
Christopher P. Marr
About Christopher P. Marr
Christopher P. Marr is CubeSmart’s President, Chief Executive Officer, and a Trustee. Under his leadership, 2024 FFO per share (as adjusted) was $2.63, while CubeSmart delivered a five-year cumulative TSR value of $165.28 on a $100 investment versus $117.56 for its REIT peer index, indicating multi‑year outperformance on a shareholder value basis . Strategically, Marr emphasized disciplined external growth, balance sheet flexibility (net debt/EBITDA of ~4.1x at year‑end 2024), and a 15th consecutive annual dividend increase, while signaling cautious 2025 expectations amid normalizing storage fundamentals .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 850,000 | 884,000 | 920,000 |
| YoY Salary Increase | — | — | 4.1% |
| 2024 CEO Total Compensation Mix | Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Salary | 920,000 | 2024 base |
| Share Awards (RSUs/PSUs, grant-date fair value) | 3,333,348 | 2024 grants |
| Option Awards (grant-date fair value) | 1,666,662 | 2024 grants |
| Annual Incentive (Cash) | 1,793,218 | 2024 actual payout |
| All Other Compensation | 288,181 | 401(k) match, deferred comp match, vehicle, dividends on unvested RS, LTD insurance |
| Total | 8,001,409 | 2024 SCT total |
| 2025 vs 2024 Target Levels | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 920,000 | 920,000 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Salary) | 175% | 175% |
| Long-Term Incentive Target ($) | 5,000,000 | 5,520,000 |
Performance Compensation
- Annual incentive structure (2024): 70% financial, 20% strategic/external growth, 10% individual goals. Marr’s individual goals paid at 100% of target; his overall annual incentive paid at 195% of salary ($1,793,218) .
| Annual Incentive (2024) | Target | Actual |
|---|---|---|
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 175% | — |
| Payout (% of Salary) | 100% at target | 195% |
| Paid ($) | 1,610,000 (target) | 1,793,218 (actual) |
- Long-term incentives (LTI) design: 1/3 PSUs (relative TSR), 1/3 time‑vested restricted shares, 1/3 stock options (10‑year term; strike = grant‑date close). RS/options vest ratably over 3 years; PSUs cliff‑vest at 3 years based on relative TSR (0–200% payout) .
| 2024 LTI Grants (Granted 1/1/2024) | Units | Grant-Date Fair Value / Pricing |
|---|---|---|
| Restricted Shares | 35,958 | $46.35 per share |
| PSUs (Target) | 25,606 | $65.09 per unit (Monte Carlo) |
| Stock Options | 179,211 | $46.35 strike; $9.30 fair value (Black-Scholes) |
| Share Awards (Fair Value) | — | $3,333,348 (SCT) |
| Options (Fair Value) | — | $1,666,662 (SCT) |
- PSU performance (2012-24 cohort): 2022 PSUs paid at 134.2% of target on relative TSR; Marr earned 22,038 shares vs 16,424 target (plus 2,812 dividend‑equivalent shares) .
| 2022 PSU Cycle (earned 12/31/2024) | Target | Earned |
|---|---|---|
| Marr PSUs | 16,424 | 22,038 |
| Earned % of Target | — | 134.2% |
- Most important performance measures linking pay: FFO per share (as adjusted), same‑store revenue growth, same‑store expense growth, and TSR vs peers .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Beneficial Ownership (as of 3/21/2025) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Common Shares | 1,388,687 (under “Common Shares”) |
| Options Exercisable or within 60 days | 838,124 |
| Options Outstanding (since plan inception, outstanding as of 3/21/2025) | 1,766,699 |
| Percent of Class | <1% (asterisk in table) |
- Vested/exercised activity (2024): shares vested 96,443 ($4,470,133 realized); options exercised 74,906 ($1,764,506 realized) .
- Ownership guidelines: CEO must hold ≥5x salary; Board review in Feb 2024 determined NEOs with requisite service met or exceeded guidelines .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for NEOs, Trustees, and senior employees .
- Deferred compensation: Company 2024 match of $122,247 on salary/bonus deferrals; Marr’s aggregate balances at 12/31/2024 were $10,779,685 (salary/bonus deferrals) and $20,859,980 (equity deferrals) .
| Deferred Compensation (Marr, 2024) | Company Match ($) | Aggregate Balance 12/31/2024 ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Salary/Bonus Deferrals | 122,247 | 10,779,685 |
| Equity Award Deferrals | — | 20,859,980 |
Employment Terms
- Severance plan (non‑CIC): If terminated without cause or for good reason outside the change‑in‑control (CIC) window, Marr receives 2x (salary + average/target bonus) paid over 24 months; pro‑rata annual bonus based on actual results; continued vesting of time‑based awards and pro‑rata PSU vesting based on actual performance; 24 months health benefits (gross‑up only for taxes on health continuation), and other customary accrued items .
- CIC severance (double‑trigger within 3 months before to 2 years after a CIC): Marr receives 3x (greater of salary at termination/CIC and average/target bonus), paid lump sum; pro‑rata annual bonus (greater of actual or target); 24 months vehicle allowance; continued/accelerated equity per plan terms. 280G cutback applies; no excise tax gross‑ups .
- Equity treatment at CIC (single‑trigger for equity): Time‑based equity vests in full; performance‑based equity vests at greater of target or actual; awards subject to net‑exercise or assumption by acquirer .
- Retirement vesting: Upon retirement at ≥60 years old with ≥10 years of service (six months’ notice and 24‑month restrictive covenant), equity continues to vest; Marr had met the age/service criteria as of 12/31/2024 .
