Jared Oasheim
About Jared Oasheim
Jared Oasheim is Chief Financial Officer of CVRx and principal financial and accounting officer, serving as CFO since October 2020. He joined CVRx in August 2015 as VP Finance/Controller after starting his career at KPMG LLP and holding leadership roles at three emerging growth technology companies. He holds a B.S. in Accounting from the Carlson School of Management (University of Minnesota) and is a certified public accountant (inactive). As of the 2025 proxy, he is 42 years old. 2024 annual incentives for Oasheim were weighted to worldwide revenue, U.S. heart failure implants, European revenue, cash expenditures, and a corporate objective, and paid out at 43% of target, indicating a pay-for-performance framework tied to operating execution .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVRx | Chief Financial Officer | Oct 2020–present | Principal financial and accounting officer; oversight of disclosure controls and SEC reporting . |
| CVRx | VP Finance/Controller | Aug 2015–Oct 2020 | Built finance function pre/post-IPO; internal controls foundation . |
| KPMG LLP | Started career | n/d | Foundation in accounting and financial reporting . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Oasheim .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $345,000 | $380,000 | $414,000 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Plan – Structure and Payouts
| Item | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target bonus (% of salary) | 50% | 50% | 50% |
| Target award value ($) | $172,500 | $190,000 | $207,000 |
| Actual award paid ($) | $101,102 | $196,724 | $89,469 |
| Payout vs target | 59% | 104% | 43% |
| Summary Compensation Table components (for reference) | 2022: Salary $345,000; Option Awards $376,684; Non‑Equity Incentive $101,102; Total $822,786 | 2023: Salary $380,000; Option Awards $740,656; Non‑Equity Incentive $196,724; Total $1,317,380 | 2024: Salary $414,000; Option Awards $1,051,620; Non‑Equity Incentive $89,469; All Other $13,800; Total $1,568,889 |
Annual Cash Incentive – Performance Metric Weighting (Oasheim)
| Metric | FY 2022 Weight | FY 2023 Weight | FY 2024 Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Heart failure implants (U.S.) | 20% | 15% | 15% |
| Worldwide revenue | 60% | 60% | 50% |
| U.S. heart failure revenue | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| European revenue | 5% | 0% | 5% |
| Cash expenditures | 15% | 15% | 15% |
| BATwire enrollment / Corporate objective | 0% (BATwire 15%) | 10% (BATwire 10%) | 15% (Corporate objective) |
Notes: Targets and actual goal-level results are not disclosed; payout outcomes by year shown above .
Long‑Term Incentives (Options)
Policy: CVRx uses stock options as primary LTI for NEOs; standard vesting is 25% on the first anniversary of grant and 1/48 monthly thereafter. Unvested options vest upon termination without Cause or for Constructive Discharge during the first six months following a Change in Control; options also accelerate on death or disability. For grants on/after June 29, 2021, options vest if the NEO is terminated without Cause or resigns for Constructive Discharge during the “Protection Period” around a Change in Control, per equity award agreements .
Outstanding options – Oasheim (as of 12/31/2024)
| Vesting Commencement | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07/24/2020 | 11,732 | — | 3.955 | 07/23/2029 |
| 10/01/2020 | 15,163 | — | 4.350 | 09/30/2030 |
| 10/01/2020 | 6,844 | — | 4.350 | 09/30/2030 |
| 10/01/2020 | 6,781 | — | 4.350 | 09/30/2030 |
| 10/16/2020 | 37,928 | — | 4.350 | 09/30/2030 |
| 02/04/2021 | 29,077 | 1,265 | 7.119 | 02/03/2031 |
| 06/29/2021 | 32,112 | 4,588 | 18.000 | 06/28/2031 |
| 01/18/2022 | 40,979 | 15,221 | 9.080 | 01/17/2032 |
| 08/02/2022 | 11,666 | 8,334 | 9.010 | 08/01/2032 |
| 01/18/2023 | 33,541 | 36,459 | 15.220 | 01/17/2033 |
| 02/02/2024 | — | 55,000 | 24.420 | 02/01/2034 |
Grant‑date fair values (SCT) for options awarded:
- 2022: $376,684; 2023: $740,656; 2024: $1,051,620 .
