Allison Marino
About Allison Marino
Allison E. Marino, age 41, is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Easterly Government Properties (since January 1, 2024), and also served as Chief Accounting Officer through March 17, 2025 . She previously was Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer (August 2021–January 2024); prior roles include Vice President & Corporate Controller at Carr Properties (2020–2021), Director of Accounting at Carr Properties (2015–2020), financial reporting roles at Marriott International (2010–2015), and audit at Ernst & Young; she is a CPA and holds a BS from the University of Pittsburgh and an MBA from the University of North Carolina . DEA’s executive incentive design ties pay to Core FFO per share, adjusted net debt/annualized pro forma EBITDA, relative/absolute TSR, and occupancy, embedding pay-for-performance discipline . Company context for 2024: net income $20.6m, Core FFO $126.9m ($1.17/share), 97% portfolio leased, ~$230m acquisitions, $400m revolver executed, and $1.06/share dividends maintained .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| DEA | EVP & CFO | Jan 2024–present | Executed $400m revolver recast and $200m senior unsecured notes; streamlined accounting; maintained investment-grade rating |
| DEA | SVP & Chief Accounting Officer | Aug 2021–Jan 2024 | Led accounting, reporting, SOX/internal controls |
| DEA | Chief Accounting Officer (dual with CFO) | Jan 2024–Mar 17, 2025 | Oversaw accounting while transitioning to CFO |
| Carr Properties | VP & Corporate Controller | Feb 2020–Aug 2021 | Corporate controllership at private REIT |
| Carr Properties | Director of Accounting | 2015–2020 | Accounting leadership |
| Marriott International | Financial Reporting & Analysis (Manager/Senior Manager) | 2010–2015 | SEC/financial reporting roles |
| Ernst & Young | Real Estate practice | Early career | Assurance for real estate clients |
External Roles
No public company board service or external directorships disclosed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 335,000 | 385,000 | 425,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 12,796 | 13,735 | 14,194 |
| Total Reported Compensation ($) | 660,231 | 726,480 | 1,114,237 |
Notes: All other compensation includes 401(k) match and charitable donation-matching program contributions .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (Cash) – 2024 Design and Outcome
| Component | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | Payout of Component |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core FFO per share (fully diluted) | 50% of objective component | $1.16 | $1.17 | $1.19 | $1.17 | 100% of objective component portion |
| Adjusted Net Debt / Annualized Quarterly Pro Forma EBITDA | 50% of objective component | 7.5x | 7.4x | 7.2x | 7.1x | 200% of objective component portion |
| Individual/subjective goals (capital markets, reporting, IR, controls) | 50% of total bonus | Qualitative | Qualitative | Qualitative | Achieved | 100% of subjective portion |
| Bonus Outcome | Target ($) | Earned ($) | % of Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 Annual Cash Bonus | 300,000 | 375,000 | 125% |
2024 target ranges: Threshold $150,000; Target $300,000; Max $600,000 . Subjective criteria focused on executing capital sourcing, leading debt/equity issuances and JV activity, overseeing reporting/forecasting, communicating strategy, and maintaining controls/SEC/GAAP/SOX compliance .