- Clawback policy: Dodd‑Frank compliant recovery of incentive compensation for 3 years prior to a required restatement; applies regardless of fault .
| Estimated Payouts (as of 12/31/2024) | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Termination between 3 months prior to and 2 years after a CIC | 17,721,441 |
| Termination outside CIC window (before 3 months prior or >2 years after) | 13,660,646 |
| Death or Disability | 9,399,069 |
| Change in Control (equity vesting only, no termination) | 7,535,082 |
Board Governance and Service
- Role and independence: Marr serves as Trustee and as President & CEO; he is not independent due to his executive role .
- Independent Board leadership: Since May 2022, Deborah R. Salzberg serves as Independent Chair; all Board committees (Audit, Compensation, Corporate Governance & Nominating) comprise only independent Trustees, which helps mitigate dual‑role concerns associated with a CEO‑Trustee .
- Attendance: In 2024, the Board held seven meetings; each Trustee attended at least 75% of their Board and committee meetings .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval: 94% of votes cast; three‑year average: 93% .
Compensation Peer Group
| Peer Group (used for 2024 program) | 2025 Changes |
|---|---|
| American Homes 4 Rent; Apartment Income REIT; Apple Hospitality REIT; Brandywine Realty Trust; Brixmor Property Group; Camden Property Trust; Choice Hotels International; COPT Defense Properties; Equity LifeStyle Properties; Extra Space Storage; Federal Realty Investment Trust; Highwoods Properties; Mid‑America Apartment Communities; SBA Communications; Sun Communities; Tanger Inc.; UDR; VICI Properties | 2025 peer group added Americold Realty Trust, National Storage Affiliates, Public Storage; removed Apple Hospitality REIT, Brandywine Realty Trust, SBA Communications, VICI Properties (reflecting market cap and asset structure considerations) . |
Performance & Track Record (context for incentives)
- Operations and outlook: Same‑store revenue trough likely in 4Q24 (‑1.6% YoY). As of late Feb 2025, same‑store occupancy gap narrowed to ‑50 bps YoY (occupancy 89.5%), with improving new move‑in rate gaps (from about ‑10.3% in Nov to ~‑7.4% in late Feb), but management remains prudently cautious for 2025 given macro and housing uncertainty .
- Balance sheet and external growth: Net debt/EBITDA ~4.1x; 2% dividend increase; creative external growth including DFW recap and a 2025 post‑year‑end buyout of an unconsolidated JV (HVP IV) for ~$452.8M consideration, targeting mid‑to‑high‑5% 2025 yield; ATM equity raised in 2024 at ~$51/share to pre‑fund .
- Guidance framing (2025): Same‑store NOI midpoint down ~3%; FFO/share guidance $2.50–$2.59 reflecting normalization and interest expense headwinds, partly offset by accretive external growth .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix and leverage: Approximately 85% of CEO pay was incentive‑based in 2024 (vs 73% for other NEOs), with PSU outcomes linked to relative TSR and annual incentives tied primarily to financial performance, aligning pay with shareholder results .
- No repricing or cash‑out of options without shareholder approval; equity award policy sets strike at grant‑date close and pre‑approves timing protocols, reducing governance risk around awards .
- Clawback, no 280G gross‑ups, hedging/pledging prohibitions, and stringent ownership guidelines (CEO ≥5x salary) reinforce alignment and downside governance protections .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging/Hedging: Prohibited (mitigates a key red flag) .
- Option repricing: Prohibited without shareholder approval .
- Excise tax gross‑up: None; 280G cutback applies .
- Equity acceleration: Single‑trigger equity vesting at CIC (mitigates retention risk concerns for acquirers but can create overhang); severance multiples require termination (double‑trigger) .
- Retirement eligibility: Marr qualifies for continued vesting on retirement (≥60 years and ≥10 years service), which modestly elevates long‑term retention risk despite restrictive covenants .
- Say‑on‑pay support: Strong (94%), indicating low external governance risk from shareholder base .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Large direct shareholdings, significant at‑risk pay, PSU focus on relative TSR, no pledging/hedging, and robust ownership guidelines support strong alignment with shareholder outcomes .
- Retention/supply overhang: Retirement eligibility and sizable exercisable options (838k within 60 days; 1.77M outstanding) could add episodic selling pressure but are tempered by continued‑vesting rules and policy safeguards .
- Execution: Marr’s messaging is disciplined—prioritizing expense control, patient external growth, and balance sheet flexibility as fundamentals normalize; 2025 guidance prudence suggests limited near‑term upside surprise from operations but supports durable long‑term value creation .
Bottom line: Governance structure (independent chair, all‑independent committees), strong shareholder support, and incentive architecture tied to TSR and FFO per share (as adjusted) position Marr as a well‑aligned steward for long‑term holders. Near‑term trading signals skew neutral given normalization headwinds and cautious guidance; watch for incremental PSU trajectory, insider option exercises, and external growth IRRs for catalysts .
Appendix: Pay vs Performance Snapshot
| Year | Company TSR Value of $100 | Peer Group TSR Value of $100 | FFO/Share (as adjusted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | $111.67 | $94.88 | $1.72 |
| 2021 | $194.96 | $134.06 | $2.11 |
| 2022 | $143.66 | $100.62 | $2.53 |
| 2023 | $173.12 | $112.04 | $2.68 |
| 2024 | $165.28 | $117.56 | $2.63 |