Implication for selling pressure: Ongoing monthly vesting post‑first anniversary and multiple outstanding option tranches create periodic liquidity opportunities, subject to pre‑clearance and trading window restrictions under the Insider Trading Policy; hedging and pledging are prohibited, which dampens leverage‑amplified selling dynamics .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| As‑of Date | Beneficial Ownership (shares) | Percent of Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| April 9, 2024 | 206,705 | 1.0% (based on 21,595,464 shares) |
| April 7, 2025 | 280,504 | 1.1% (based on 26,056,808 shares) |
- Methodology includes shares issuable within 60 days via options/RSUs under SEC rules .
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: Company policy prohibits hedging transactions and pledging of CVRx stock, including margin accounts; this reduces alignment risk from collateral‑driven forced sales .
- Trading controls: Insider Trading Policy imposes quarterly trading windows and pre‑clearance for officers .
Employment Terms
- Employment at will; 30 days’ advance notice for terminations without Cause or for resignation/Constructive Discharge per employment agreements .
- Severance (non‑CEO NEOs, including CFO):
- Termination without Cause or for Constructive Discharge (non‑CIC): 12 months’ base salary and 12 months’ medical premium reimbursement .
- Double‑trigger CIC (Protection Period: 3 months before to 18 months after a Change in Control): 12 months’ base salary, 100% of current‑year target annual bonus, and 12 months’ medical premium reimbursement .
- Equity vesting protections:
- Stock options accelerate on death/disability; for grants on/after June 29, 2021, vest upon qualifying termination during the CIC Protection Period; certain CIC‑related terms also provide vesting if terminated without Cause or for Constructive Discharge within six months following a Change in Control (award agreements) .
- Clawbacks/tax gross‑ups: No clawback or tax gross‑up provisions were found in the excerpts reviewed; not disclosed in the cited sections .
Performance & Track Record
- Role and tenure: CFO since October 2020; VP Finance/Controller from August 2015 .
- 2024 incentive outcome: Annual cash incentive paid at 43% of target, reflecting performance versus revenue and operating KPIs selected by the Compensation Committee (worldwide revenue, U.S. HF implants, European revenue, cash expenditures, corporate objective) .
- Certifications and filings: As CFO, Oasheim provides Section 302/906 certifications in Form 10‑K/10‑Q and signs material filings and 8‑Ks, evidencing responsibility for financial reporting and controls .
Governance & Policies Relevant to Alignment
- Insider Trading Policy: Quarterly trading windows, pre‑clearance, no tipping, and compliance with Nasdaq standards .
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: Prohibits short sales, options/derivatives, collars, exchange funds designed to hedge, and pledging/margin accounts .
- Officer exculpation amendment (DGCL 102(b)(7) for officers) approved/recommended to align with director protections, supporting officer retention in a litigious environment (general governance context) .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Oasheim’s variable pay is materially linked to revenue growth and core operating KPIs; payout outcomes varied (59% in 2022, 104% in 2023, 43% in 2024), indicating a responsive incentive construct versus operating performance cycles .
- Option‑heavy LTI: High reliance on options (vs. RSUs/PSUs) increases upside alignment with shareholder value; extensive legacy low‑strike grants alongside more recent higher‑strike grants create layered optionality and potential post‑vesting liquidity events, moderated by anti‑hedging/pledging and trading window controls .
- Retention/CIC risk: Standard 12‑month severance and double‑trigger CIC protections (salary + 100% target bonus + benefits for 12 months) are market‑typical and should mitigate near‑term retention risk without excessive parachute economics; equity acceleration is limited to qualifying terminations (no single‑trigger), which is shareholder‑friendly .
- Skin‑in‑the‑game: Beneficial ownership increased from ~1.0% to ~1.1% between 2024 and 2025, supporting alignment; absence of pledging reduces downside governance risk .
Overall: Incentive mix emphasizes growth and operating discipline with variable outcomes, option‑based LTI amplifies shareholder alignment, and governance policies (anti‑pledging/hedging, double‑trigger CIC) reduce red flags. Continued monitoring of vesting cadence and any Form 4 activity is warranted for near‑term selling pressure assessment. .