Sign in

You're signed outSign in or to get full access.

Rasmani Bhattacharya

Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer at CSG SYSTEMS INTERNATIONALCSG SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL
Executive

About Rasmani Bhattacharya

Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer at CSG, age 56, leading legal, compliance, and procurement; joined CSG in January 2022 after serving as EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary at Gates Corporation and starting her career as a corporate lawyer at Vinson & Elkins LLP. She holds a BA in Economics and Foreign Affairs and a JD, both from the University of Virginia . Company-level performance over her tenure: revenue rose from $1,169.3M in 2023 to $1,197.2M in 2024 (+2.4% YoY), while Company TSR values were 117.44 (2022), 111.64 (2023) and 110.00 (2024) based on a $100 initial investment; GAAP net income was $66.3M (2023) and $86.9M (2024) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
CSGEVP & Chief Legal Officer2022–presentLeads legal, compliance, and procurement; experience negotiating complex, multi‑jurisdictional transactions .
Gates CorporationEVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary2015–2017Led global legal, M&A, IP, regulatory, compliance, insurance, and environmental matters .
Vinson & Elkins LLPCorporate LawyerNot disclosedEarly career in Houston office; complex transactional legal foundation .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Target Bonus %Actual Bonus Paid ($)
2024440,000 75% 198,990
2023425,000 75% 364,013

Additional 2024 “All Other Compensation” details: 401(k) contributions $18,975, accrued dividends on unvested equity $50,702, perquisites $343; total “All Other Compensation” $70,020 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Performance Bonus (2024)

ComponentTarget/DefinitionActual (2024)Payout Impact
Company Performance Percentage Achieved100% at target; formula links base salary × target bonus × achieved company % 60.3% Reduces payout vs target
People & Culture ModifierCompany-level modifier in formula 0.0% No incremental impact
Individual Performance Percentage AchievedCapped at 100% 100% Full individual component achieved
Total Annual Bonus EarnedDollar payout$198,990 Result of formula inputs above

Equity LTI Structure (2024 grants)

Award TypeGrant DateTarget Shares (#)Maximum Shares (#)VestingPerformance Metric
Two‑Year performance‑based LTIMar 10, 202411,349 22,698 Earned at end of two‑year period; payout 0%–200% depending on performance Non‑GAAP EPS, Total Revenue, Avg annual YoY organic revenue growth; targets set but not publicly disclosed; capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative
Three‑Year rTSR LTIMar 10, 20243,783 7,566 Earned at end of three‑year period (ending Dec 31, 2026); 0%–200% based on rTSR vs Russell 2000; payout capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative Relative TSR vs Russell 2000
Time‑based RSUMar 10, 202410,088 N/AVests in three equal annual installments starting first anniversary of grant Retention-focused, full‑value award

Outstanding Equity Awards at Fiscal Year‑End (values at $51.11/share)

Grant DateTypeNot Vested (#)Market Value ($)Unearned PSUs/TSR (#)Market/Payout Value ($)
Mar 10, 2022Time‑based RSU1,715 87,654
Mar 10, 2022TSR PSU1,714 87,603
Oct 10, 2022Time‑based RSU612 31,279
Oct 10, 2022TSR PSU1,374 70,225
Mar 10, 2023Time‑based RSU3,908 199,738
Mar 10, 2023Two‑Year PSU13,192 674,243
Mar 10, 2023TSR PSU4,396 224,680
Mar 10, 2024Time‑based RSU10,088 515,598
Mar 10, 2024Two‑Year PSU22,698 1,160,095
Mar 10, 2024TSR PSU7,566 386,698

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemValue
Total beneficial ownership (Feb 28, 2025)45,075 shares; <1% of outstanding (28,773,311 shares outstanding)
Restricted shares not vested (Feb 28, 2025)33,653
Ownership guidelinesExecutive Vice Presidents: 3× base salary minimum; measured via 20‑day trailing average
Compliance statusAll non‑employee directors, CEO, and EVPs are in compliance (subject to grace periods and transfer limitations)
Hedging/pledgingProhibited under company policy

Employment Terms

Executive Severance Plan – Cash/Equity/Benefits (as of Dec 31, 2024)

