Ben Jenkins
About Ben Jenkins
Benjamin J. Jenkins is President and Chief Investment Officer of DigitalBridge (DBRG) since March 2022. He is 54, a co‑founder of Digital Bridge Holdings, former Chairman of Global Tower Partners, and previously a Senior Managing Director heading Blackstone’s Hong Kong office for 12 years. He holds a BA with honors from Stanford and an MBA with distinction from Harvard Business School . Company performance during 2024 included fee revenue growth >20%, FRE growth >30% with a 32% FRE margin, FEEUM reaching $36B, and $9B of new fee-earning equity raised, while cumulative TSR for 2024 was 62.57 and net income was $147M .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Digital Bridge Holdings | Co‑Founder; Chairman | 2013–2019 | Built digital infrastructure investment platform; acquired by DigitalBridge in July 2019 . |
| Global Tower Partners | Former Chairman | Until 2013 | Led growth at a major U.S. tower company (context: GTP acquired by AMT in 2013) . |
| The Blackstone Group | Senior Managing Director; Head of Hong Kong Office | 12 years (ending 2013) | Led 12+ private equity investments across telecom and other sectors, including GTP . |
| Saunders, Karp & Megrue | Associate | Not disclosed | Private equity investing roles . |
| Morgan Stanley | Financial Analyst | Not disclosed | Early career finance experience . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles for Jenkins are disclosed in the latest proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric (USD) | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $700,000 | $700,000 |
| Target Annual Cash Bonus | $700,000 | $700,000 |
| Actual Annual Cash Bonus Paid | $932,453 | $0 |
Notes:
- Annual cash bonuses for NEOs paid under the 2024 plan were 0% due to not meeting threshold criteria; Jenkins received no 2024 bonus .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (Corporate)
| Metric | Weight | Minimum (50% payout) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FEEUM Capital Raise (with ≥0.84% avg management fee) | 33.3% | $7,000.0M | $7,500.0M | $8,300.0M | $8,978.0M (failed fee-rate condition) | 0% |
| Run-rate FRE post Corporate G&A | 33.3% | $148.0M | $164.4M | $180.9M | $134.0M | 0% |
| Run-rate Distributable Earnings (DE) | 33.3% | $89.3M | $99.2M | $109.2M | $78.1M | 0% |
Result: Weighted payout percentage was 0%, so Jenkins’ 2024 annual bonus was $0 .
2024 Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Award Structure
| Component | Grant Form | Grant Date | Target Value (USD) | Shares/Units | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time-based | Restricted Class A Shares | 3/15/2024 | $843,750 | 44,904 | 3 annual tranches (2025–2027), continued employment |
| Performance-based | RSUs (PSUs) | 3/15/2024 | $843,750 | 22,452 target (0–200% payout) | 3-year performance (1/1/2024–12/31/2026): Cumulative DE/share with Relative TSR modifier (cap 1.0x if absolute TSR negative; overall cap 200%) |
Performance metric scales for 2024 PSUs:
- Cumulative DE/share threshold $2.14 (50%), target $2.85 (100%), max ≥$3.56 (200%) .
- Relative TSR modifier: ≤30th percentile=0.8x; 55th=1.0x; ≥80th=1.2x; capped at 1.0x if absolute TSR negative .
Historical PSU outcomes:
- 2021 PSUs and 2022 PSUs forfeited based on relative TSR versus peer group .
Pay-Mix Context, Clawback, and Practices
- Emphasis on performance: 50% of LTI is performance-based; no guaranteed bonuses; clawback policy compliant with SEC/NYSE for 3-year restatements; no hedging/pledging allowed; no tax gross‑ups on change‑of‑control; no single‑trigger cash severance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Common Share Equivalents | % of Common Share Equivalents | % of Class A Shares |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benjamin J. Jenkins | 2,511,825 | 1.33% | <1% (*) |
(*) Less than one percent as presented in the proxy .
Outstanding Unvested Equity at 12/31/2024
| Metric | Amount |
|---|---|
| Restricted Class A Shares (unvested) | 93,544 |
| PSUs (target unearned units) | 55,052 |
Restricted share vesting schedule by date:
| Vesting Date | Shares |
|---|---|
| March 15, 2025 | 41,874 |
| March 15, 2026 | 36,702 |
| March 15, 2027 | 14,968 |
PSU performance end dates (target units outstanding):
| Performance End Date | Units |
|---|---|
| March 14, 2026 | 32,600 |
| December 31, 2026 | 22,452 |
Additional alignment mechanisms:
- Executive stock ownership guideline for President: 6x base salary; all NEOs compliant or on track as of 12/31/2024 .
