Collin Gerry
About Collin Gerry
E. Collin Gerry, 43, is Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Civeo, appointed effective August 1, 2024. He has been with Civeo since May 2014, previously serving as SVP, Canadian Operations (May 2020–July 2024) and VP, Corporate & Business Development (Sep 2016–May 2020). He holds a Bachelor of Business Administration from The University of Texas at Austin . In 2024, Civeo delivered $84 million in operating cash flow, reduced total debt by $22 million, returned $44 million (64% of 2024 free cash flow) to shareholders, and ended with net leverage of 0.5x; pay-versus-performance shows the company TSR index at 156 vs peer group 102, and adjusted EBITDA of ~$79.9 million .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Civeo | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer | Aug 2024–present | Oversees finance, treasury, and capital allocation; appointed after serving as Interim CFO support from CAO . |
| Civeo | Senior Vice President, Canadian Operations | May 2020–Jul 2024 | Led Canadian operations, safety and financial execution . |
| Civeo | Vice President, Corporate & Business Development | Sep 2016–May 2020 | Corporate and business development leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raymond James | Senior Vice President, Equity Research (energy, OFS coverage, including Civeo’s prior parent Oil States International) | Not disclosed | Sell-side research expertise; industry coverage aligned with Civeo end-markets . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $380,000 (as of Dec 31, 2024) ; confirmed at appointment | |
| AICP Target (% of base) | 60% | |
| AICP Target ($) | $228,000 | |
| AICP Actual Payout ($) | $119,368 (58% of target) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Compensation Plan (AICP) – 2024
AICP metrics and outcomes are split between financial (AICP EBITDA at consolidated/division levels) and safety (TRIR). Maximum payout is capped at 200% of target; thresholds generally at ~85% of objectives .
| Metric | Target | Actual | Payout ($) | Payout (% of Target) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial (AICP EBITDA) | $228,000 (aggregate AICP target) | Company: 91.5% of budget; Canada: 74.6%; Australia: 113.8% | $47,177 | 58% total across financial+safety | |
| Safety (TRIR) | Included in AICP | Consolidated: 200% payout; Canada: 187%; Australia: 200% | $72,191 | Included in 58% total | |
| Total AICP | $228,000 | — | $119,368 | 58% | CFO payout approved by Comp Committee |
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024 Grants and Structure
2024 NEO LTIP mix: 60% cliff-vested Performance Share Awards (PSUs) and 40% time-based phantom share units (RSUs-equivalent). Time-based awards vest 1/3 annually over three years; performance awards vest on third anniversary, subject to performance goals. No stock options issued; company has not issued options since 2014 .
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares/Target (#) | Grant-Date Price ($) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (PSUs) | 3/2/2024 | 7,138 | $23.44 | $172,511 | Cliff vest 3/2/2027 | Relative TSR and 3-year EBITDA growth |
| Phantom Units | 3/2/2024 | 13,256 | $23.44 | $310,721 | 1/3 on 3/2/2025, 3/2/2026, 3/2/2027 | Time-based |
| Phantom Units (promotion grant) | 6/10/2024 | 3,821 | $24.34 | $93,003 | 1/3 on 3/2/2025, 3/2/2026, 3/2/2027 | Time-based |
| 2024 LTIP Total Valuation | — | — | — | $576,235 | — | Mix 60% PSUs / 40% phantom units |
Stock vested in 2024 for Gerry: 19,253 shares; value realized $432,430 (pre-tax) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (SEC definition) as of March 17, 2025: 2,132 common shares; percentage “<1%” of outstanding (13,549,417 shares) . Calculated ownership ≈ 0.016% (2,132 / 13,549,417), derived from disclosed share counts .
- Executive share ownership guidelines: executives must attain holdings based on a multiple of salary; must hold at least 50% of net vested shares for 12 months post-vesting. As of March 17, 2025, Gerry’s target ownership is 28,755 shares; current holdings 31,811; compliant .
- Outstanding awards (12/31/2024): no options outstanding; phantom units and PSUs only .
- Time-based phantom units unvested (and market value at $22.72/share): 4,981 ($113,168); 7,402 ($168,173); 13,256 ($301,176); 3,821 ($86,813) .
- Performance awards (unearned) and market/payout value at target: 4,982 ($113,191); 3,701 ($84,087); 7,138 ($162,175) .
- Footnotes: 2022 phantom units vesting 33.33% annually on 2/25/2023, 2/25/2024, 2/25/2025 (fully vested in 2025); 2023 PSUs vest 2/23/2026 (TSR and cumulative operating cash flow); 2024 PSUs vest 3/2/2027 (TSR and 3-year EBITDA growth); 6/10/2024 phantom vests 3/2/2025–2027 .
