No. of Shares (max) | 22,239 |
| Vesting | 3-year cliff; standard malus/clawback; dividends accrue only if vest |
2022 PSP Outcome (2014–2024 Cycle)
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Vesting Level | 98.75% of maximum |
| Interests Held | 27,623 |
| Interests Due to Vest | 27,278 |
| Vesting Date | March 2025 |
| Estimated Value (@ $92.52) | $2,523,760 |
Key sustainability sub-metrics achieved at/near stretch: revenue from products with enhanced sustainability attributes 49% vs 47%/49% thresholds; women in senior management 20% vs 16%/19%; inclusion assessment 71 vs 70/73 (50% vest on that subcomponent) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 155,606 ordinary shares; <1% of outstanding |
| Unvested/Unearned Equity (12/31/2024) | 2022 PSP: 27,278 ($2,523,734); 2023 PSP: 24,153 ($2,234,636); 2024 PSP: 22,593 ($2,090,304) – market values at $92.52 |
| Options | None disclosed |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers |
| Ownership Guidelines (effective 1/1/2025) | NEOs must hold ≥3x base salary; 75% net share retention until compliant; 5-year compliance window (by 1/1/2030). Committee notes NEOs are in compliance or on track |
| Post-employment Holding (legacy policy) | Applies to CEO/CFO; not specified for Buckley |
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Provision |
|---|---|
| Role/Appointment | President, International; effective 1/1/2024 |
| Employment Agreement | Executed 2/20/2024 |
| Contract Duration | Continues until terminated; earlier of CRH termination (≥12 months’ written notice) or Buckley resignation (≥6 months’ notice), or reaching state pension age (68) |
| Compensation Structure | Base salary with 8% holiday allowance; annual bonus target 87.5% (max 175%); 25% of bonus in deferred shares; housing/mobility allowance; car/allowance |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | Non-compete 9 months; non-solicit 12 months after termination (less any garden leave) |
| Garden Leave / Pay in Lieu | CRH discretion to place on garden leave or pay base salary in lieu of notice |
| Severance | No contractual cash severance; committee discretion governs equity under plan “Good Leaver” provisions |
| CIC / Equity Treatment | Under share plans, CIC consideration: PSP may vest pro‑rata based on performance and elapsed time; DSBP accelerates; committee retains discretion. New 2025 Equity Incentive Plan defaults to double-trigger vesting |
| Clawback | Company clawback policy adopted per SEC/NYSE standards (Exhibit 97.1 to 2024 10-K) |
| Tax Support/Gross-ups | Tax support/gross-up reported: $39,311 in 2024 |
Selected potential termination scenario value (as of 12/31/2024, using $92.52 share price): Good Leaver/involuntary termination without cause – unvested PSUs valued at $4,710,259; disability or death also show PSUs at $4,710,259; disability/death include life/disability benefits $1,752,488 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and leverage to performance: Buckley’s 2024 bonus paid at 98.6% of max off EPS, cash flow, and RONA beats, and his 2022 PSP vests at 98.75% with meaningful value crystallizing March 2025, indicating strong linkage of pay to cash generation, returns, and TSR .
- Near-term vesting supply vs retention: The March 2025 PSP vest (~$2.52m) and ongoing PSP tranches (2026/2027) present potential selling supply, mitigated by new ownership guidelines (≥3x salary; 75% net retention) and anti-hedging/pledging prohibitions, reducing insider selling pressure risk .
- Contractual protections and change-of-control: No guaranteed severance; equity follows plan-level Good Leaver/CIC rules; new 2025 plan adopts double-trigger vesting—a shareholder-friendly guardrail limiting windfalls and aligning retention with transactional outcomes .
- Governance and pay sentiment: Say-on-pay support was 97% at the 2024 AGM; compensation program evolved for 2025 to introduce RSUs (40% of LTI) and higher ownership requirements, balancing performance leverage and retention in U.S. market context .
- Minor red flag: Tax gross-up ($39,311) appears modest; overall program features—clawback, no dividend on unvested awards, no option repricing—mitigate governance risk .