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Subi Sethi

Chief Operating Officer at Clearwater Analytics Holdings
Executive

About Subi Sethi

Clearwater Analytics’ Chief Operating Officer (age 49) since April 23, 2025; previously Chief Client Officer since January 2020. Prior roles include leading end‑to‑end operations at UnitedHealth Group’s Optum Global Solutions (2014–2020) and leadership positions at Genpact (2005–2014). Education: Mathematics (Delhi University) and Advanced Management (IMT Ghaziabad) . Company performance in 2024: revenue grew 23% to $451.8M, Adjusted EBITDA grew 38% to $145.7M, and non‑GAAP gross margin/EBITDA margin expanded to 78%/32%; Net Revenue Retention reached 116% .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Clearwater AnalyticsChief Client Officer2020–Apr 2025Executive leadership of client organization; role tied to scorecard metrics such as revenue, bookings, NPS, ESS .
UnitedHealth Group – Optum Global SolutionsHead of end‑to‑end operations2014–2020Led end‑to‑end operations for a large-scale platform .
GenpactLeadership roles (Operations, Quality, Transitions, Technology)2005–2014Multi‑function leadership across Ops/Quality/Tech .

External Roles

  • No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Notable fixed/perquisite items
2023312,198 Relocation allowance $60,000 (2023) and housing $7,140; COLA subsidy $50,000 for 2023 .
2024350,000 COLA subsidy $75,000 (as long as based in Boise); included in “All Other Compensation” .

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive (Scorecard)

YearTarget ($)Actual Payout ($)Scorecard AchievementNotes
2024250,000 255,000 102% Metrics for Sethi included Revenue, Bookings, Rev from 2023 Booked‑not‑Billed, Non‑GAAP Gross Profit, Rev from 2024 Bookings, NPS, ESS; weights not disclosed .
2024 Special100,000One‑time discretionary bonus approved in 2025 for 2024 achievements .

Company scorecard targets vs actuals (informing all NEO payouts):

Metric ($M)2024 Target2024 ActualAchievement %
Revenue432.7451.8104
Adjusted EBITDA135.4145.7108
Non‑GAAP Gross Profit335.1353.5105

Equity Awards (Grants and Structure)

Grant DateTypeShares (Target)Fair Value ($)Vesting / Performance
2/28/2024PSUs125,0002,430,000Earned 0–110% each year based on 1‑yr revenue growth; 2024 growth 22.7% → 100% earn for 2024 tranche (1/3), certified Feb 19, 2025 .
2/28/2024RSUs125,0002,430,000Time‑based; 25% per year over 4 years, continued employment required .
2/20/2023PSUs200,000Same metric; earn 0–110% per year (2023–2025); 2024 tranche at 100% .
2/20/2023RSUs200,0004‑year time‑based vesting .

PSU metric and payout schedule:

  • Threshold/Target/Max (annual revenue growth): <18% = 0%; 18–<20% = 80%; 20–<23% = 100%; ≥23% = 110% .
  • 2024 revenue growth was 22.7%, so 2024 tranches of 2021/2022/2023/2024 PSUs earned at 100%; Sethi’s PSUs earned for 2024 performance: 90,100 units (across outstanding grants) .

2024 Compensation Mix (disclosed)

Component2024 Value ($)
Salary350,000
Non‑Equity Incentive (Annual Bonus)255,000
Special Bonus (2025 for 2024)100,000
Stock Awards (Grant‑date fair value)4,860,000
All Other Compensation (incl. TRA payment and COLA)339,211

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total beneficial ownership403,684 Class A shares as of April 25, 2025 (<1% of outstanding) .
Outstanding unvested RSUs (12/31/24)93,750 (2024 grant), 150,000 (2023 grant), plus legacy 35,150 and 23,433 from 2021 awards; select line items show market values at $27.52/share: $2.58M (93,750), $4.13M (150,000), $0.97M (35,150) .
Outstanding unearned PSUs (12/31/24)41,667 (2024 grant), 66,666 (2023 grant); market/payout values shown for PSU columns on certain lines: $2.52M (aggregate indicated) .
Stock options3/8/2021: 141,461 exercisable and 3,125 unexercisable at $12.40; 1/02/2020: 41,875 unexercisable at $4.40; 1/21/2020: 6,701 unexercisable at $4.40 .
2024 realizations (liquidity)Options exercised: 150,000 shares, value realized $2,481,861; Stock vested: 188,925 shares, value realized $3,800,226 .
Ownership guidelinesExecutives (other than CEO) must hold 2x base salary within 5 years; counts RSUs (vested/unvested) but not PSUs .
Pledging/hedgingAnti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policy; pre‑approval required for any pledging; short sales and derivatives prohibited; encourages 10b5‑1 plans .

