Nicola Steele
Chief Operating Officer at DNUT
Executive
About Nicola Steele
Nicola J. Steele, age 38, was appointed Chief Operating Officer (principal operating officer) of Krispy Kreme, Inc. effective March 3, 2025; she holds a B.Sc. in Psychology from Swinburne University of Technology . She rose through Krispy Kreme Australia/New Zealand operations since 2006, serving as Retail Director (2019–2022), COO (2022–2023), and President/Director of the ANZ subsidiaries (2023–2025) before her global COO role . For context on performance alignment, the company reported FY2024 net revenue of $1.7B, organic revenue growth of 5%, Net Income of $3.8M, and Adjusted EBITDA of $193.5M; company TSR since IPO implied a $100 investment ended FY2024 at $57.53, reflecting share underperformance vs the S&P Consumer Discretionary sector over that period .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Krispy Kreme Holdings PTY Ltd.; Krispy Kreme Australia PTY Ltd.; Krispy Kreme New Zealand Limited | President and Director | Sep 2023 – Mar 2025 | Not disclosed in filings |
| Krispy Kreme Australia/New Zealand | Chief Operating Officer | Mar 2022 – Aug 2023 | Not disclosed in filings |
| Krispy Kreme Australia/New Zealand | Retail Director | Jan 2019 – Feb 2022 | Not disclosed in filings |
| Krispy Kreme Australia/New Zealand | Progressive store and operations management roles | Oct 2006 – 2018 | Not disclosed in filings |
External Roles
None disclosed in company filings for Nicola Steele .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of Base) | Maximum Bonus Opportunity | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 400,000 | 70% | 200% of base salary | Eligible for FY2025 LTI at target $400,000 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (company framework and recent outcome)
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Payout Factor at Threshold/Target/Maximum | FY2024 Actual Result | FY2024 Payout Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue Growth (YoY) | 4.0% | 6.1% | 10.0% | 75% / 100% / 120% | Above threshold | 0% (see EBITDA gate) |
| Adjusted EBITDA Growth (YoY) | 4.0% | 8.9% | 14.0% | 75% / 100% / 152% | Below threshold | 0% (below-threshold EBITDA blocks payout) |
| Free Cash Flow ($) | $7.5M | $15.0M | $35.0M | 90% / 100% / 110% | Below threshold | 0% |
- Steele’s 2025 AIP metrics/targets were not disclosed at appointment; company-wide 2024 plan is shown for pay-for-performance context .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI)
| Grant/Program | Grant Date | Vehicle | Target Value | Vesting/Performance | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 Annual LTI (COO) | 2025 (not specified) | 50% RSUs / 50% PSUs | $400,000 | RSUs: 100% cliff on 3rd anniversary; PSUs: vest at end of 3-year performance period (goals to be set in award) | Not disclosed for 2025 PSU at appointment |
| One-time RSU (COO sign-on/retention) | Apr 10, 2025 | RSUs | $400,000 | 100% cliff vest on Apr 10, 2028 | N/A (time-based) |
| Company PSU design (for 2024 grants to NEOs) | Apr 11, 2024 | PSUs | N/A | 3-year performance period (2024–2026); 0–200% payout | 60% ROIC; 20% Net Leverage Ratio; 20% landfill food waste reduction |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Policy/Status |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | 3x base salary for executive officers; 5-year phase-in from becoming an exec officer |
| Shares counted toward guideline | Includes unvested RSUs and earned performance shares; excludes unearned PSUs and unexercised options |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers (no hedging, short sales, margining or pledging Company stock) |
| Clawback | SEC-compliant policy: recover erroneously awarded incentive compensation for 3 completed fiscal years preceding a required accounting restatement |
| Change-in-control vesting | Double-trigger: vesting only if (i) CoC and qualifying termination within 24 months, or (ii) awards not assumed/substituted at CoC |
| Steele beneficial ownership | Not disclosed in the April 10, 2025 beneficial ownership table (Steele not listed individually) |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | No individual employment agreement disclosed for Steele; company standard is generally no exec agreements other than CEO |
| Severance (company practice for non-CEO NEOs) | Lump-sum ≈12 months base salary plus ~12 months COBRA subsidy upon involuntary termination without cause (illustrated for listed NEOs); no excise tax gross-ups |
| Change-in-control treatment | Double-trigger equity vesting as described above |
| Relocation assistance | Provided in connection with appointment |
| Clawback and insider trading | Company-wide clawback and anti-hedging/anti-pledging apply to Steele |
Note: Severance specifics for Steele were not individually disclosed; table reflects company practices disclosed for NEOs and global policies .
Investment Implications
- Near-term selling pressure should be limited: Steele’s RSU awards vest 100% after three years (one-time RSU vests on Apr 10, 2028), creating retention alignment and deferring liquidity until 2028 .
- Pay-for-performance rigor: The AIP includes a hard EBITDA growth gate; in FY2024, EBITDA and FCF fell below threshold, resulting in zero payout for the plan year, signaling discipline in cash bonus payouts .
- Alignment and risk controls: Executives face 3x-salary ownership guidelines with a five-year phase-in, are prohibited from hedging/pledging, and are subject to an SEC-compliant clawback—all supportive of investor alignment and risk mitigation .
- Change-in-control terms are shareholder-friendly: Double-trigger equity vesting reduces windfall risk, while still providing executive retention in strategic scenarios .
- Monitoring points: Watch for the sizing and performance metrics of Steele’s 2025 PSU award once granted, Form 4 filings for any subsequent equity transactions, and 2025–2026 AIP metric stringency to gauge future cash incentive outcomes .