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David Harvey

Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer at CVB FINANCIALCVB FINANCIAL
Executive

About David Harvey

David C. Harvey is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Citizens Business Bank (CVB Financial Corp.’s principal subsidiary). He was appointed EVP & COO on February 23, 2022 (after serving as EVP & Chief Operations Officer since December 31, 2009), and is 57 years old . Prior roles include EVP, Commercial & Treasury Services Manager (2008–2009) and SVP, Operations Manager (2000–2008) at Bank of the West . Under CVBF’s multi‑metric incentive design, 2024 shareholder returns were 12% over one year, and 4% over three and five years; the company earned $200.7 million net income in 2024 and reported top‑quartile performance vs. peers on several banking KPIs, framing Mr. Harvey’s pay‑for‑performance context .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Citizens Business Bank (CVB Financial)EVP & Chief Operating Officer2022–Present Leads operations and technology execution; recognized for advancing technology projects, enhancing customer service platform, and executing four sale‑leasebacks to streamline the real estate footprint .
Citizens Business Bank (CVB Financial)EVP & Chief Operations Officer2009–2020+ (title later updated to COO) Long‑tenured operator overseeing core bank operations and systems integration .
Bank of the WestEVP, Commercial & Treasury Services Manager2008–2009 Led commercial/treasury services in a large regional bank environment .
Bank of the WestSVP, Operations Manager2000–2008 Managed large‑scale operations and process efficiency .

Fixed Compensation

Multi‑year NEO compensation (Harvey):

Metric (USD)202220232024
Base Salary$508,077 $529,310 $545,464
Plan‑based Discretionary Bonus (cash)$91,800 $196,000 $109,200
Stock Awards (Grant‑date Fair Value)$516,810 $499,994 $520,014
Metrics‑based Non‑Equity Incentive (cash)$265,200 $53,000 $120,120
All Other Compensation$60,054 $61,254 $67,172
Total Compensation$1,441,941 $1,339,559 $1,361,971

Key plan ranges (ECP Plan): metrics‑based incentive opportunity 0%–60% of base salary; separate plan‑based discretionary bonus opportunity 0%–20% of base salary .

Performance Compensation

Harvey’s 2024 incentive design (weighting within the metrics‑based portion) and outcomes:

MetricWeighting (% of incentive)Level 1 (Threshold)Level 2 (Target)Level 3 (Max)2024 ActualPayout LevelHarvey Payout (% of Salary)
Net Profit After Tax (CVBF)50% $185,000k $205,000k $225,000k $200,716k Level 1 10%
Average Demand Deposits10% $6,900,000k $7,150,000k $7,400,000k $7,144,000k Level 1 2%
Average Total Loans (Net)10% $8,750,000k $8,900,000k $9,050,000k $8,694,000k Not Met 0%
Noninterest Income10% $50,000k $53,000k $56,000k $56,800k Level 3 6%
Noninterest (Operating) Expenses20% $240,000k $232,000k $224,000k $233,600k Level 1 4%
Total metrics‑based incentive22%

Additional plan‑based discretionary bonus: 20% of base salary ($109,200) recognizing leadership across product development, tech programs, customer service, and four property sale‑leasebacks/footprint optimization . Combined 2024 incentive + discretionary payout: $229,320 = 42% of base salary (vs. 47% in 2023, which included a supplemental discretionary bonus) .

Equity grants in 2024:

  • Time‑vested RSUs: 13,699 units granted 1/24/2024 (GDFV $260,007) .
  • PRSUs (3‑yr performance): threshold 10,274; target 13,699; max 17,124 (GDFV $260,007) .
  • Total 2024 stock awards (SCT): $520,014 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 124,612 shares (≈0.1% of outstanding) as of March 28, 2025 record date .
  • Hedging/pledging/10b5‑1 plans: CVBF prohibits hedging and pledging by restricted persons absent pre‑clearance; as of the proxy date, there were no known 10b5‑1 plans in effect for directors or Section 16 officers and no known hedged or pledged positions .