Long-Term Incentives – 2024 Grants and Vesting
| Award Type | Metric/Tranche | Grant Date | Target Units (#) | Vesting/Performance Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Service-based LTIP Units | — | Jan 2, 2024 | 11,538 | Cliff vest Dec 31, 2026; accelerated on termination without cause/good reason, death/disability |
| TSR Performance LTIP Units | Absolute TSR | Jan 2, 2024 | 1,009 | 3-year performance to Dec 31, 2026 with forfeiture if Absolute TSR <4% |
| TSR Performance LTIP Units | U.S. Treasury-relative TSR | Jan 2, 2024 | 1,207 | 3-year performance; forfeiture if <3% on Treasury-relative |
| TSR Performance LTIP Units | FTSE Nareit Equity REITs relative TSR | Jan 19, 2024 | 1,107 | 3-year performance; forfeiture at ≤35th percentile |
| TSR Performance LTIP Units | FTSE Nareit Office REITs relative TSR | Jan 19, 2024 | 991 | 3-year performance; forfeiture at ≤35th percentile |
| Operational Performance LTIP Units | Average quarterly occupancy ≥94% | Jan 2, 2024 | 6,696 | 3-year performance to Dec 31, 2026; target-or-zero payout, then vest; acceleration on specified terminations |
Prior vesting: 3,621 units/shares vested in 2024 with $41,135 value realized; no option exercises and company does not grant stock options currently .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (common shares) | 11,066 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Beneficial ownership (shares+units) | 16,286 combined; less than 1% of outstanding shares+units |
| Unvested awards (12/31/24) | 23,232 not-vested stock/units; $263,916 value at $11.36 per share |
| Unearned performance awards (12/31/24) | 18,148 unearned; $206,161 value at $11.36 per share |
| Scheduled vesting (service-based LTIP) | 7,268 units vest Dec 31, 2025; 11,538 units vest Dec 31, 2026 |
| Ownership guidelines | NEOs must hold ≥2× base salary in DEA equity within 5 years; all Section 16 officers are in compliance |
| Anti-hedging/anti-pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited absent NCG Committee approval; 2025 waivers granted only to CEO and Vice Chairman; none disclosed for CFO |
Employment Terms
- No employment agreement; executives subject to restrictive covenants including non-compete and non-solicit during employment and for 12 months post-termination (California exception for Vice Chairman) .
- Severance economics are equity-focused with double-trigger acceleration on change-in-control: performance periods truncate at CoC for measurement; service-based vesting accelerates if termination without cause/for good reason within 18 months post-CoC .
- Clawback policy mandates recovery of incentive-based compensation upon material restatements, regardless of fault .
| Scenario (as of 12/31/24, $11.36/share) | Performance-Based Awards ($) | Service-Based Awards ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause/for good reason | 9,815 | 263,916 | 273,731 |
| Death/Disability | 9,815 | 263,916 | 273,731 |
| Change-in-control (no termination) | — | — | — |
| CoC + termination without cause/for good reason | 87,764 | 263,916 | 351,680 |
Other governance: CFO facilitates stockholder communications to the independent Chairman under DEA’s stockholder communications policy .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 contributions: successfully recast $400m revolver and issued $200m senior unsecured notes at attractive spreads; maintained flexible balance sheet and investment-grade rating; reduced portfolio operating costs and streamlined accounting; communicated strategy to investors .
- Company operating backdrop: 97% leased; renewals with 19.3-year weighted average term; development awards including a net-zero Flagstaff courthouse and FDA lab; acquisitions across federal, contractor, and state/local assets .
- 2024 financial outputs: net income $20.6m ($0.19/share), Core FFO $126.9m ($1.17/share), and maintained $1.06/share annual dividend .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased at-risk pay: 2024 bonus designed with higher rigor in Core FFO and leverage hurdles versus 2023; objective component achieved 100%/200% payouts, with total bonus at 125% of target reflecting performance execution .
- Long-term equity emphasizes performance: TSR units across absolute and relative benchmarks and occupancy-based operational units; forfeiture at below-threshold outcomes indicates discipline; service-based units vest in 2026 for retention .
- No tax gross-ups, no single-trigger cash severance; clawback in place; minimal perquisites, supporting shareholder-friendly posture .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Incentives tethered to Core FFO/share, leverage, TSR, and occupancy directly tie Marino’s pay to value creation and balance sheet quality, reinforcing capital discipline amid rate environments .
- Retention and potential selling pressure: Service-based LTIP units scheduled to vest on Dec 31, 2025 (7,268) and Dec 31, 2026 (11,538) may create delivery events; performance-based units vest only if three-year targets are met, moderating near-term selling pressure risk .
- Change-in-control economics: Absence of cash severance and reliance on double-trigger equity acceleration reduces golden-parachute overhang while ensuring continuity protections in strategic events .
- Governance risk: Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies and ownership guidelines (in compliance) limit misalignment and collateral-driven sales; waivers were granted to CEO/Vice Chairman only, not to CFO .