- Anti‑hedging/pledging policy prohibits options trading, short sales, margin holding, and pledging, except with Board approval .
- Performance fee allocations: Firm allocates 60–65% of carried interest to employees; Jenkins holds specified carry allocations ranging 3.5%–9% for DBP II and certain other funds .
Insider selling pressure indicators:
- No options outstanding or granted in 2024; vesting schedule is spread over 2025–2027 (mitigates near-term selling pressure); PSUs require 3-year performance, further deferring potential vesting .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreement Effective/Start | Initial term began March 28, 2022; 3-year term; auto-renews unless 180‑day advance non‑renewal notice . |
| Base Salary / Target Bonus / Target LTI | Not less than $700,000 base; $700,000 target bonus; $1,600,000 target annual equity awards (subject to Board review) . |
| Carried Interest Allocations | Specified allocations for DBP II and certain other funds (3.5%–9%) . |
| Severance (without cause / good reason) | Lump sum 2x (salary + average bonus), plus prior-year unpaid bonus, pro‑rata target bonus, full vesting of equity and carried interest; medical benefits for 24 months . |
| Change-of-Control | Full vesting of equity and carried interest (single-trigger for equity); cash severance is paid upon termination (double-trigger), per standard severance terms . |
| Non‑Compete / Non‑Solicit | Non‑compete for 2 years post‑termination unless terminated without cause or for good reason; standard confidentiality and non‑disparagement . |
| Golden Parachute Cutback | 280G/4999 cutback to avoid excise tax if it results in greater after‑tax benefit . |
Illustrative severance values at 12/31/2024 (proxy model):
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Equity Acceleration |
|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / for good reason | $3,059,532 | $1,055,176 (time-based equity only) |
| Change-of-control with termination | $3,059,532 | $1,055,176 |
| Change-of-control without termination | — | $1,055,176 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift to formulaic pay-for-performance: 2024 Annual Incentive Plan weighted 100% to objective financial metrics (FEEUM raise at fee rate, run-rate FRE post G&A, run-rate DE); all paid 0% due to miss—reinforces discipline and reduces guaranteed cash .
- LTI equity: 50% PSUs tied to multi‑year CDE/share with relative TSR modifier; 2021 and 2022 PSUs forfeited on relative TSR—signaling high hurdle equity and strong alignment to long‑term performance .
- No options; emphasis on RSUs and PSUs reduces risk-taking, but increases fixed equity grant exposure amid stock price volatility .
Related Party Transactions and Perks
- Performance fee allocations to executives paid by third‑party investors; escrow and clawback mechanisms apply to carried interest payments .
- Jenkins’ “All Other Compensation” for 2024 included performance fee allocation ($21,574), Wafra-related bonus allocation ($342,395), and dividends on unvested stock ($3,593) .
- No tax gross‑ups on change‑of‑control; related party transactions require Audit Committee or disinterested Board approval under policy .
Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay
- Peer group for compensation benchmarking: Ares Management, Blue Owl Capital, Carlyle Group, Cohen & Steers, Hamilton Lane, StepStone Group, TPG; unchanged for 2025 .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: >81% in favor after institutional engagement (covering ~27% of outstanding stock) .
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment: Jenkins’ cash pay restrained (no 2024 bonus), with multi‑year PSUs tied to CDE/share and relative TSR; equity ownership guidelines (6x salary) and anti‑pledging policy reduce misalignment risks .
- Retention risk moderate: Meaningful severance (2x cash) and automatic vesting on change‑of‑control for equity/carry provide retention and potential transaction alignment; non‑compete (2 years) enhances post‑departure protection .
- Trading signals: Upcoming time-based vesting tranches (2025–2027) and 2024–2026 PSUs could create periodic supply, but absence of options lowers near-term exercise-driven selling; watch FEEUM growth quality (fee rate), FRE and DE trends versus PSU hurdles .
- Performance execution: 2024 missed incentive metrics despite strong capital formation highlights the importance of fee-rate discipline and FRE/DE trajectory; analysts should track whether 2025 initiatives in digital energy and stabilized data centers drive metric achievement relevant to PSUs and future bonuses .