Peter D. Seymour
About Peter D. Seymour
Peter D. Seymour (age 56 as of April 1, 2025) is Chief Financial Officer of Douglas Emmett, Inc. (appointed CFO in 2019; joined DEI in 2017 as Chief Strategic Officer). He previously spent 20 years at The Walt Disney Company, serving as EVP and CFO of the Disney-ABC Television Group. He holds a B.A. from Stanford University and an M.B.A. from Stanford Graduate School of Business . Company performance inputs used by DEI’s Compensation Committee include Funds From Operations (FFO) per share, Total Shareholder Return (TSR), ESG and operating goals; in 2024 DEI delivered FFO per share of $1.71 vs a $1.67 target (rated Outperform), 1-year TSR of 34.42% (79th percentile vs peers; TSR category rated Perform), and ESG/operating goals largely rated Outperform .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Douglas Emmett, Inc. | Chief Financial Officer | 2019–present | Executive officer overseeing finance, part of NEO group measured on FFO, TSR, ESG, operating, and external activity performance goals . |
| Douglas Emmett, Inc. | Chief Strategic Officer | 2017–2019 | Joined to lead strategy before promotion to CFO . |
| The Walt Disney Company (Disney-ABC Television Group) | EVP & CFO | 20 years (prior to 2017) | Senior finance executive for major media unit; prior experience emphasized in DEI bio . |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year cash and other fixed elements from DEI’s Summary Compensation Table.
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $550,000 | $550,000 | $550,000 |
| Bonus (USD) | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| All Other Compensation (USD) | $13,000 (401(k) match, auto allowance) | $13,000 (401(k) match, auto allowance) | $13,000 (401(k) match, auto allowance) |
DEI emphasizes low perquisites relative to peers; perquisites for Seymour are limited and each was < $25,000 in 2022–2024 .
Performance Compensation
DEI pays NEO incentives predominantly in performance- and time-vested LTIP Units, granted after year-end based on goal achievement (not formulaic; significant transfer restrictions and stock-price hurdles apply) .
Annual incentive structure and 2024 outcomes (applies to NEOs, including CFO)
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual/Assessment | Payout/Notes | Vesting/Restrictions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFO per share | 20% | $1.67/share (set Feb 2024) | $1.71/share; rated Outperform | Drives LTIP award sizing at year-end based on Committee discretion | LTIP Units vest over 3 years; transfer restricted 4–7 years post-grant; subject to stock-price hurdle (2% for 2024 grants); forfeiture after 10 years if hurdle unmet . |
| Total Shareholder Return (absolute and relative) | 20% | Top-quartile relative = Outperform | 1-yr TSR 34.42% (79th percentile); 3-yr (35.70)%; 5-yr (46.88)%; TSR category rated Perform | As above | As above . |
| ESG goals | 20% | Published ESG targets (e.g., -30% GHG by 2035; 80% Energy Star) | GHG −13% vs 2019 (on track) – Outperform; 84% Energy Star – Outperform; diversity – Perform; overall ESG rated Outperform | As above | As above . |
| Operating goals | 20% | IT upgrades; low G&A/revenue; above-market leased rate | IT upgrades completed (Perform); G&A 4.6% of revenue vs 8.8% office peers – Outperform | As above | As above . |
| External business and other factors | 20% | No numeric targets; Committee judgment on acquisitions/financings/development | Committee evaluation | As above | As above . |
Equity grants and vesting (CFO-specific)
| Year | Approval Date | Grant Date | Instrument | Units Granted | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Dec 8, 2023 | Dec 27, 2023 | LTIP Units | 134,319 | $1,399,604 |
| 2024 | Dec 4, 2024 | Dec 12, 2024 | LTIP Units | 115,424 | $1,592,851 |
| 2024 Equity Vested | Units Vested | Value Realized on Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| LTIP Units (vested 12/31/2024) | 104,827 | $1,945,589 (based on $18.56 close 12/31/2024) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 66,193 shares/OP units; “less than 1%” of class as of record date (Apr 1, 2025) . Outstanding shares: 167,446,350 . |
| Unvested LTIP Units (12/31/2024) | 184,996 units; market value $3,433,526 at $18.56/share . |
| Scheduled vesting of unvested LTIPs | 93,705 (12/31/2025); 62,435 (12/31/2026); 28,856 (12/31/2027) . |
| Post-vesting restrictions | Vested units subject to a stock-price performance hurdle and a four-year lockout before eligible for redemption . |
| Stock-price hurdle and duration | Transfer restricted for 4–7 years post-grant; 2024 grants require future stock price >102% of grant price; 100% forfeiture after 10 years if unmet . |
| Ownership guidelines | Executive officers must hold equity ≥3x salary within five years; all executives were in compliance as of record date . |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging discouraged and allowed only with Audit Committee approval; trading pre-clearance required and blackout periods apply . |
Insider selling pressure appears mitigated near term by multi-year vesting, a four-year lockout on vested LTIPs, and stock-price hurdles before liquidity, which together defer monetization even after vesting .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Peter D. Seymour (CFO) |
|---|---|
| Appointment and background | Appointed CFO in 2019; joined DEI in 2017 as Chief Strategic Officer; prior 20 years at Disney-ABC Television Group (EVP & CFO) . |
| Employment agreement | No individual severance or employment agreement disclosed for Seymour (CEO/COO only have employment agreements) . |
| Severance (without cause/for good reason) | None contractually for Seymour; CEO/COO receive 3x average compensation and 3 years medical/dental—applies to them only . |
| Change-of-control (CIC) | No single-trigger. Following a CIC, same treatment as above if terminated without cause/for good reason; unvested equity accelerates only if the class into which it converts is no longer publicly traded. Estimated CIC acceleration value at 12/31/2024: $3.4 million for Seymour . No 280G gross-up . |
| Death/disability | Immediate vesting of equity scheduled to vest in year of termination. Estimated value at 12/31/2024: $1.9 million for Seymour. No additional medical benefits for Seymour (CEO/COO only) . |
| Clawback | NYSE/SEC-compliant clawback adopted Dec 1, 2023; recovers excess incentive-based pay upon restatements; discretionary recoupment for fraud/willful misconduct . |
| Related-party transactions | Seymour and spouse lease an apartment from DEI at market terms; determined not financially material under SEC/NYSE standards . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift toward equity-heavy incentives: For non-CEO/COO NEOs, ~71–74% of 2024 compensation was contingent restricted equity (LTIP Units) based on performance, with strict multi-year transfer restrictions and stock-price hurdles—indicating a high at-risk, long-dated pay mix .
