Anthony L. Grande
About Anthony L. Grande
Anthony L. Grande is Executive Vice President and Chief Development Officer at CoreCivic, serving in this role since July 2008; he joined the company in 2003 and previously led State Customer Relations (SVP 2007–2008; VP 2003–2007). He is 55, holds a bachelor’s degree from The American University and a master’s in education from Vanderbilt University . Company performance context during his tenure includes 2024 Adjusted EBITDA of $330.8 million and strong shareholder returns: 1-year TSR 50%, 3-year TSR 118%, 5-year TSR 33% with peer percentile ranks of 90%, 96%, and 40%, respectively . CoreCivic’s compensation approach ties meaningful at-risk pay to Adjusted EBITDA, Breakthrough Short-Term Goals, Strategic Business Goals, and multi-year performance-based RSUs modified by relative TSR .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CoreCivic | VP, State Customer Relations | 2003–2007 | Built state partner relationships driving utilization and revenue opportunities |
| CoreCivic | SVP, State Customer Relations | 2007–2008 | Led expansion of state partnerships, supporting occupancy growth |
| CoreCivic | EVP & Chief Development Officer | 2008–present | Oversees growth strategy and partner development across Safety, Community, Properties |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| State of Tennessee | Commissioner of Economic and Community Development | Prior to 2003 | Economic development experience and public-sector relationships that support CoreCivic’s government partnerships |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 543,757 | 568,617 | 585,686 |
| Restricted Stock Awards ($) | 999,996 | 1,104,994 | 1,105,000 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 559,731 | 766,928 | 948,529 |
| Change in Nonqualified Deferred Comp Earnings ($) | 21,921 | — | — |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 84,263 | 80,660 | 93,545 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 2,209,668 | 2,521,199 | 2,732,760 |
Notes:
- 2024 official base salary rate set by the Compensation Committee: $595,030 (+3% YoY) . The paid amount reflects payroll timing .
- Target annual incentive opportunity for other NEOs (including Grande) in 2024: 108% of base salary; maximum 182% .
Performance Compensation
Annual cash incentive mechanics (2024):
| Component | Weighting / Scales | Target | Actual | Payout / Modifier | Vesting | |---|---|---:|---:|---| | Adjusted EBITDA | Scaled to % of base; other NEOs: 58%–158% across min→max; target 108% | $306.75m | $330.8m | 147.2% of base (pre-modifier) | Cash | | Short-Term Goals (STGs) | 4 discrete goals; other NEOs: STG1=4%, STG2=4%, STG3=4%, STG4=12% | 4 goals | 0 goals achieved | 0% of base | Cash | | Strategic Business Goals (SBGs) | Modifier grid 0.8x–1.2x | Achieve ≥3 of 4 | Achieved 3 of 4 | 1.1x applied | Cash | | Final Annual Bonus | — | — | — | 162.0% of base (other NEOs; applied to Grande) | Cash |
Long-term incentive structure (2024 grants; vesting conditions and sizing):
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares (Target) | Threshold / Max | Fair Value Inputs | Vesting & Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance-based RSUs | 2/15/2024 | 32,887 | 16,444 / 49,331 | Monte Carlo $16.80/share | Vests in 3 annual tranches based on annual Normalized FFO; rTSR modifier vs Russell 2000; 2024 rTSR at 91st percentile → 1.2x |
| Time-based RSUs | 2/15/2024 | 38,799 | — | Close $14.24/share | Ratably over 3 years; later of anniversary or audited FS delivery |
Vesting outcomes and outstanding equity (as of 12/31/2024):
| Category | Unearned RSUs (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Performance-based RSUs – tranche set A | 44,261 | 962,234 (at $21.74) |
| Performance-based RSUs – tranche set B | 74,312 | 1,615,543 (at $21.74) |
| Performance-based RSUs – tranche set C | 80,455 | 1,749,092 (at $21.74) |
Notes:
- 2024 plan design for NEOs is a 50/50 split of performance- and time-based RSUs .
- Company “uses RSUs rather than stock options” to mitigate risk and align with long-term value creation .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and guideline compliance:
| Date | Shares Beneficially Owned | Shares Required by Guidelines | Number of Shares Held (Guideline Calc) | Compliance Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/12/2018 | 55,438 | — | — | — |
| 3/18/2019 | 75,452 | — | — | — |
| 3/16/2021 | 134,383 | — | — | — |
| 3/15/2023 | 101,170 | — | — | — |
| 3/18/2024 | 94,126 | — | — | — |
| 3/5/2025 (guidelines review) | — | 35,671 | 111,673 | In compliance; deadline 8/21/2013 |
Additional alignment and risk protections:
- No hedging or pledging permitted for executives; none engaged in such transactions .
- Executive stock ownership guidelines require holdings equal to 3x base salary divided by share price at hire/promotion, within five years; Grande exceeds required holdings as of latest review .
Employment Terms
Severance plan and change-in-control economics (Anthony L. Grande; as of 12/31/2024):
| Trigger/Event | Equity (Accelerated RSU Vesting) | Cash Severance | Insurance Benefits | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change in Control (no termination) | $4,326,869 | — | — | $4,326,869 |
| Qualifying Termination upon Change in Control | $4,326,869 | $1,779,140 (2.99x base salary) | $40,401 | $6,146,410 |
| Involuntary Termination Without Cause | — | $595,030 (1.0x base salary) | — | $595,030 |
| Death or Disability | $4,326,869 | — | $1,500,000 | $5,826,869 |
Key terms:
- Equity acceleration is single-trigger upon change in control (vests even without termination) .
- Cash severance is double-trigger (requires qualifying termination in connection with change in control) .
- Clawbacks: Board-adopted recoupment policy (Dec 2022) for fraud/illegal acts/intentional misconduct causing adverse events; may cancel unvested awards or recoup bonuses . NYSE Executive Compensation Recoupment Policy (2023) mandates recovery of erroneously awarded incentive comp after certain accounting restatements; method at Compensation Committee discretion . Section 304 SOX recovery applies to CEO/CFO after misconduct-related restatements .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Grande’s 2024 bonus scaled with Adjusted EBITDA ($330.8m actual; 147.2% of base) and was subject to a strategic modifier (+10% for 3/4 SBGs), resulting in 162% of base; no Short-Term Goals achieved, demonstrating payout sensitivity to breakthrough objectives . Multi-year PSUs vest on annual Normalized FFO with rTSR modifier (91st percentile in 2024 → 1.2x), supporting long-term value alignment .
- Retention risk vs selling pressure: Significant unearned RSUs outstanding (199,028 total across tranches for Grande; $4.33m value at $21.74) vest over time, incentivizing retention; equity accelerates on single-trigger change in control, raising potential transaction optionality . Hedging/pledging prohibited, and Grande exceeds stock ownership guidelines, reducing misalignment risk .
- Governance signals: Strong say-on-pay support (97.99%) indicates shareholder approval of plan design and pay outcomes . The company emphasizes RSUs over options and comprehensive clawbacks (Board and NYSE policies), mitigating risk and supporting pay integrity .
Monitor annual Form 4 filings for any discretionary sales around vesting dates and review upcoming proxy updates for changes to severance triggers or incentive metric stringency; current structure ties meaningful pay to EBITDA and FFO with TSR modifiers while preserving robust clawback mechanisms .