Joseph Esposito
Chief Accounting Officer at DNUT
Executive
About Joseph Esposito
Joseph J. Esposito, age 41, was appointed Chief Accounting Officer and principal accounting officer of Krispy Kreme (DNUT) effective September 15, 2025; he previously served as Vice President, Global Tax (April 2023–September 2025) and Senior Director, Global Tax (December 2020–April 2023), and earlier was an International Tax Director at PwC (2011–2020); he is a CPA (NC and SC) and holds a Master of Accountancy and B.S. in Business Administration from the University of South Carolina . Company performance context during FY2024: net revenue $1.7B with 5% organic revenue growth, net income $3.8M (benefit from Insomnia Cookies divestiture), and Adjusted EBITDA $193.5M; the pay-versus-performance table shows 2024 TSR value of a $100 initial investment at $57.53 versus $130.68 for the S&P Consumer Discretionary sector .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Krispy Kreme, Inc. | Chief Accounting Officer (principal accounting officer) | Sep 2025–present | Oversees accounting and reporting as principal accounting officer |
| Krispy Kreme, Inc. | VP, Global Tax | Apr 2023–Sep 2025 | Led corporate tax function and global tax planning |
| Krispy Kreme, Inc. | Senior Director, Global Tax | Dec 2020–Apr 2023 | Senior leadership in global tax |
| PwC | International Tax Director and prior corporate tax consulting roles | Sep 2011–Dec 2020 | Advised multinational clients on international tax structuring and compliance |
External Roles
- No current public-company board roles or director committee positions disclosed for Esposito .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Value/Rate | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | $300,000 | Annual base compensation effective with CAO appointment |
| Target annual bonus | 45% of base salary | Eligible under AIP; maximum payout = 200% of target |
| Annual LTI target | $200,000 (FY2026) | Annual grants generally 50% RSUs, 50% PSUs; RSUs vest at 3 years; PSUs vest after 3-year performance period |
| One-time stock options | 40,000 options | Vest at 3 years; 6-year term; grant at appointment; strike price not disclosed |
| One-time RSUs | 20,000 RSUs | Vest 100% at 2 years from grant |
| One-time PSUs | 20,000 PSUs | Performance period 2026–2028; goals to be set early 2026 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (company design reference)
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Plan factor at threshold/target/max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue Growth | 4.0% | 6.1% | 10.0% | 75% / 100% / 120% |
| Adjusted EBITDA Growth | 4.0% | 8.9% | 14.0% | 75% / 100% / 152% |
| Free Cash Flow | $7.5M | $15.0M | $35.0M | 90% / 100% / 110% |
| Total payout (multiplicative) | — | — | — | 50% / 100% / 200% overall cap |
- Notes: AIP required EBITDA at least at threshold for any payout in 2024; no AIP awards paid for 2024 company performance; Esposito will have AIP metrics set annually by the committee going forward .
PSUs design (company standard)
| Metric | Weighting | Performance period | Vesting mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 60% | 3-year (e.g., 2024–2026 for 2024 grants) | 0–200% of target; linear interpolation; certified post-period |
| Net Leverage Ratio (Net Debt/Adj. EBITDA) | 20% | Same | As above |
| Landfill food waste reduction | 20% | Same | As above |
- Esposito’s one-time PSUs will have goals set in early 2026 for the 2026–2028 performance period .
Vesting schedules and potential selling pressure
| Award | Quantity | Vesting dates | Potential supply overhang |
|---|---|---|---|
| One-time RSUs | 20,000 | 100% at 2nd anniversary of grant | Single large vest → potential sell pressure near vest date |
| Annual RSUs (FY2026 target) | Value-based | 100% at 3rd anniversary | One-time 3-year cliff vest structure |
| One-time PSUs | 20,000 | End of 2028 (subject to goal certification) | Event risk at certification; settlement could add supply |
| One-time options | 40,000 | 3rd anniversary; 6-year term | Exercise/hold decisions tied to moneyness; no value if out of the money |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | DNUT policy/practice | Esposito status |
|---|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | 6× salary CEO; 3× salary for other executive officers; 5-year phase-in; counts unvested RSUs and earned PSUs; excludes unearned PSUs/options | Not disclosed in the appointment filing |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers; no margining or pledging allowed | Must comply; no pledging disclosed |
| Clawback | SEC/Nasdaq-compliant clawback adopted Oct 2023; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive comp upon restatement (3-year lookback) | Applies to his incentive compensation |
| Beneficial ownership | — | Not disclosed as of appointment; not in April 2025 proxy table |
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Effective date | Appointed principal accounting officer effective September 15, 2025 |
| Indemnification | Expected to enter into DNUT’s standard form of indemnification agreement |
| Related-party transactions | None reportable under Item 404(a); no family relationships with directors/executives |
| Change-in-control treatment | Omnibus Plan awards carry double-trigger vesting (accelerate only if both a change-in-control occurs and termination without cause/for good reason within 24 months, or if awards are not assumed/substituted) |
| Insider trading policy | Prohibits trading on MNPI; bans hedging, short sales, margining/pledging of company stock by directors/executives |
| Perquisites/gross-ups | DNUT states minimal perquisites; no excise tax gross-ups; relocation gross-ups only selectively provided to executives (company-wide policy) |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Equity-heavy structure (options, RSUs, PSUs) with three-year performance cycles and double-trigger protections ties compensation to long-term results and capital structure health (ROIC, leverage), reinforcing pay-for-performance and retention .
- Retention and vesting overhang: A single 20k RSU cliff vest at two years and option vesting at three years create discrete windows of potential selling pressure; PSUs settle post-2028 certification, adding event-driven supply considerations .
- Governance and risk controls: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging and a robust clawback reduce misalignment and risk-taking; standard indemnification is typical for financial reporting leadership roles .
- Execution risk context: 2025 saw finance leadership transitions (CFO change in July 2025), elevating the importance of a strong principal accounting function during strategy execution and reporting transformation .
- Compensation leverage: Annual AIP design (Net Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA, FCF) and PSUs historically emphasize profitable growth and cash discipline, supporting investor confidence in the financial guardrails shaping executive decisions .