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Gregory Scott Thomas

Executive Vice President, General Counsel at CIRRUS LOGICCIRRUS LOGIC
Executive

About Gregory Scott Thomas

Gregory Scott Thomas is Executive Vice President and General Counsel at Cirrus Logic, age 60, promoted to EVP in December 2024 after serving as SVP, General Counsel since December 2023; he has held progressively senior legal roles since joining in December 2000 . His FY2025 pay-for-performance exposure is anchored to semiannual cash bonuses linked to Operating Profit Margin and Revenue Growth (payouts: 139% in H1; 124% in H2) and to equity MSUs/PSUs tied to Relative TSR and Strategic Revenue, respectively . Company incentive targets included a 26% Operating Profit Margin for 100% cash bonus payout at ≤10% revenue growth . He is subject to strict clawback and insider trading policies, including prohibitions on hedging and pledging .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Cirrus LogicVP & Associate General Counsel, Intellectual Property2000–2003Established IP legal function following his hire in Dec 2000
Cirrus LogicVice President, General Counsel, Corporate Secretary2003–2017Led corporate legal and governance, Corporate Secretary responsibilities
Cirrus LogicSenior Vice President, General Counsel, Corporate SecretaryNov 2017–Dec 2023Senior legal leadership; corporate governance stewardship
Cirrus LogicSenior Vice President, General CounselDec 2023–Dec 2024Continued as top legal executive; transitioned Corporate Secretary role
Cirrus LogicExecutive Vice President, General CounselDec 2024–presentExpanded executive responsibility; member of executive leadership team

External Roles

  • No external public company directorships disclosed; Mr. Thomas is listed among executive officers, not directors, in the proxy .

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY2025FY2026 (set March 2025)
Base Salary$471,000 $485,130 (3.0% increase)
Target First-Half Cash Bonus$176,625 $181,924
Target Second-Half Cash Bonus$176,625 $181,924
Target Total Cash Compensation$824,250 $848,978
Base Salary Market PositionAbove 75th percentile (FY25) Between 50th and 75th percentiles (FY26)
Cash Bonus Outcomes (FY2025)H1 FY2025H2 FY2025FY2025 Total
Incentive Plan Pay-Out Percentage139% 124%
Operating Profit Margin (Non-GAAP)25% 28%
Revenue Growth15% -1%
Actual Semiannual Cash Bonus Paid$246,306 $218,937 $465,243
Summary Compensation (SCT)FY2023FY2024FY2025
Salary$433,700 $453,371 $471,000
Stock Awards (RSUs/MSUs/PSUs grant-date fair value)$616,727 $666,895 $1,400,094
Option Awards (grant-date fair value)$308,339 $333,337 $0
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation$549,277 $331,855 $465,243
All Other Compensation$15,105 $15,043 $16,783
Total$1,923,148 $1,800,501 $2,353,120