Employment Terms

TopicKey terms
Employment agreementAt‑will; sets base and target bonus; provides severance protections .
Severance (no CoC)3 months of base salary (Sethi) .
Change‑in‑control (CoC)Double‑trigger equity acceleration for RSUs/PSUs if assumed/substituted and employment is terminated without cause/for good reason within 2 years post‑CoC; pre‑IPO options accelerate on CoC even without termination per IPO amendments .
Potential payments (as of 12/31/24)Termination without cause/for good reason in connection with CoC: cash $87,500; equity acceleration $13,386,455. CoC without termination: equity acceleration (options) $1,170,327 .
Restrictive covenantsNon‑compete during employment and 12 months post‑employment; non‑solicit during employment and 18 months post‑employment; perpetual confidentiality; mutual non‑disparagement (for certain NEOs incl. Sethi) .
280G/gross‑ups280G cut‑down to avoid excise tax (no gross‑ups) .
ClawbackNYSE‑compliant clawback of erroneously awarded incentive comp upon restatement .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Shift to annual equity cadence and reduced equity burn in 2024; Sethi’s 2024 grants (125k PSUs/125k RSUs) were materially smaller than 2023 (200k/200k), aligning with shareholder feedback to moderate SBC as % of revenue .
  • Performance emphasis: annual bonus tied to multi‑metric scorecard (revenue, bookings, non‑GAAP gross profit, NPS, ESS), and PSUs tied to annual revenue growth with threshold/target/max rigor; 2024 tranches paid at target (22.7% growth) .
  • Discretionary overlay: one‑time 2025 bonuses (e.g., Sethi $100k) recognizing 2024 execution; Committee indicates such discretion is limited to extraordinary circumstances .
  • Anti‑risk features: Clawback, anti‑hedging/pledging, independent consultant, stock ownership guidelines (2x salary) .

Multi‑Year Compensation (Sethi)

Metric ($)20232024
Salary312,198 350,000
Bonus (special/discretionary)99,500 100,000
Stock Awards (grant‑date fair value)7,596,000 4,860,000
Non‑Equity Incentive (annual bonus)227,250 255,000
All Other Compensation140,347 339,211
Total8,378,545 5,904,211

Ownership Snapshot (Sethi)

As of dateBeneficial shares% Outstanding (if disclosed)
Apr 25, 2025403,684<1% (denoted “*”)

Performance & Track Record (Context)

  • 2024 company outcomes underpinning incentive payouts: Revenue +23% to $451.8M; Adjusted EBITDA +38% to $145.7M; NRR 116%; non‑GAAP margin expansion .
  • 2024 scorecard targets were exceeded on revenue, Adjusted EBITDA, and non‑GAAP gross profit; Sethi’s scorecard paid at 102% .
  • 2024 PSU tranches paid at target (100%) based on 22.7% revenue growth .

Compensation Governance

  • Peer group (Dec 2023) across fintech/application software (e.g., BL, VERX, QTWO, APPF, AI, CCCS, SMAR, PCTY, etc.) informs competitive positioning .
  • Say‑on‑pay support ~92% in 2024; Committee reduced equity grants and moved toward annual cadence in response to investor feedback .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • No pledging/hedging permitted absent pre‑approval; policy prohibits short and derivative transactions .
  • Clawback policy in force; no tax gross‑ups; 280G cut‑down .
  • Related‑party TRA program resulted in a one‑time TRA bonus payment in 2024 ($255,449 for Sethi), with TRA bought out in Q4’24; no ongoing TRA bonuses post‑amendment .
  • Insider liquidity events: 2024 exercises/vestings (options 150,000; RSU/PSU 188,925) indicate potential ongoing sell‑to‑cover activity, a common withholding/tax practice; not necessarily directional selling .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High equity mix (PSUs/RSUs) with annual revenue‑growth PSUs and scorecard cash incentives ties Sethi’s pay to growth, profitability, client satisfaction (NPS) and employee health (ESS) .
  • Retention: Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs plus a low cash severance (3 months) suggests retention primarily via equity vesting, not cash protections; double‑trigger equity acceleration on CoC mitigates cliff risk in a sale scenario .
  • Selling pressure: Expect periodic share supply from scheduled RSU/PSU vesting and option exercises (notably quarterly/annual cycles); 10b5‑1 plans are encouraged by policy, which can smooth execution .
  • Governance: 92% say‑on‑pay support and reduced 2024 equity burn reflect constructive shareholder dialogue; clawback and anti‑pledging further reduce governance risk .
  • Performance linkage: With 2024 revenue and EBITDA surpassing targets, and PSU tranches paying at target, incentive realizations appear consistent with disclosed rigor and outcomes .