- No stock options; no repricing: DEI historically does not grant options to NEOs and prohibits option repricing, reducing asymmetry risk from underwater options .
- Formula-light, discretion-heavy design: Committee balances quantitative and qualitative outcomes across five goal categories; prevents gaming but adds subjectivity risk in payouts .
- Peer benchmarking: Compensation benchmark group centers on California-focused office/multifamily REITs; DLR was replaced by JBGS to maintain comparability .
Compensation & Ownership Tables (CFO)
Summary Compensation Table (Seymour)
| Year | Salary | Bonus | Stock Awards (Grant-Date FV) | All Other Comp | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $550,000 | $0 | $1,399,634 | $13,000 | $1,962,634 |
| 2023 | $550,000 | $0 | $1,399,604 | $13,000 | $1,962,604 |
| 2024 | $550,000 | $0 | $1,592,851 | $13,000 | $2,155,851 |
Outstanding and Vested Equity (Seymour)
| Date/Metric | Units | Valuation |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested LTIPs (12/31/2024) | 184,996 | $3,433,526 at $18.56 close |
| Scheduled vesting | 93,705 (12/31/2025); 62,435 (12/31/2026); 28,856 (12/31/2027) | — |
| 2024 LTIPs vested | 104,827 | $1,945,589 at $18.56 close |
Beneficial Ownership (as of Apr 1, 2025)
| Holder | Shares/OP Units | % of Class |
|---|---|---|
| Peter D. Seymour | 66,193 | <1% |
| Shares outstanding | 167,446,350 | — |
Performance & Track Record Indicators
- 2024 performance metrics underpinning pay: FFO per share $1.71 vs $1.67 target (Outperform); 1-year TSR +34.42% (79th percentile), but 3-year and 5-year TSR negative; ESG targets largely Outperform; operating G&A/revenue among best-in-class .
- Pay versus performance context: Company-reported Pay vs Performance table shows FFO of $345.5 million and net income of $7.6 million for 2024 (vs FFO $377.3 million and net loss $75.8 million in 2023), framing 2024 improvement in GAAP earnings and committee’s emphasis on FFO as the primary financial measure for NEO pay .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
- Alexandria (ARE), Apartment Income REIT (AIRC/AIV historical), Boston Properties (BXP), Empire State (ESRT), Hudson Pacific (HPP), JBG Smith (JBGS), Kilroy (KRC), Paramount (PGRE), Piedmont (PDM), SL Green (SLG), UDR (UDR), Vornado (VNO). DLR was replaced by JBGS in 2021 to improve comparability .
Risk Indicators & Governance
- Clawback compliant with SEC/NYSE; hedging prohibited; pledging restricted case-by-case; no single-trigger CIC; no tax gross-ups; no evergreen contracts; low perquisites .
- Related-party transaction disclosed (CFO apartment lease) deemed not financially material under SEC/NYSE standards .
- Equity award timing: committee approves awards in early December, grants later in December based on then-current stock price; 2024 grant priced at $19.71 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Seymour’s pay is predominantly long-dated LTIP Units with three-year vesting, four-year post-vesting lockups, and stock-price hurdles, which tightly align with shareholders and create “golden handcuffs” that limit near-term selling pressure and support retention through 2027+ .
- Downside protection to shareholders: No options, no repricing, no single-trigger CIC, and no tax gross-ups reflect shareholder-friendly design; clawback provides post hoc protection .
- Performance sensitivity: Committee discretion across five goal categories permits balanced evaluation; 2024 results (FFO beat, strong 1-yr TSR but weak 3–5 yr TSR) were reflected with continued equity-heavy awards to NEOs including Seymour .
- Severance risk asymmetry: Unlike CEO/COO, Seymour has no contractual severance, which reduces parachute risk but could modestly elevate external poaching risk; however, large unvested/locked LTIP equity and ownership guidelines mitigate near-term departure incentive .