  • Multiples and triggers:
    • Qualifying termination unrelated to change in control: 1× base salary + 100% of target bonus; pro‑rated actual bonus if terminated after June 1; pro‑rated vesting of unvested time‑based equity; pro‑rated performance equity remains eligible post‑period based on actual performance; 18 months of COBRA .
    • After change in control within 18 months (double‑trigger): 2× base salary + 2× target bonus; pro‑rated target annual bonus; full acceleration of time‑based equity; performance-based equity accelerates at target; 18 months COBRA; subject to Sections 280G/4999 limitations .
    • “Cause” includes breaches of restrictive covenants (confidentiality, non‑compete, non‑solicit), misconduct, felony, materially inaccurate certifications, etc. .
    • No single‑trigger change‑in‑control vesting of equity awards; no income tax gross‑ups .

Estimated Benefits – Qualifying Termination Unrelated to Change in Control

ComponentAmount
Cash amount (1× base + 100% target bonus)$770,000
Pro‑rata annual performance bonus$330,000
Pro‑rata acceleration of time‑based restricted stock$484,881
Pro‑rata acceleration of performance/market‑based LTI$781,421
COBRA (18 months)$16,024
Total$2,382,325

Estimated Benefits – Qualifying Termination After Change in Control (within 18 months)

ComponentAmount
Cash amount (2× base + 2× target bonus)$1,540,000
Pro‑rata annual performance bonus$330,000
Acceleration of time‑based restricted stock$834,269
Acceleration of performance‑based LTI (at target)$1,301,772
COBRA (18 months)$16,024
Total$4,022,064

Clawback policy (Nov 2023): permits recoupment of incentive‑based compensation (cash, time‑based stock, performance‑based stock) in case of a material restatement due to noncompliance with financial reporting requirements; applies to current and former executive officers and severance‑paid incentive compensation .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Year‑over‑year mix: Salary increased from $425,000 (2023) to $440,000 (2024) ; stock awards rose from $781,536 (2023) to $1,351,842 (2024), while non‑equity bonus fell from $364,013 (2023) to $198,990 (2024), reflecting lower company performance percentage (60.3%) .
  • Program design emphasizes at‑risk, performance‑based equity (two‑year financial PSUs and three‑year rTSR PSUs) plus time‑based RSUs for retention; no stock option repricing and no single‑trigger CiC vesting .
  • Bonus formula combines company performance, People & Culture modifier, and individual performance; all NEOs were assigned 100% individual performance in 2024, but People & Culture modifier was 0% and company performance was 60.3% .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval: 97.5% .
  • Governance practices include meaningful share ownership, clawbacks, prohibition of hedging/pledging, no tax gross‑ups, no single‑trigger CiC vesting, and independent compensation consultant engagement .

Employment & Tenure

  • Start date at CSG: January 2022; current role EVP & Chief Legal Officer .
  • Responsibilities: leads legal, compliance, and procurement; deep expertise in complex, multi‑jurisdictional transactions (JVs, restructurings, strategic partnerships) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong due to 3× salary ownership requirement (in compliance), multi‑year PSUs tied to Non‑GAAP EPS, revenue, organic growth, and rTSR; hedging/pledging prohibited—reduces misalignment risk .
  • Retention risk: Moderate—significant unvested RSUs/PSUs outstanding and standard severance protection; double‑trigger CiC benefits could be sizable if termination occurs within 18 months post‑deal .
  • Near‑term flow/overhang: Time‑based RSUs vest annually in three tranches beginning one year after grant; monitor vest dates (e.g., 2024 grant on Mar 10, 2024) for potential selling pressure; note accrued dividends on unvested equity indicate ongoing sizable restricted holdings .
  • Event‑driven watch: CSG announced a transaction for NEC to acquire CSG (Oct 29, 2025); if the acquisition closes, CiC provisions imply accelerated vesting at target for performance equity and enhanced cash severance upon qualifying termination—material for executive incentives and share overhang [18] [16] .
  • Program quality: High say‑on‑pay support (97.5%) and governance features (clawbacks, no gross‑ups, no single‑trigger) suggest shareholder‑friendly design; pay outcomes in 2024 show sensitivity to company performance (60.3% achieved), indicating real at‑risk pay .