Matthew David
CorMedixAbout Matthew David
Matthew David is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of CorMedix Inc. (CRMD) since May 2020 and served as interim Chief Executive Officer from October 4, 2021 through May 10, 2022; he is 47 years old as of April 25, 2025, with an MD from NYU School of Medicine and a BA in Chemistry, magna cum laude, from Dartmouth College . His prior experience spans strategy roles in late-stage biopharma and investment banking covering capital-raising and strategic transactions, which aligns to CRMD’s financing and growth needs . Performance context: Company TSR rose to a value of $178.02 on a $100 initial investment in 2024 vs $82.64 in 2023, while net income remained negative at $(17.9) million in 2024 and $(46.3) million in 2023, framing pay outcomes versus shareholder returns and profitability .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ovid Therapeutics Inc. | Head of Strategy | Joined Oct 2018 | Led financing strategy and investor relations for late-stage rare neuro disorders portfolio |
| Frequency Therapeutics | Strategic Advisor | 2017–early 2019 | Advised on financing, IR and strategic initiatives |
| Bank of America Merrill Lynch; Piper Jaffray; Thomas Weisel Partners; Ferghana Partners | Investment banker (life sciences) | Various | Advised across capital-raising and strategic transactions in life sciences |
| Lehman Brothers | Equity research – Large Pharma | Earlier career | Fundamental research coverage of large pharma equities |
| Beth Israel Hospital | Surgical resident | Early career | Clinical training; foundational discipline |
External Roles
No public company board roles or external directorships disclosed for Matthew David .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 (post-Merger agreement) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $389,135 | $409,500 (effective Jan 2024) | $423,833 (Executive Employment Agreement dated Aug 31, 2025) |
| Target Bonus (%) | 40% of base | 40% of base | 45% of base |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $156,000 | $171,171 | Not disclosed |
Performance Compensation
Annual cash bonus framework and outcomes:
- Metric framework: “Specified Company objectives” with target set as a percentage of base (no detailed weighting or KPIs disclosed) .
- 2024 payout: $171,171 to David under the non-equity incentive plan, reflecting performance against company objectives .
- Equity awards granted in 2024 to David are time-based (options and RSUs), not performance-based; no PSUs were disclosed .
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Form | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash Bonus (2024) | Company objectives (not itemized) | Not disclosed | 40% of base | $171,171 | Cash | N/A |
| RSUs (granted 1/12/2024) | Time-based | N/A | 50,000 units | N/A | Shares | 25% on grant; 25% annually yrs 1–3 |
| Stock Options (granted 1/12/2024) | Time-based | N/A | 100,000 options | N/A | Options | 25% on grant; 25% annually yrs 1–3 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and outstanding awards:
- Hedging/pledging: CRMD prohibits hedging/short sales and strongly discourages pledging/margin; clawback policy adopted Dec 2023 for financial measure-based compensation (mandatory) and discretionary clawbacks for misconduct .
- Executive ownership guidelines: Only director stock ownership guidelines disclosed; no executive ownership guideline disclosure .
| Snapshot | Common Shares Owned | Options Exercisable | Options Unexercisable | RSUs Unvested (#) | RSUs Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outstanding Awards at 12/31/2024 | N/A | 122,667 @ $5.63 exp 5/11/2030; 122,667 @ $4.08 exp 5/11/2030; 40,000 @ $8.32 exp 1/10/2031; 125,000 @ $5.56 exp 10/31/2031; 75,000 @ $4.03 exp 2/17/2032; 62,500 @ $4.43 exp 1/14/2033; 25,000 @ $3.47 exp 1/12/2034 | 25,000 @ $4.03 exp 2/17/2032; 62,500 @ $4.43 exp 1/14/2033; 75,000 @ $3.47 exp 1/12/2034 | 37,500 (vesting 25% grant date; 25% yrs 1–3) | $303,750 (at $8.10 close) |
| Beneficial Ownership (4/25/2025) | 23,395 | 654,084 | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Beneficial Ownership (9/30/2025) | 27,066 | 545,984 | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Ownership as % of common shares outstanding: Less than 1% at both dates (starred in proxy tables) .
Notes:
- 2024 award vesting conventions: Options in the outstanding table generally vest over 4 years for legacy grants , while 2024 grants vest over 3 years with 25% at grant ; RSU schedules include legacy 50/30/20 and 25% at grant then annually .