- Hedging/pledging: prohibited for officers/directors; also prohibits short sales, options/derivatives, and pledging/margining shares. Pre-clearance required for trades; 50% net-vested holding period policy .
Employment Terms
- Executive Agreements: U.S. executives employed at will; protection on qualified termination events. Double-trigger required for change-of-control payouts (CoC + qualifying termination). Protection period: 18 months for Gerry (24 months for CEO) .
- Severance multiples:
- Outside CoC protection period: lump sum equal to one year’s base salary + target annual bonus .
- During CoC protection period: lump sum equal to 1.5x base salary + target annual incentive for Gerry .
- Quantification of payments (as of 12/31/2024 scenario analysis; share price $22.72):
- Not-for-Cause (NFC) termination: Cash severance $608,000; accelerated stock awards $439,465; health & welfare benefits $42,623; total $1,090,088 .
- CoC qualified termination (CIC): Cash severance $912,000; accelerated stock awards $1,028,784; health & welfare benefits $63,934; outplacement $57,000; total $2,061,718 .
- Death/Disability/Retirement (DDR): Accelerated stock awards $1,028,784; total $1,028,784 .
- Clawback policy: recovery of incentive-based compensation in event of accounting restatement per Rule 10D-1 and NYSE listing standards .
- Excise tax gross-ups: company policy prohibits gross-ups in agreements entered after the 2014 spin-off .
Performance Compensation Details
| Program | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Mechanics | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AICP | Financial (AICP EBITDA) and Safety (TRIR) | Not disclosed | $228,000 | $119,368 total; split $47,177 financial, $72,191 safety | Thresholds generally ~85%; max 200% of target | Annual cash |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Relative TSR; 3-year EBITDA growth | PSUs 60% of LTIP mix | 7,138 target shares | N/A until 2027 | Cap at 100% if absolute TSR negative; vest based on performance | Cliff vest on 3/2/2027 |
| Phantom Units (2024 grants) | Time-based | Phantom units 40% of LTIP mix | 13,256 (3/2/2024); 3,821 (6/10/2024) | N/A | Time-based vesting | 1/3 annually 2025–2027 |
Equity Awards Granted (2024)
| Award | Grant Date | Shares (#) | Grant-Date Price ($) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares | 3/2/2024 | 7,138 | $23.44 | $172,511 | 100% on 3/2/2027, subject to performance |
| Phantom Units | 3/2/2024 | 13,256 | $23.44 | $310,721 | 33.33% on 3/2/2025, 3/2/2026, 3/2/2027 |
| Phantom Units (promotion) | 6/10/2024 | 3,821 | $24.34 | $93,003 | 33.33% on 3/2/2025, 3/2/2026, 3/2/2027 |
Compensation Summary (2024)
| Component | Amount (USD) |
|---|---|
| Salary | $329,721 |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | $576,235 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (AICP) | $119,368 |
| All Other Compensation | $357,157 (includes $18,324 retirement plan match; $1,510 life insurance; $337,323 Canadian tax equalization) |
| Total | $1,382,481 |
Governance, Policies, and Committee Oversight
- Executive compensation best practices include independent consultant, performance-based mix (≥50%), payout caps, ownership policy with 50% net-vest holding for 12 months, prohibition on hedging/pledging, double-trigger CoC benefits, and no option repricing .
- Compensation Committee members: Martin A. Lambert (Chair), Constance B. Moore, Michael Montelongo; all independent; committee recommended inclusion of CD&A in proxy .
- Say-on-pay: advisory vote proposed in 2025; board recommends “FOR” approval .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AICP tied to EBITDA and safety delivered below target in 2024 for consolidated and Canada, above for Australia; PSUs tethered to relative TSR and EBITDA growth/operating cash flow, with downside cap if absolute TSR is negative—supportive of alignment and risk control .
- Retention and selling pressure: Three-year vesting on phantom and PSUs with 12-month 50% net-vest hold requirement and hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce immediate selling pressure and signal alignment; 2024 vesting of 19,253 shares adds supply but policy constraints likely temper near-term sales .
- Change-of-control economics: 1.5x base + target bonus (double-trigger) plus equity acceleration implies moderate protection without excess; quantified CIC scenario total of ~$2.06 million suggests manageable shareholder dilution/expense impacts .
- Ownership and skin-in-the-game: Beneficial ownership is small (~0.016% calculated) but guideline-compliant holdings above target indicate progress toward alignment; absence of options and focus on PSUs/time-based units favors long-term value creation over short-term option-driven behavior .
- Execution risk: Gerry’s tenure as CFO began mid-2024; track record includes leading Canadian operations during a period of company deleveraging, cash flow generation, and capital returns. Continued performance against TSR/EBITDA targets and disciplined capital allocation will be key levers for incentive payouts and value creation .