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Peter McCann

Senior Vice President, Australia at Civeo
Executive

About Peter McCann

Peter L. McCann is Senior Vice President, Australia (age 58), serving in this role since June 2014. Previously he was Managing Director of The MAC (2012–2014), Executive General Manager, Finance at The MAC (2010–2012), and CFO of Royal Wolf Trading (2004–2010). He holds a Bachelor of Commerce in Accountancy from the University of New South Wales . Company performance metrics tied to his incentives include AICP EBITDA and safety TRIR; in 2024 Australia division EBITDA exceeded target (AUD 132.2m vs 116.2m) and Australia TRIR outperformed (0.18 vs 0.70), contributing to his 123% of target AICP payout . At the company level, cumulative TSR on a $100 base was $156 in 2024 and adjusted EBITDA was $79.9m in 2024, framing the environment for long-term awards and payouts .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Civeo – The MAC (subsidiary)Managing Director2012–2014Led subsidiary operations in Australia
Civeo – The MACExecutive General Manager, Finance2010–2012Oversaw finance for Australian operations
Royal Wolf TradingChief Financial Officer2004–2010Finance leadership and governance

Fixed Compensation

  • Base salary (USD) and AICP target | Metric | 2023 | 2024 | |---|---|---| | Base Salary (USD) | $296,865 | $329,850 | | Target AICP (% of base) | 70% | 70% |

  • All Other Compensation (2024) | Type | Amount (USD) | |---|---| | Australian Superannuation (statutory) | $18,911 |

  • Summary Compensation (multi-year) | Component (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |---|---:|---:|---:| | Salary | $312,615 | $299,070 | $313,358 | | Bonus | — | $178,133 | — | | Stock Awards (Grant-Date FV) | $501,764 | $437,718 | $498,428 | | Non-Equity Incentive (AICP) | $294,601 | $358,060 | $269,058 | | All Other Compensation | $16,972 | $18,210 | $18,911 | | Total | $1,125,952 | $1,291,191 | $1,099,755 |

Performance Compensation

  • AICP structure and 2024 results (Australia) | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | |---|---|---:|---:|---| | Consolidated AICP EBITDA (USD) | 40% | $88.6m | $81.1m | Not disclosed; contributes to total | | Australia Division EBITDA (AUD) | 40% | $116.2m | $132.2m | Not disclosed; contributes to total | | Australia TRIR (safety) | 20% | 0.70 | 0.18 | 200% (component) | | Total AICP payout (USD) | — | — | — | $269,058 (123% of target) |

  • LTIP grants and vesting (2024 awards) | Award Type | Grant Date | Quantity | Grant-Date FV (USD) | Vesting | Performance Metrics | |---|---|---:|---:|---|---| | Performance Share Award | Mar 2, 2024 | 12,525 target; 4,384 threshold; 25,050 max | $302,704 | Cliff vest Mar 2, 2027 | 70% 3-yr EBITDA growth; 30% relative TSR | | Phantom Share Units | Mar 2, 2024 | 8,350 | $195,724 | 33.33% annually on Mar 2, 2025/2026/2027 | Time-based |

  • Historic PSA payout (2012–2024 cycles) | Grant Year | Performance Period | Metrics and Weighting | Committee-Certified Payout | |---|---|---|---| | 2022 PSA | Jan 1, 2022–Dec 31, 2024 | 50% cumulative cash from operations; 50% relative TSR | 65.2% of target (CFOA 46.6%; TSR 18.6%) |

  • Stock vested (realized) during 2024 | Name | Shares Vested | Value Realized (USD) | |---|---:|---:| | Peter L. McCann | 20,082 | $451,444 |

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership | Holder | Common Shares | % of Outstanding | |---|---:|---:| | Peter L. McCann | 51,981 | 0.38% (51,981 / 13,549,417) |

  • Ownership guidelines and compliance | Executive | Target Ownership (Shares) | Current Holdings (Shares) | Compliance | |---|---:|---:|---| | Peter L. McCann | 34,413 | 86,268 | Yes |

  • Outstanding unvested awards at 12/31/2024 (market price $22.72) | Award Type | Grant | Unvested Units (#) | Market Value (USD) | |---|---|---:|---:| | Phantom Units (time-based) | Feb 25, 2022 (1/3 schedule) | 3,369 | $76,544 | | Phantom Units (time-based) | Feb 23, 2023 (1/3 schedule) | 4,199 | $95,401 | | Phantom Units (time-based) | Mar 2, 2024 (1/3 schedule) | 8,350 | $189,712 | | Performance Shares (target unearned) | Feb 25, 2022 | 10,105 | $229,586 | | Performance Shares (target unearned) | Feb 23, 2023 | 6,299 | $143,113 | | Performance Shares (target unearned) | Mar 2, 2024 | 12,525 | $284,568 |

  • Alignment policies • Company prohibits hedging and pledging by officers/directors; NEOs must hold at least 50% of net vested shares for 12 months post-vesting .

  • Options • No options outstanding; Civeo has not issued options since 2014 .

Employment Terms

  • Executive Agreement economics and protections | Provision | Outside Change-of-Control | During Change-of-Control Protection Period | |---|---|---| | Cash Severance (lump sum) | One year base salary + target annual bonus | 2x base salary + target annual bonus; 18-month protection period for McCann | | Equity Vesting | Pro-rata vest of awards vesting over 12 months post-termination | Full vest/accelerated per award terms if not assumed; PSA payout determined as of CoC date; vest/payment per program on termination following CoC | | Outplacement | Up to 15% of salary, time-limited | Up to 15% of salary, time-limited | | Health/Benefits | Not specified for McCann; Dodson/Gerry detail provided separately | Not specified for McCann; Dodson/Gerry detail provided separately | | Term/Renewal | Rolling daily auto-renew; terminates 3 years after notice of non-extension | Same | | Release Requirement | Required to execute release to receive benefits | Required | | Excise Tax Gross-up | None (only Dodson has legacy gross-up) | None (only Dodson has legacy gross-up) |

  • Quantified potential payments as of 12/31/2024 (USD; AUD items converted at $0.6597) | Scenario | Cash Severance | Stock Awards (accelerated/assumed target) | Outplacement | Total | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Not for Cause (outside CoC) | $560,745 | $417,067 | — | $977,812 | | CoC + Qualified termination (double-trigger) | $1,121,490 | $1,018,924 | $49,478 | $2,189,892 | | Death/Disability/Qualifying Retirement | — | $1,018,924 | — | $1,018,924 |

  • Retirement eligibility • As of Dec 31, 2024, only McCann was retirement-eligible among NEOs, influencing DDR treatment of equity .

Investment Implications

• Pay-for-performance alignment appears intact: McCann’s 2024 AICP paid at 123% with 200% safety factor and Australia EBITDA above target, while consolidated EBITDA was below target; LTIP PSAs are majority performance-weighted and capped on TSR if absolute TSR is negative .
• Upcoming vesting cadence can create mechanical share supply: time-based phantom units vest in equal thirds each March; 2024 PSAs cliff-vest Mar 2, 2027; 2022 PSAs vested Feb 25, 2025 at 65.2% of target—key dates to watch for potential liquidity events or withholding-related selling pressure .
• Retention risk is moderated by double-trigger CoC economics and rolling auto-renewal agreements; retirement eligibility increases optionality for DDR equity treatment but no special retention bonuses are disclosed for McCann .
• Strong alignment/low governance risk signals: meaningful share ownership with guideline compliance, prohibition on pledging/hedging, clawback/holding policies; no options or repricing and no excise tax gross-up for McCann .