- No pledges of shares disclosed; policy discourages pledging .
Employment Terms
Contract structure and severance/CIC economics:
- Original CFO agreement (May 11, 2020): Auto-renews annually; 2024 base $409,500; target bonus 40% of base . Severance upon termination without cause or for Good Reason: 9 months base salary, prorated bonus based on actual performance, subsidized COBRA up to 9 months, and 1 year additional time vesting (full vesting if termination within 24 months after a corporate transaction) . Non-compete: 12 months post-termination; scope is worldwide for David .
- Severance valuation if triggered at 12/31/2024: No corporate transaction: cash $478,296; COBRA $35,031; accelerated equity $433,438; total $946,765. Within 24 months post-corporate transaction: cash $478,296; COBRA $35,031; accelerated equity $982,125; total $1,495,452 .
- New Executive Employment Agreement (Aug 31, 2025, post-Melinta transaction): Base $423,833; target bonus 45% . Severance (without cause/Good Reason): 9 months base, prorated bonus, COBRA subsidy up to 9 months, acceleration of awards scheduled to vest within the next anniversary, and any unpaid prior-year bonus; release required; no mitigation offset except specific COBRA conditions . CIC within 24 months: 9 months base and full target bonus (paid over 9 months), prorated bonus, COBRA subsidy during salary/bonus continuation, and full acceleration of all unvested awards; release required .
- Clawback: Mandatory (financial reporting measures) adopted Dec 2023; discretionary clawback for misconduct .
- Tax gross-up: Not disclosed.
- Deferred compensation/Pension/SERP/Perquisites: Not disclosed; 2024 “All Other Compensation” comprises health benefit premiums and 401(k) match .
| Scenario (as disclosed) | Cash Severance | Bonus Treatment | COBRA | Equity Acceleration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination w/o Cause or for Good Reason (legacy terms, 2024) | 9 months base | Prorated annual bonus (actual performance) | Subsidized up to 9 months | One year time-vesting; full vesting if within 24 months post-corporate transaction |
| CIC within 24 months (legacy valuation at 12/31/2024) | $478,296 cash | Prorated bonus + accelerated value $982,125 equity | $35,031 | Full vesting |
| New 2025 Agreement – Termination w/o Cause/Good Reason | 9 months base | Prorated bonus; prior-year unpaid bonus paid | Subsidized during salary continuation | Awards scheduled within next anniversary vest; performance awards do not accelerate if unmet |
| New 2025 Agreement – CIC within 24 months | 9 months base + full target bonus (paid over 9 months) | Prorated bonus | Subsidized during salary/bonus continuation | All unvested awards fully vest |
| Non-compete | 12 months; worldwide for David | — | — | — |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: David’s annual bonus is tied to unspecified company objectives; 2024 equity grants are time-based rather than performance-based, reducing direct linkage to defined KPIs; however, clawback adoption strengthens governance on financial measure-based pay .
- Retention and termination economics: Severance and CIC terms provide meaningful downside protection and full acceleration upon CIC-related termination, which can incentivize continuity through transactions but may create overhang in potential exit scenarios; non-compete of 12 months mitigates near-term competitive risk on departure .
- Insider selling pressure: No Form 4 details were disclosed in proxies; beneficial ownership decreased from 677,479 (as of 4/25/2025) to 573,050 (as of 9/30/2025), primarily reflecting option balances rather than outright share sales; absence of Form 4 detail limits conclusions on selling pressure .
- Alignment and pledging risk: Company policy prohibits hedging/shorts and strongly discourages pledging, reducing misalignment/leveraging risks; no executive ownership guideline disclosure suggests less formalized skin-in-the-game expectations vs directors .
- Execution risk context: TSR improved materially in 2024 despite continuing net losses, indicating shareholder return momentum amid ongoing profitability challenges; finance leadership continuity through transaction integration (Melinta) and updated 2025 terms implies focus on strategic financing and integration milestones .
Key takeaways: • Bonus design remains opaque; equity awards largely time-based in 2024 → monitor any shift to PSUs or explicit financial/operational KPIs.
• CIC acceleration and nine-month cash/bonus bridge create potential dilution/overhang in change events but support executive retention through strategic transactions.
• Governance positives include clawback adoption and anti-hedging/pledging policy; lack of executive ownership guidelines is a neutral-to-minor gap.