Performance Compensation

MetricTargetActual (FY2025 H1)Actual (FY2025 H2)Payout BasisVesting
Operating Profit Margin (Non-GAAP)26% (100% payout at ≤10% revenue growth) 25% 28% Operating Profit payout curve 0–200% N/A (cash)
Revenue GrowthMultiplier: 100% at ≤10%; rises linearly beyond 15% -1% Multiplies Operating Profit payout N/A (cash)
Incentive Plan Pay-Out %0–250% capped 139% 124% Product of OPM payout × Revenue multiplier N/A (cash)
MSUs (Relative TSR)0–200% payout; Russell 3000 comparator from Feb 2024 grants N/AN/ATSR vs index Per plan; performance-based equity
PSUs (Strategic Revenue)0–200% payout N/AN/AStrategic revenue progress Per plan; performance-based equity
FY2025 Grants (Thomas)Grant DateRSUs (#)MSUs (# at Threshold/Target/Max)PSUs (# at Threshold/Target/Max)Grant-Date Fair Values
Annual Equity Awards2/6/2025 (approved 2/4/2025) 4,470 666 / 2,665 / 5,330 2,235 / 4,470 / 8,940 RSUs $466,713; MSUs $466,668; PSUs $466,713
Target Annual Cash BonusFY2025$353,250
  • RSU vesting schedule: RSUs vest 100% on the third anniversary of grant (e.g., 2/6/2028 for FY2025 grant) .
  • Option vesting schedule: 4-year vesting; 25% at year 1 and remainder monthly or annually per grant; 10-year option term .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of 5/13/2025)Shares Beneficially Owned% of Shares OutstandingDirect SharesOptions Exercisable within 60 Days
Gregory S. Thomas76,150 <1% (asterisk in table) 26,307 49,843
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of 3/29/2025)TypeGrant DateUnvested Units (#)Market Value at $99.51
RSUs2/6/20233,012 $299,724
MSUs2/6/20234,338 (listed at maximum per plan disclosure) $431,674
RSUs2/8/20243,576 $355,848
MSUs2/8/20244,714 (listed at maximum per plan disclosure) $469,090
RSUs2/6/20254,470 $444,810
MSUs2/6/20255,330 (listed at maximum per plan disclosure) $530,388
PSUs2/6/20258,940 (listed at maximum per plan disclosure) $889,619
Stock Options (as of 3/29/2025)Exercisable (#)Unexercisable (#)Exercise PriceExpiration Date
734$31.2511/4/2025
3,239$54.6511/2/2026
1,794$55.7211/1/2027
13,500$41.4911/7/2028
11,400$68.5611/6/2029
7,706$78.003/3/2031
5,2811,761$88.003/2/2032
3,5053,504$102.372/6/2033
2,0976,289$93.242/8/2034
  • Stock ownership guidelines: Executive officers must hold the lesser of 1x annual salary or 10,000 shares; phase-in period five years. All subject executives with completed phase-in met requirements as of 3/29/2025 .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for directors, officers, employees, and consultants under Insider Trading and Confidentiality Policy .
  • FY2025 realized equity: Thomas exercised 11,706 options ($760,944 value) and vested 7,110 shares ($740,933 value) in FY2025, indicating potential liquidity events .

Employment Terms

  • Executive Severance and Change of Control Plan (amended and restated Aug 24, 2023): double-trigger design; no individual employment agreements for NEOs (except CFO offer letter provisions) .
  • Involuntary termination without cause (no CIC): up to 6 months base salary continuation and 6 months COBRA; CEO eligible for 12 months .
  • Qualifying termination within 12 months post-CIC (double-trigger): lump sum 12 months base salary; 100% annual target bonus plus prorated current-period target bonus; full acceleration of unvested equity; 12 months COBRA; 6-month post-termination option exercise (subject to option terms) .
Estimated CIC Benefits (assuming termination on 3/29/2025)Lump Sum SalaryAccelerated Unvested EquityHealth BenefitsCash Bonus (Target + Prorate)Total
Gregory S. Thomas$471,000 $2,320,469 $27,201 $529,875 $3,348,545
  • Clawback: Recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation policy effective Oct 2, 2023 (Nasdaq-compliant); prior 2018 recoupment policy; Severance Plan includes recoupment upon subsequently discovered “Cause” with interest .
  • 280G treatment: Modified cutback to optimize after-tax benefits; no excise tax gross-ups .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix shift: Thomas’s option awards declined to $0 in FY2025 from $333,337 in FY2024 and $308,339 in FY2023, indicating emphasis on full-value equity (RSUs/MSUs/PSUs) vs. options .
  • Target total direct compensation positioning (FY2025): between 25th–50th percentile for Thomas; committee aimed for internal pay equity around the 50th percentile for NEOs .
  • Responsible grant timing: Annual executive equity grants occur after Q3 earnings release on the second business day, reducing MNPI timing risks .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong linkage of cash bonuses to Operating Profit Margin and revenue growth, and equity to Relative TSR and Strategic Revenue, supports pay-for-performance and shareholder alignment; hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment risks .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Significant unvested RSU/MSU/PSU balances and scheduled RSU vesting in 2026–2028 provide retention hooks; FY2025 option exercise and stock vesting realized ~$1.5M gross value, indicating periodic liquidity that could create modest selling pressure around vest dates .
  • Change-of-control economics: CIC protection of ~$3.35M for Thomas with full equity acceleration and bonus payouts is meaningful but not excessive; double-trigger design and 280G cutback are shareholder-friendly relative to gross-ups or single-trigger vesting .
  • Execution risk: Legal and governance continuity from Thomas’s 25-year tenure lowers transition risk in corporate governance; shift away from options to RSUs/PSUs/MSUs reduces risk-taking incentives while maintaining long-term performance focus .