Outstanding equity and vesting schedule (as of 12/31/2024; close $21.41):

Award TypeUnvested/Unearned UnitsMarket ValueVesting Terms
Time RSUs (Grant 1/24/2024)13,699 $293,296 1/3 each on Jan 24, 2025/2026/2027 (2)
Time RSUs (prior grant)6,893 $147,579 1/2 each on Jan 25, 2025 and Jan 25, 2026 (3)
Time RSUs (prior grant)3,834 $110,668 Vests Jan 26, 2025 (4)
PRSUs (cycle ending 2027)13,699 (target) $293,296 Scheduled to vest Jan 24, 2027; performance‑based (5)
PRSUs (cycle ending 2026)10,339 (max reflected) $221,358 Scheduled to vest Jan 25, 2026; performance‑based (6)
PRSUs (cycle ending 2025)14,375 (max; vesting achieved) $307,769 Vested Jan 26, 2025 at maximum based on 2022–2024 performance (7)

Vesting cadence implies potential selling windows around late January 2025–2027, subject to blackout policies and individual elections .

Employment Terms

  • Agreement: 2024 Named Executive Officer Employment Agreement effective July 2, 2024; two‑year term through June 30, 2026, auto‑renewing annually unless notice given ≥6 months prior .
  • Base salary/annual review: Salary set and adjusted at CEO/Compensation Committee discretion .
  • Annual incentives: ECP Plan eligibility with 0%–60% metrics‑based and 0%–20% discretionary cash bonus ranges, paid post‑year subject to continued employment through year‑end .
  • Long‑term equity: Annual RSUs/PRSUs/options targeted at ≈100% of prior‑year base salary (not guaranteed), with PRSUs on three‑year cycles .
  • Change‑in‑control (double‑trigger within 180 days before or 12 months after): Cash severance equal to 2x base salary + 2x average prior two years’ bonuses + lump sum equal to 24 months COBRA cost grossed up for payroll taxes; paid in equal installments over 18 months; equity acceleration (time‑vested awards vest; PRSUs vest at target if <2 years elapsed, or on actual/partial performance if ≥2 years) .
  • Without cause (non‑CIC): Committee may, at its discretion, consider severance on a case‑by‑case basis (no guaranteed formula) .
  • Death or disability: Immediate vesting of RSUs/PRSUs (PRSUs at target if performance period not ended) .
  • Restrictive covenants: Confidentiality; one‑year non‑solicitation of customers and employees; arbitration; California law governance; Section 409A/280G best‑net cutback applied (no golden parachute tax gross‑ups) .
  • Clawback: Company‑wide Compensation Recoupment Policy (SEC/Nasdaq compliant) covers incentive‑based pay (including PRSUs) upon restatement, regardless of fault; the agreement separately acknowledges compliance with applicable recoupment requirements .

Potential payment values (December 31, 2024 illustrations):

  • CIC termination (Harvey): Cash severance $1,632,866; equity acceleration $1,400,722; total $3,033,588 .
  • Death/disability equity acceleration value: $1,283,829 .

Say‑on‑Pay & Governance Signals

  • 2024 say‑on‑pay support: ~91.75% approval, indicating broad investor backing of the compensation program .
  • Compensation risk controls include balanced metrics, deferrals via equity, clawback, insider trading/hedging/pledging restrictions, and oversight by Compensation Committee with independent consultant Pearl Meyer .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Harvey’s cash incentive (22% of salary) and equity mix (annual 50% PRSUs/50% RSUs; multi‑year PRSU cycles) align pay with profitability, expense control, deposit growth, and noninterest income outcomes; discretionary bonus (20% of salary) rewarded execution on tech, customer experience, and real‑estate optimization .
  • Retention vs. optionality: The 2024 NEO agreements add CIC protection (2x salary+bonus and equity acceleration), while retaining discretion for non‑CIC severance—supporting retention through change while limiting guaranteed severance in normal conditions .
  • Trading/overhang: Annual January vesting (time RSUs and PRSUs) creates repeatable windows for potential insider selling pressure; however, no 10b5‑1 plans or pledging by Section 16 officers were reported as of the proxy, and blackout policies apply .
  • Governance risk: No tax gross‑ups, robust clawback, and high say‑on‑pay support suggest low compensation‑governance risk; performance targets were moderated for 2024 macro headwinds but still resulted in below‑target outcomes for several metrics, constraining payouts—consistent with pay‑for‑performance .